State v. Waltz

• Decision Date: 15 August 1952
• Docket Number: No. 35564,35564
• Citation: 237 Minn. 409,54 N.W.2d 791
• Parties: STATE v. WALTZ.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 791

54 N.W.2d 791

237 Minn. 409

STATE v. WALTZ.

No. 35564.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 15, 1952.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where the evidence, as in the case at bar, is competent and sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, it is for the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to find the facts, and draw inferences in the light of all the evidence, and its verdict must stand.

2. Where there is both direct and circumstantial evidence, it is not error, in the absence of a request, to omit jury instructions as to circumstantial evidence.

3. Where there is both direct and circumstantial evidence, a request for an instruction which is incorrect as applied to the facts of the case may properly be denied.

4. Instructions to a jury on the law of circumstantial evidence are given solely to guide the jury in its evaluation of Inculpatory circumstantial evidence and have no application to Exculpatory circumstantial evidence, which the jury--in determining whether defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt--must consider and evaluate wholly free of the restrictive limitations governing the use of inculpatory evidence.

John S. McGrath, St. Paul, Donald Chapman, Minneapolis, for appellant.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., James F. Lynch, County Atty., St. Paul, Richard B. Ryan, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.

MATSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction of defendant for assault in the second degree. ^* The information charged that defendant made an assault on one Arthur F. Porter with a weapon (a knife) likely to produce grievous bodily harm and that defendant wounded Porter with the knife.

On July 29, 1950, about 1:25 a.m., Rita Mary Buhl and her friend Margaret M. Pickhartz met defendant at Seven Corners in St. Paul. Margaret was engaged to marry defendant. Shortly thereafter they met and fell into a conversation with Lawrence Everson, who had been visiting drinking places the same evening. The four of them went to Everson's home in his car. Everson left the other three at his home, saying that he had an arrangement to meet someone, and returned shortly thereafter with Arthur F. Porter and Violet E. Nelson.

The men drank some beer and some of the party sang. Before very long Everson allegedly made coarse advances toward Rita, though Everson denies this, and at this point Rita, Margaret, and defendant decided to leave. Witnesses testified that defendant asked Everson to drive them home but that Everson refused. A heated argument ensued.

Defendant and the two women left and went to the sidewalk beyond a fence in front of the Everson home. Everson came out into the yard on the other side of the fence--either right behind them or shortly afterward--and the argument relative to the request to drive them home continued. It was then between 2 and 2:30 in the morning. While the argument was going on, Porter came out as peacemaker.

Porter testified that he walked up close to defendant (but with the fence between them) and That defendant struck him in the shoulder with a knife. Everson testified that Porter said to him that defendant had a knife but that he, Everson, saw only a shiny object in defendant's hand and that he did not know what it was. Porter was cut in the upper arm.

It was denied that defendant struck Porter with a knife and defendant attempted to show (1) that he had no knife and (2) that Porter was cut by a piece of glass.

As to the question of whether defendant had a knife, Margaret testified that when Everson was talking with the group at Seven Corners defendant jokingly said that he did not have enough money to buy food at a restaurant, whereupon she, Margaret (also in jest), proceeded to search him. She said that she found no knife. Rita corroborated this testimony. Margaret said that Everson was present at the time of the search, but Everson testified that no search took place in his presence. Margaret also testified that defendant was wearing a jeweled ring on his finger, the inference being that this was the shiny object which Everson saw.

On the question of whether Porter was cut by a piece of glass, Everson testified that when Porter told him that defendant had a knife he, Everson, ran into the house and got a beer bottle which he threw at defendant. He said that the bottle did not hit defendant but flew across the street and broke against the curb. Margaret and Rita, on the other hand, testified that the beer bottle hit the fence and broke, and Margaret said that there was glass by the fence. The defense urges that it was this glass which cut Porter.

A police officer testified, however, that he searched for glass shortly afterward and that he did not find any glass anywhere along the fence, but that he did find glass, apparently from a beer bottle, in the yard and gutter across the street.

