State v. Wallace

• Decision Date: 08 September 1942
• Citation: 131 P.2d 222,170 Or. 60
• Parties: STATE <I>v.</I> WALLACE
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

170 Or. 60

131 P.2d 222

STATEv.

WALLACE

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued June 17, 1942.

Reargued September 8, 1942.

Affirmed November 10, 1942.

Rehearing denied December 22, 1942.

Criminal law

1. The statute requiring notice of intention to introduce evidence of insanity has no direct bearing on a case in which the state introduces evidence sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of insanity and to require an instruction thereon.

Criminal law

2. In first degree murder prosecution, statements of district attorney, in opening statement and on argument of a motion in absence of jury, regarding defendant's conduct was not "evidence" and if unsupported by evidence would not require submission of insanity defense to jury.

Criminal law

3. Where insanity issue is properly before the court, evidence regarding any and all conduct of defendant and relevant circumstances surrounding such conduct are admissible on the issue of insanity and the only exclusionary rule must be based on the power of court in its discretion to exclude remote evidence in order to confine the trial within reasonable limits.

Criminal law

4. In criminal case, insanity is an "affirmative defense" which must be proved by defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

Criminal law

5. Under "right and wrong test" if, at the time of committing an act, the party was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know the nature and quality thereof, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong, he should not be held responsible under the criminal law.

Criminal law

6. The law will not punish a man for an act which is the result of or produced by, mental weakness, but it will punish him for an unlawful act, not the result of, or produced or influenced by mental disease, even though some mental unsoundness is shown to have existed.

Criminal law

7. The "irresistible impulse doctrine" has been rejected and that type of mental derangement does not relieve the actor from responsibility.

Criminal law

8. Mental incapacity produced by voluntary immediate intoxication and existing only temporarily at the time of the commission of the criminal act is no defense even though such intoxication produced mental derangement.

Criminal law

9. The "right and wrong test" for determining criminal responsibility applies to cases of alleged insanity through alcoholism as fully as to alleged insanity of other types.

Criminal law

10. The mental effects of mere voluntary intoxication may not excuse commission of unlawful act but if excessive and long-continued use of intoxicants produces a mental condition of insanity, permanent or intermittent, which insane condition exists when an unlawful act is committed, such insane mental condition may be of such nature as to relieve the person so affected from the consequences of the act that would otherwise be criminal.

Criminal law

11. "Mania a potu" means insanity resulting as a secondary effect produced by excessive and protracted indulgence in intoxicating liquors in which the patient becomes a madman fully deprived of reason while the fit is upon him but mere evidence of voluntary immediate intoxication is not evidence of mania a potu.

Homicide

12. In first degree murder prosecution, where state introduced evidence concerning specific acts of defendant which would have been admissible in support of an insanity defense but the evidence was not presented by state to show insanity but for other purposes and it was confined to specific instances of depraved or abnormal conduct by defendant on the very day of the crime, and all of that conduct was explainable on either theory of insanity or theory of intoxication, and there was no evidence to support the first theory, the state's evidence did not require submission of insanity as a defense to the jury.

Criminal law

13. Where a defendant is afforded the opportunity by statute to raise the question of his irresponsibility by reason of insanity at time act was committed but chooses not to do so and interposes only a general plea of not guilty, he can not under such plea claim irresponsibility by reason of insanity and demand an acquittal by reason thereof.

Criminal law

14. The criminal statute requiring notice of intention to present insanity defense is valid.

Criminal law

15. Under statute authorizing trial court, in its discretion, to permit introduction of evidence regarding insanity by defendant who failed to file notice of intention to introduce such evidence, if just cause for failure to file notice has been made to appear, a defendant does not sufficiently show just cause when he merely shows by counsel's unsworn statement that counsel did not know of certain specific language used by the defendant and disclosed by the state.

Criminal law

16. The statute requiring defendant to file notice of intention to introduce evidence of insanity applies to cases in which the defendant intends to show insanity as a defense and also to cases in which insanity is to be used not as a defense but to reduce the degree of the crime or to mitigate the punishment.

