State v. Walker
| Decision Date | 03 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. COA11–1093.,COA11–1093. |
| Citation | 723 S.E.2d 173 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Joshua Wray WALKER. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 April 2011 by Judge Richard D. Boner in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 2012.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Tina Lloyd Hlabse, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel R. Pollitt, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant Joshua Wray Walker appeals from a judgment sentencing him to a term of 96 to 125 months imprisonment based upon his convictions for second degree kidnapping and having attained habitual felon status. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss the second degree kidnapping charge for insufficiency of the evidence; (2) instructing the jury on a theory of guilt that lacked adequate evidentiary support; (3) failing to instruct the jury concerning the issue of Defendant's guilt of the lesser included offense of false imprisonment; (4) improperly expressing an opinion concerning the validity of the habitual felon allegation; and (5) admitting inadmissible and irrelevant evidence concerning Defendant's prior convictions for felonious breaking or entering and possession of a firearm by a felon during the habitual felon proceeding. After careful consideration of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that none of Defendant's arguments have merit and that the trial court's judgments should remain undisturbed.
Defendant and the victim, Dela Crump, had been involved in a romantic relationship for approximately fifteen years before parting company in 2008. After their separation, Ms. Crump obtained a domestic violence protection order against Defendant.
On 13 July 2010, Ms. Crump was at her residence along with her three children and one of the children's friends. Between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., Defendant telephoned Ms. Crump for the purpose of requesting to borrow ten dollars to utilize in purchasing cigarettes. Subsequently, Ms. Crump telephoned her sister, Crystal Crump, and asked her to come over. A while later, Crystal Crump and her boyfriend, Shannon White, arrived at Ms. Crump's residence with plans to spend the night.
Later that evening, while they were sitting on the front porch, Crystal Crump and Mr. White observed Defendant walking towards Ms. Crump's residence. Crystal Crump and Mr. White went back inside and told Ms. Crump what they had seen. Although Ms. Crump watched Defendant repeatedly ring the doorbell and knock on the door of her home, she did not answer the door or speak to Defendant. Instead, Ms. Crump telephoned the police and went to the magistrate's office for the purpose of reporting Defendant's violation of the domestic violence protection order.
Ms. Crump returned to her residence around 3:00 a.m. and fell asleep on the living room couch. At that point, Crystal Crump and Mr. White were asleep in Ms. Crump's bedroom. At approximately 5:20 a.m., Defendant broke into the residence. Ms. Crump became hysterical when she saw Defendant, jumped from the couch, and ran to her bedroom. Defendant followed Ms. Crump, grabbed her by the arms, and threw her onto the bed where Crystal Crump and Mr. White were sleeping. Defendant asked Ms. Crump, “[w]hy are you trying to get me locked up now?” and “[w]hy are you trying to take out papers on me now?” Defendant then attacked Mr. White.
At that point, Crystal Crump ran to the kitchen and called 911, while Ms. Crump exited the bedroom, grabbed her keys and cellphone, and attempted to unlock an exterior door. As Ms. Crump tried to leave the residence, Defendant placed her in a headlock and dragged her through the living room, dining room and kitchen into the bedroom, where he threw her onto the bed a second time, placed his hands around her neck, and asked her “who are you f––––g?” According to Ms. Crump, Defendant “had pressure with both hands on my neck shaking me back and forth” and, while she could still breathe, she could not speak.
Ms. Crump estimated that she was on the bed with Defendant for five to six seconds. As a result of the fact that Crystal Crump was screaming at Defendant to stop, Defendant told Crystal Crump that he “ought to jump on you, you stupid b–––h,” and that he would beat Crystal Crump if she did not shut up. Upon seeing his children, Defendant removed his hands from Ms. Crump's neck. Ms. Crump later testified that, when Defendant stopped, “it was like he had just raised up like he was raging through whoever [was] next.”
Although Defendant left the bedroom, he returned shortly thereafter and attempted to shut the door. Crystal Crump prevented Defendant from completely closing the door by wedging her foot into the doorway. At that point, Defendant stated that
At the time that the responding officers arrived at the residence, they went to the bedroom, where they found Defendant sitting on the bed and Ms. Crump standing on the far side of the bed. As the officers led Defendant away, he indicated that all he wanted to do was talk to Ms. Crump. In response, Ms. Crump stated, “you sure picked a fine time now[,] didn't you?” Although Defendant lunged at Ms. Crump, he was forcefully restrained by the officers. After the conclusion of this incident, Ms. Crump had bruises on her neck and arms. However, Ms. Crump did not seek medical treatment for her injuries.
On 15 July 2010, a warrant for arrest was issued charging Defendant with second degree kidnapping. On 9 August 2010 and 15 November 2010, the Cleveland County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with first degree burglary, assault by strangulation, second degree kidnapping, and having attained habitual felon status. The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 11 April 2011 criminal session of the Cleveland County Superior Court. On 13 April 2011, the jury returned verdicts finding Defendant guilty of second degree kidnapping and not guilty of first degree burglary and assault by strangulation. After the jury convicted Defendant of second degree kidnapping, the habitual felon charge was heard before the trial court and a jury. At the conclusion of the habitual felon proceeding, the jury returned a verdict finding that Defendant had attained habitual felon status. Based upon the jury's verdicts, the trial court entered a judgment sentencing Defendant to a term of 96 to 125 months imprisonment. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's judgment.
In his first challenge to the trial court's judgment, Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the second degree kidnapping charge because the evidence was insufficient to show that his purpose in restraining or removing Ms. Crump was to facilitate the commission of an assault by strangulation or to terrorize her. Defendant's argument lacks merit.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, this Court determines “whether [the State presented] substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) that [the] defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.” State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (citations omitted). In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a dismissal motion, we scrutinize the record “in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences,” State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 161, 604 S.E.2d 886, 904 (2004), cert. denied,546 U.S. 830, 126 S.Ct. 47, 163 L.Ed.2d 79 (2005), and consider the defendant's evidence “insofar as it merely explains or clarifies or is not inconsistent with the [S]tate's evidence.” State v. McCoy, 303 N.C. 1, 23–24, 277 S.E.2d 515, 531 (1981) (citation omitted). State v. Pigott, 331 N.C. 199, 211, 415 S.E.2d 555, 562 (1992). “If the evidence presented is circumstantial, ‘the question for the court is whether a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.’ “ State v. Thomas, 296 N.C. 236, 244, 250 S.E.2d 204, 209 (1978) (quoting State v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 358, 139 S.E.2d 661, 665 (1965)). We review a trial court's decision to deny a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence de novo. State v. Smith, 186 N.C.App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007).
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–39 provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove from one place to another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person ... shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or removal is for the purpose of:
....
(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person following the commission of a felony; or
(3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person so confined, restrained or removed or any other person.
....
(b) .... If the person kidnapped was released in a safe place by the defendant and had not been seriously injured or sexually assaulted, the offense is kidnapping in the second degree and is punishable as a Class E felony.
As a result, in...
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