State v. Warren
| Decision Date | 30 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 49961,No. 3,49961,3 |
| Citation | 133 Ga.App. 793,213 S.E.2d 53 |
| Parties | The STATE v. Fannie WARREN |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Donald W. Huskins, Eatonton, for appellant.
Eva L. Sloan, Milledgeville, for appellee.
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Robert S. Stubbs, II, Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., John W. Dunsmore, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for amicus curiae.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
On the call of her case for arraignment for the offense of murder on July 15, 1974 the defendant, by her counsel, pleaded not guilty, waived formal arraignment, and demanded a list of the state's witnesses and a copy of the indictment. The district attorney acknowledged the oral demand, but requested an informal, written demand for his files to remind him to provide the list.
On the call of the case for trial on July 18, 1974, both sides announced ready, the jury was sworn, and the district attorney called the names of the state's witnesses to be sworn and inquired as to whether defense counsel had not witnesses she wanted to call. Defense counsel objected that she had not been given a list of the state's witnesses, for which she had made an alleged written demand. The district attorney replied that to his knowledge he hadn't received any written demand, but that he couldn't say that she had not given it to him. A written demand, dated July 15, 1974, appears in the record of the case.
The trial judge granted a '10-minute' recess in order for the state to give the defendant a list of the witnesses and a copy of the indictment. Thereafter, both sides called their witnesses and had them sworn. Defense counsel then moved that the state not be allowed to use any of its witnesses it had sworn, because she had not been given a list of them until the case had been announced ready, the jury struck, and the trial started. The trial judge ruled that the defendant had not waived her right to a copy of the indictment and a list of the witnesses, sustained her motion, then announced that he would entertain a motion in the case. The defendant moved for a directed verdict of not guilty, which the judge granted, and then discharged the defendant and the jury. The judge then wrote out in longhand the following order: 'On motion of the attorney for the defendant for a verdict of not guilty due to the fact that a list of witnesses was not furnished to the defendant or her attorney after demand before arraignment said motion is sustained and said motion is granted.' This order was dated and signed by the judge.
The state appeals. The defendant moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the same is beyond the scope of Code Ann. § 6-1001a (Ga.L.1973, pp. 297, 298), which provides: (Emphasis supplied.) Held:
Obviously, paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) of Code Ann. § 6-1001a do not apply to the factual situation before us. Assuming that the directed verdict of not guilty (acquittal) was 'an order, decision or judgment sustaining a plea or motion in bar' under subsection (c) of § 6-1001a above, has the defendant been put in jeopardy? State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317(1), 206 S.E.2d 475, 477.
Code Ann. § 26-507(a)(1) (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1267) provides: 'A prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly prosecuted for the same crime, based upon the same material facts, if such former prosecution . . . resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal; . . .' This court, in Marchman v. State, 132 Ga.App. 677, 681, 209 S.E.2d 88, 91, quoted from the committee notes to § 26-507, supra, as follows: '(F)urther proceedings in a case are permissible and do not constitute a bar unless the proceedings at one time resulted in an adjudication that the accused was not guilty.' (Emphasis supplied.) In Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 324, 326, 206 S.E.2d 481, the Supreme Court held that jeopardy had attached prior to the mistrial, when the jury was sworn and impaneled. (But see White v. State, 230 Ga. 327, 340, 196 S.E.2d 849.) Although Jones, supra, was based on two cases decided prior to the 1968...
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Prater v. State
...236 Ga. 1, 2, 222 S.E.2d 354 (1976); Williams v. The State, 185 Ga.App. 633, 634, 365 S.E.2d 491 (1988). 14. State v. Warren, 133 Ga.App. 793, 213 S.E.2d 53 (1975). 15. Id.; Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 247 S.E.2d 92 16. OCGA § 16-1-8(d). 17. OCGA § 16-1-8; Bethay v. The State, 235 Ga. ......
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State v. Brown
...v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 443 S.E.2d 474 (1994) ; State v. Fly, 193 Ga.App. 190, 191(2), 387 S.E.2d 347 (1989) ; State v. Warren, 133 Ga.App. 793, 795–796, 213 S.E.2d 53 (1975). See also State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33(2), 728 S.E.2d 171 (2012) (“The State does not have the right to appeal dec......
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State v. Vansant
...verdict based on an insufficiency of the evidence to support the charge is not generally appealable by the State. See State v. Warren, 133 Ga.App. 793, 213 S.E.2d 53 (1975); see also State v. Fly, 193 Ga.App. 190, 387 S.E.2d 347 (1989). An exception exists where, as here, the trial court di......
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...that the defendant can be protected by some other form of relief. See Favors v. State, 234 Ga. 80(1), 214 S.E.2d 645; State v. Warren, 133 Ga.App. 793, 796, 213 S.E.2d 53. Relief for such violations of the statute may be achieved by motions for mistrial or continuance, as the trial judge su......