Criminal law

17. The statute requiring notice of intention to produce evidence of insanity for defensive purpose of reduction of degree of crime or mitigation of punishment is valid.

Criminal law

18. In first degree murder prosecution, where defendant did not file notice of intention to introduce evidence of insanity, but the state introduced evidence of specific instances of depraved or abnormal conduct of defendant on day of crime, of which instances defendant's counsel had no prior knowledge, denial of defendant's motion for leave to file the required notice was not an abuse of discretion.

Jury

19. Where insanity is to be an issue both parties have right to examine jurors concerning their attitude on insanity defense.

Criminal law

20. The statute requiring notice of intention to produce evidence of insanity as a defense or for the defensive purpose of reduction of degree of crime or mitigation of punishment is in complete harmony with modern doctrine in entire procedural field which is to require frank disclosure of issues and evidence and to avoid surprise and chicanery.

Homicide

21. In first degree murder prosecution, instruction on issue of intoxication was proper.

Homicide

22. In first degree murder prosecution, mental condition of defendant, so far as it was effected by voluntary intoxication, was properly to be considered.

Criminal law

23. On appeal from conviction for first degree murder, supreme court was not authorized to determine the penalty which should be imposed but was authorized only to determine if error was committed at the trial and if the fundamental principles which underlie all judicial procedure were respected.

KELLY, C.J., and BELT and RAND, JJ., dissenting.

                  See 15 Am. Jur. 12
                  22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 436
                

Before KELLY, Chief Justice, and BELT, BAILEY, LUSK, RAND, ROSSMAN and BRAND, Associate Justices.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.

ALFRED P. DOBSON, Judge.

The defendant, William E. Wallace, was convicted of murder in the first degree. From the ensuing judgment and sentence of death he appeals.

AFFIRMED. REHEARING DENIED.

Leroy L. Lomax, of Portland, for appellant.

Clarence A. Potts, Deputy District Attorney, and James R. Bain, District Attorney, both of Portland, for respondent.

BRAND, J.

On the 8th day of August, 1941, defendant fatally shot Benjamin H. Finkell. To the charge of murder in the first degree the defendant entered a plea of not guilty.

The Oregon statute provides:

"All matters of fact tending to establish a defense to the charge in the indictment or information, other than those specified in the third subdivision of section 26-841, and except as herein provided, may be given in evidence under the plea of not guilty; provided, however, that where the defendant pleads not guilty and purposes to show in evidence that he was insane or mentally defective at the time of the alleged commission of the act charged, he shall, at the time he pleads, file a written notice of his purpose; and provided further, that the defendant may file such notice at any time thereafter but before trial when just cause for failure to file the same at the time of making his plea shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court. If the defendant fails to file any such notice he shall not be entitled to introduce evidence for the establishment of such insanity or mental defect; provided, however, that the court may, in its discretion, permit such evidence to be introduced where just cause for failure to file the notice has been made to appear." O.C.L.A. 26-846.

The provision concerning notice of insanity was added in the year 1937 and has, until now, received no construction by this court.

The defendant did not, at any time before trial, file or seek permission to file any notice of purpose to show in evidence that he was insane or mentally defective at the time of the alleged commission of the act charged.

Upon this appeal, the defendant presents two assignments of error. The first is as follows:

"Upon the opening statement to the jury by James R. Bain, District Attorney, it appeared affirmatively and conclusively that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. That upon conclusion of the District Attorney's opening statement, counsel for the defendant moved the court to allow the defendant to add to his plea of Not Guilty, a plea of insanity as an excuse for his acts, which motion was over ruled by the Court and an exception taken to the Court's ruling and duly allowed by the Court. That the Court erred in over ruling the defendant's motion and the Court's act constituted an abuse of the Court's discretion."

The second assignment of error is as follows:

"That during the trial of the State's case, numerous...