State v. Waldie, 20732

• Decision Date: 10 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 20732,20732
• Citation: 893 P.2d 811,126 Idaho 864
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Debra Lee WALDIE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 811

893 P.2d 811

126 Idaho 864

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Debra Lee WALDIE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20732.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

March 10, 1995.

Petition for Review Denied May 11, 1995.

Bruce H. Greene, Sandpoint, for appellant.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Douglas A. Werth, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent. Douglas A. Werth argued.

LANSING, Judge.

Debra Lee Waldie pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence, I.C. §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(3). She reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence that she contends was the product of her illegal detention by a patrol officer. We affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence.

I. FACTS

The circumstances leading to Waldie's arrest were described as follows at a hearing on the motion to suppress. On May 17, 1992, at approximately 11:30 p.m., a patrol officer observed a vehicle ahead of him which, according to his testimony, was "driving at an inconsistent speed and shifting from side to side in it's own lane." Waldie was the driver of the vehicle. As the officer followed for a short distance, the speed of Waldie's automobile varied between thirty-five and fifty miles per hour on a road where the posted speed limit was fifty-five miles per hour. Soon after the officer began his observation, Waldie's vehicle turned into a field and came to a stop. The vehicle's lights were then turned off. The officer stopped nearby but stayed on the shoulder of the road, and turned on the blue and red overhead lights of his patrol car "as basically a safety factor."

While the officer was still in his automobile, using his radio to request a records check of the vehicle's license plate number, Waldie exited her automobile and walked to the patrol car. She told the officer that she had just finished her work shift and had stopped to rest after becoming fatigued but that she was okay. The officer then detected an odor of alcohol and noticed that Waldie's eyes were glassy. When asked if she had been drinking, Waldie admitted to the officer that she had consumed a couple of beers. The officer then asked Waldie to take a breath test on a portable alco-sensor. Waldie complied, and the test result indicated a blood alcohol concentration of .172. Waldie was then arrested.

Waldie filed a motion to "suppress all the evidence gathered herein on the grounds that the warrantless stop of the Defendant and her vehicle was lacking in adequate cause...." Although Waldie stopped her vehicle voluntarily and without any compulsion by the patrolman, she contended that she was seized thereafter when the patrolman activated the overhead lights on his patrol car. She argued that this seizure was violative of the Fourth Amendment because the officer's observations at that point did not justify a reasonable suspicion that Waldie was engaged in criminal conduct.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court held there had been no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a traffic stop because no violation of the law had been observed by the officer. The court also concluded, however, that Waldie's constitutional rights were not violated because Waldie had not been seized by the officer when she stopped her vehicle and then walked to the patrol car. Waldie's motion to suppress was, accordingly, denied.

Waldie thereafter entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony driving under the influence, I.C. §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(3), reserving her right to appeal the district court's denial of the motion to suppress.

II. ANALYSIS

The disposition of motions to suppress evidence for violation of constitutional rights present mixed questions of fact and law. Here, the facts material to the issues raised on appeal are not in dispute. Therefore, we exercise free review in determining whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts presented. State v. Jordan, 122 Idaho 771, 772, 839 P.2d 38, 39 (Ct.App.1992); State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 321, 824 P.2d 894, 896 (Ct.App.1991).

Waldie does not dispute that the officer had probable cause to arrest her for DUI once he detected the odor of alcohol on her breath and administered the breath test. However, Waldie contends the evidence which supported the arrest must be suppressed because it was the product of an unconstitutional seizure that occurred earlier when the officer brought his car to a stop near Waldie's vehicle and activated the overhead red and blue lights.

A person is "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that she was not free to leave. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); State v. Jordan, 122 Idaho 771, 773, 839 P.2d 38, 40 (Ct.App.1992); State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 524, 826 P.2d 481, 485 (Ct.App.1991). Waldie maintains that she was seized by activation of the patrol car's emergency lights because by terms of I.C. § 49-625, drivers must yield to emergency vehicles operating emergency flashing lights, and under I.C. §§ 49-1404 and 18-705, she would have been guilty of a misdemeanor if she had attempted to drive away after the officer turned on his overhead lights.

The State counters that: (1) the activation of the patrol car's overhead lights did not constitute a seizure, and thus the Fourth Amendment was not implicated, and (2) even if there was a seizure it was justified based upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We find it unnecessary to determine whether activation of the patrol car's emergency lights was a show of authority that effectuated a seizure, for assuming that Waldie was "seized" at that time, such seizure was justified based upon the information then known to the officer.

Whenever a police officer approaches an individual and restrains his or her freedom to leave, even briefly, the officer has "seized" that person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 819, 748 P.2d 401, 403 (1988). However, such a seizure which falls short of a formal arrest is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution if it is reasonable. Terry, supra; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578-79, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).

The purpose of the Fourth Amendment's strictures is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government agents, and thereby safeguard the citizenry's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-80:

In order to assess the reasonableness of [a...