The testimony of two doctors who examined Porter after he was hurt is in conflict. Dr. William P. Mulvaney, the police surgeon, testified that he could not be sure that Porter was the man brought in, but that a man about his age was brought in. He said that the man had a wound just a little above his left elbow; that it was a jagged laceration about one-half a centimeter in extent, a V-shaped laceration; and that he believed it was caused by glass rather than by a knife. A police officer, on the other hand, testified that Dr. Mulvaney said that the wound could have been caused by either a knife or glass. Dr. John Howard Allen, an intern at Ancker hospital who treated Porter, said that the wound was in the upper part of the left arm; that it was about three-quarters of an inch long, approximately one inch deep, cleanly incised, and not jagged; that there was no evidence of any foreign matter in the wound; and that, while he could not state exactly what type of instrument had produced the wound, it must have been at least one inch long, three-quarters of an inch wide or less, and quite sharp.

At the close of all of the evidence, the trial court gave some instructions to the jury relative to the law of circumstantial evidence and refused to give other instructions as requested by defendant. The jury found defendant guilty.

The issues on appeal are three:

(1) Does the evidence sustain the verdict?

(2) Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence as requested by defendant?

(3) Did the trial court err in the instructions which it gave relative to circumstantial evidence?

1. The evidence is in conflict. Where, however, the evidence is competent and sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, it is for the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to find the facts, and draw inferences in the light of all the evidence, and its verdict must stand. ¹ The evidence in the case at bar is sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict as to defendant's guilt.

2--3. Defendant requested the court to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence as follows:

'You are instructed that the State in this case is relying upon what is known as circumstantial evidence * * *.'

Where there is both direct and circumstantial evidence, it is not error, in the absence of a request, to omit jury instructions as to circumstantial evidence. State v. Colcord, 170 Minn. 504, 212 N.W. 894. And, see, Annotation, 89 A.L.R. 1379. Likewise, where there is both direct and circumstantial evidence, a request for an instruction which is incorrect as applied to the facts of the case may properly be denied. Stated v. Bailey, 235 Minn. 204, 50 N.W.2d 272.

In the case at bar, the proposed instruction states that the prosecution's case was based on circumstantial evidence. The record shows that the prosecution's case was based on the direct testimony of Porter that defendant committed the crime charged, although there was corroborative inculpatory circumstantial evidence. This being so, the requested instruction was properly denied. See, People v. Lapara, 181 Cal. 66, 70, 183 P. 545, 546--547.

4. The trial court in its instructions to the jury directed the jury To consider all the circumstances surrounding and connected with the case. The following paragraph, however, was also included:

'During the course of your examination as prospective jurors, you were questioned by counsel regarding the rule of circumstantial evidence * * *. The Court is giving you no instruction regarding circumstantial evidence, because All of the evidence upon which the State relies in this case is direct evidence, and circumstantial evidence is not involved. * * * Therefore, You will dismiss from your mind any consideration regarding the law of circumstantial evidence * * *.' (Italics supplied.)

It is defendant's contention that this instruction was prejudicial, because the Defense was based on circumstantial evidence and the trial court told the jury to disregard the law of circumstantial evidence. This contention is erroneous, because (1) the trial court's instruction taken as a whole specifically directed the jury to take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding and connected with the case; (2) the trial court made it clear in directing the jury to disregard the law of circumstantial evidence that it had reference only to inculpatory evidence; and (3) instructions for the evaluation of circumstantial evidence in a criminal case by their very nature and purpose are applicable only to inculpatory evidence.

It is to be noted that the trial court in giving its instructions above quoted carefully pointed out that no instruction as to circumstantial evidence was being given, because all the evidence On which the state relied was Direct evidence. This made it clear to the jury that the trial court, in directing that no consideration be given to the law of circumstantial evidence, referred only to evidence on which the prosecution relied for conviction. Furthermore, in charging the jury to disregard the...