State v. Walker

• Decision Date: 08 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-1047,83-1047
• Citation: 444 So.2d 1137
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Carolyn WALKER, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1137

444 So.2d 1137

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Carolyn WALKER, Appellee.

No. 83-1047.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Second District.

Feb. 8, 1984.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Peggy A. Quince, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

Robert E. Jagger, Public Defender, and Robert J. Lancaster, Asst. Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellee.

GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.

This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to section 893.13(2)(a)7, Florida Statutes (1981), which requires that a lawfully dispensed controlled substance must be kept in the container in which it was originally delivered. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A) and section 26.012(1), Florida Statutes (1981).

The facts are not in dispute. On the morning of June 30, 1982, appellee Carolyn A. Walker was preparing to leave for work. She took two tablets of Centrax, a controlled substance, from an original container which she had lawfully obtained from an authorized person. She wrapped the tablets in a paper napkin and placed the napkin in her purse, intending to consume the tablets during the day as specified by her prescription. On her way to work she was involved in a traffic accident. Subsequently she was detained for a driver's license violation and her purse was searched. The Centrax tablets were then discovered. She was charged with a violation of section 893.13(2)(a)7, a first degree misdemeanor, which provides as follows:

(2)(a) It is unlawful for any person:

....

7. To possess a controlled substance lawfully dispensed to him by a pharmacist or practitioner, in a container other than that in which the controlled substance was originally delivered.

In county court Ms. Walker filed a motion to dismiss the information, arguing that section 893.13(2)(a)7 was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and violated the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. In a well-reasoned order the court granted her motion, holding that the section was unconstitutional on the grounds of substantive due process and equal protection. The state appeals.

In reaching its decision, the court relied on claims of equal protection and substantive due process. Since the test is essentially the same where no fundamental rights are at stake, United Yacht Brokers v. Gillespie, 377 So.2d 668 (Fla.1979), we prefer to focus on the latter argument. Under a substantive due process analysis, legislation is examined to determine whether it unreasonably and unjustifiably transgresses the fundamental restrictions on the power of government to intrude upon individual rights and liberties. If irrational legislative means have been adopted to realize the given legislative goals, then a constitutional violation exists. Patch Enterprises v. McCall, 447 F.Supp. 1075 (M.D.Fla.1978). As Judge Scott reasoned in Patch:

The basic test of substantive due process is whether the state can justify the infringement of its legislative activity upon personal rights and liberties. So long as the legislative activity does not encroach upon constitutional guarantees, or run afoul of federal statutory law, a state has a broad scope of discretion in which to regulate the conduct of its citizens.... It need only be shown that the challenged legislative activity is not arbitrary or unreasonable.... Courts will not be concerned with whether the particular legislation in question is the most prudent choice, or is a perfect panacea, to cure the ill or achieve the interest intended.... If there is a legitimate state interest which the legislation aims to effect, and if the legislation is a reasonably related means to achieve the intended end, it will be upheld.... Nevertheless, despite a state's wide discretion, and the cautious restraint of the courts, there remain basic restrictions and limits on a state's legislative power to intrude upon individual rights, liberties, and conduct. To exceed those bounds without rational justification is to collide with the Due Process Clause.

447 F.Supp. at 1081, 1081 (citations omitted).

The Florida Supreme Court has framed the issue as whether a statute bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive. Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla.1974). Since the basic principle of substantive due process is to protect the individual from an abusive exercise of governmental powers, this court has held that legislation must not arbitrarily state that actions which are inherently and generally innocent shall constitute criminal offenses. City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck, 114 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959).

In Simmons v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 407 So.2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA), aff'd, 412 So.2d 357 (Fla.1982), our sister court struck that portion of section 550.241, Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), which prohibited the racing of an animal injected with a drug or "any substance foreign to the natural horse or dog." The court acknowledged the proper exercise of the state's police power for the valid legislative objectives of preserving the integrity of the sport of racing and protecting the health of the animals. The issue then became whether an absolute ban on the use of drugs, medication, and any other substance foreign to the animal was a reasonable means to attain those objectives. The court ruled that that section of the statute banning any foreign substance resulted in prohibiting the use of all substances, helpful and harmful, beneficial and detrimental. When weighed against the legislative reasons for the statute, the section lacked a rational basis to the objectives. See also Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Association v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 397 So.2d 692 (Fla.1981).

Our task is first to examine the legislative goals of chapter 893, Florida's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, and then to determine whether the means chosen, that is section 893.13(2)(a)7, bears a reasonable relationship to any of those objectives. According to the preamble of chapter 73-331, Laws of Florida, the legislative objectives of chapter 893 are: (1) eliminate the confusion resulting from the existence of two statutory chapters on drug abuse by combining both into one chapter; (2) create uniformity between federal and state drug laws; and (3) expand the exercise of the state's authority over the manufacture and distribution of dangerous drugs. As found by the court below, these are "reasonable and worthwhile objectives." We also agree with the trial court's determination that only the third objective, that of expanded state control over the manufacture and distribution of dangerous drugs, is a legitimate legislative objective to which section 893.13(2)(a)7 could be rationally related. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). On this point, the court below stated: "[O]utlawing possession of drugs secured in a fashion sanctioned by state law has nothing to do with the prevention of unlawful manufacture,...