State v. Wallace
| Decision Date | 26 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1414, Sept. Term, 2019,1414, Sept. Term, 2019 |
| Citation | 236 A.3d 735,247 Md.App. 349 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Charles Edward WALLACE |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: Virginia S. Hovermill (Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Argued by: Michael T. Torres (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Berger, Wells, James P. Salmon (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
A jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found appellee, Charles Wallace, guilty of attempted second-degree murder, first- and second-degree assault, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, possession of a regulated firearm after previously having been convicted of a crime of violence, and reckless endangerment.1 The court thereafter sentenced Wallace to a term of thirty years’ imprisonment for attempted second-degree murder, a consecutive term of twenty years’ imprisonment (the first five without the possibility of parole) for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and a concurrent term of five years’ imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, for possession of a regulated firearm after previously having been convicted of a crime of violence, merging the remaining convictions for sentencing purposes. Wallace noted a direct appeal,2 and, in an unreported opinion, a panel of this Court affirmed his convictions. Wallace v. State , Sept. Term, 2012, No. 557 (filed July 11, 2013) ("Wallace I ").
Wallace subsequently filed a petition, under the Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, seeking vacatur of his convictions. In his petition, Wallace alleged that his trial counsel had been ineffective in three ways: first, in failing to object to an erroneous jury instruction for attempted second-degree murder; second, in conceding the admissibility of "other crimes" evidence which, purportedly, was inadmissible; and third, in failing to object to the trial court's erroneous and prejudicial statements to the jury, when explaining the firearm possession offense, that Wallace previously had been convicted of a crime of violence. Following a hearing, the postconviction court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting Wallace's petition and awarding him a new trial.
The State filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The State then filed an application for leave to appeal.3 Although the State conceded that trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to object to the erroneous attempted second-degree murder jury instruction, it contended that Wallace was entitled only to vacatur of that conviction and that the postconviction court erred in granting a new trial as to all outstanding charges. An applications panel of this Court granted the State's application and transferred the case to the regular appellate docket.
In this appeal, the State raises two issues, which we have re-phrased:
For the reasons that follow, we vacate the postconviction court's order and remand with instructions to vacate the attempted second-degree murder conviction but otherwise deny the postconviction petition. Given our resolution of this appeal, we need not and shall not address the second issue.
We quote our unreported opinion in Wallace's direct appeal for factual context:
Wallace I , slip op. at 2-3.
A ten-count indictment subsequently was returned, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, charging Wallace with attempted murder in the first-degree, attempted murder in the second-degree, assault in the first-degree, assault in the second-degree, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a regulated firearm after previously having been convicted of a crime of violence, possession of a regulated firearm after previously having been convicted of a disqualifying crime, and reckless endangerment.
A jury trial ensued. In addition to the victim's testimony, a shirt worn by Wallace on the night of the shooting was admitted into evidence; forensic testing disclosed the presence of gunshot residue on that shirt. Wallace I , slip op. at 16-22. Ultimately, eight counts of the indictment were presented to the jury,4 and Wallace was acquitted of attempted first-degree murder but convicted of the remaining offenses.
To provide context for our analysis, we set forth the postconviction court's rulings, both in its original memorandum opinion and its amended order.
In its memorandum opinion, the postconviction court determined that trial counsel's failure to object to the concededly erroneous attempted second-degree murder jury instruction constituted deficient performance which caused prejudice to Wallace. In a footnote elsewhere in its opinion, it further declared, without explanation, that the proper remedy for that ineffective assistance was a new trial on all charges.
As for trial counsel's concession that purportedly inadmissible "other bad acts" evidence was admissible, the postconviction court, in its memorandum opinion, found that, although the evidence was inadmissible, trial counsel's concession could be deemed trial strategy, and it declined to find deficient performance. As for trial counsel's failure to object to the trial court's statements, informing the jury that Wallace previously had been convicted of a "crime of violence," the postconviction court found deficient performance but no prejudice "solely based on this particular deficient performance."
The postconviction court then proceeded to address whether the cumulative effect of all trial counsel's errors was sufficient to result in ineffective assistance.5 The postconviction court declared that the "combination of the three allegations" raised in Wallace's petition amounted to deficient performance, that prejudice had ensued, and that Wallace was entitled to a new trial.
In response to the State's motion for reconsideration, the postconviction court issued an amended order. The amended order not only denied the State's motion for reconsideration, it further declared, among other things, "that the Memorandum Opinion entered June 13, 2019 shall be clarified to reflect the Court's finding that trial counsel's failure to object to the prior bad acts evidence was an error and amounts to deficient performance;" and "that the Memorandum Opinion entered June 13, 2019 shall be clarified to reflect the Court's finding that the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors clearly resulted in denial of effective assistance of counsel[.]"
Additional facts will be recited where pertinent to the issues.
"The ultimate question of whether counsel was ineffective ‘is a mixed question of law and fact.’ " State v. Thaniel , 238 Md. App. 343, 359-60, 192 A.3d 804 (quoting Newton v. State , 455 Md. 341, 352, 168 A.3d 1 (2017) ), cert. denied , 462 Md. 93, 198 A.3d 223 (2018), cert. denied , 587 U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2027, 204 L.Ed.2d 229 (2019). "We defer to the factual findings of the postconviction court unless clearly erroneous, but we review its ultimate legal conclusions without deference, re-weighing the facts in light of the law to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred." Id. at 360, 192 A.3d 804 (citation and quotation omitted) (cleaned up).
Legal Standards Governing Ineffective Assistance Claims
"The right to the effective assistance of trial counsel is grounded in the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ). An ineffective assistance claim consists of two elements: deficient performance and prejudice. Newton , 455 Md. at 355, 168 A.3d 1 (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). A postconviction petitioner bears the burden of proof. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
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