State v. Warren, 5D14–1266.
| Decision Date | 10 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 5D14–1266.,5D14–1266. |
| Citation | 168 So.3d 337 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Bret Thomas WARREN, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
168 So.3d 337
STATE of Florida, Appellant
v.
Bret Thomas WARREN, Appellee.
No. 5D14–1266.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 10, 2015.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Thomas J. Lukashow, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Opinion
BERGER, J.
The State of Florida appeals the trial court's order forever discharging Bret Warren for the crimes of burglary and theft based on a speedy trial violation. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191. The State argues the trial court erred in concluding that the charges involved the same conduct and criminal episode as a prior arrest that occurred more than 175 days before the information was filed. We agree and reverse.
On April 8, 2013, Orlando Police Officer James Strawn, was flagged down by a custodian at the University of Central Florida (UCF) Education Complex regarding a suspicious person. While investigating, Officer Strawn observed Warren on the second floor of the education building. He ordered Warren to sit down, told Warren he was under arrest, and placed him in handcuffs. Officer Strawn removed the cuffs after he told Warren he would not file charges if Warren provided his real name and the reason he was in the building.1 According to Officer Strawn, he told Warren he would arrest him for loitering and prowling if he could not confirm his name. At this point in time, Warren was not free to leave. Officer Strawn indicated he wanted to verify Warren's identity and make sure he did not have any outstanding warrants. At some point thereafter, Warren provided his correct information and gave Officer Strawn permission to search his backpack.2 He was released and given a trespass warning after Officer Strawn verified his identity and confirmed that there were no warrants for his arrest. Warren was not allowed to drive home, however, because he had a suspended driver's license.
While waiting for Warren's truck to be towed, Officer Strawn inquired about a trinket found inside Warren's backpack. Warren told Officer Strawn he got the trinket for his girlfriend. Officer Strawn did not know whether the trinket was stolen, but, suspecting it had been, told Warren that if it was stolen and he returned it, Warren would not be charged with theft.
After several minutes, Warren approached Officer Strawn, who was speaking with another officer, and confessed to stealing the trinket. Warren also told Officer Strawn that he had other stolen items in his truck. After the two went through Warren's truck and separated out the stolen items, Warren led Officer Strawn through the education building to room 220, which was unlocked. Warren indicated he took the property from room 220. Prior to entering room 220, they tried the door to room 205, but it was locked. Warren did not indicate that any items were taken from room 205. He was allowed to leave.
On June 7, 2013, Officer Strawn and a detective reviewed surveillance video of room 205. The video revealed Warren using a yellow rag to open desk drawers. Police later learned that some of the items stolen from room 205 were recovered on April 8, 2013, during Officer Strawn's initial encounter with Warren. Two of those items, a banking deposit book and a voice recorder, were identified by the victim, Eric Brewington, as having been stolen
from room 205. Thereafter, an arrest warrant was issued. Warren was arrested pursuant to the warrant on July 18, 2013.
On October 8, 2013, the State filed an information charging Warren with a single count of burglary and a single count of theft, alleged to have occurred over a three day timespan, encompassing both rooms and multiple victims. Specifically, the information alleged in Count 1 (Burglary) that between April 7 and April 10, 2013, Warren “in violation of Florida Statutes 810.02(1)(b) 1. [sic] and 810.02(4)(a), enter[ed] into a structure, located in the vicinity of 4000 Central Florida Boulevard, Education Building ... with the intent to commit an offense therein, at a time said premises were not open to the public, nor was the defendant licensed or invited to enter.” As to Count 2 (Petit Theft),3 the information alleged that between April 7 and April 10, 2013, Warren “did, in violation of Florida Statute 812.014(3)(c), knowingly obtain or use, or endeavor to obtain or use the property of another, to-wit: jewelry or a trinket or office supplies, of a value of less than [$300]....” The information identifies the victims as UCF or Laurence Jaffe or Eric Brewington.
On March 14, 2014, Warren filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. In his motion, Warren alleged that he was arrested for the offenses charged in the information on April 8, 2013 and that the State's failure to charge him within the 175–day speedy trial period entitled him to discharge. After a hearing, the trial court agreed, concluding:
But nonetheless, I—for purposes of this case, the court's going to find that the arrest—the arrest occurred on April 8th, because I find the defendant's testimony to be more credible and straightforward than that of the officer.
So my ruling is based on the candor, credibility and testimony of both the officer and the defendant in this matter. The court will find that the clock began to tick on April the 8th.
This appeal followed.
Florida's speedy trial rule requires the State to bring a defendant to trial within a specified time from the date the defendant is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode that gave rise to the crime charged. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d) ; State v. Williams, 791 So.2d 1088, 1091 (Fla.2001) (citing Genden v. Fuller, 648 So.2d 1183, 1184–85 (Fla.1994) ); State v. Pelham, 99 So.3d 599, 601 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (en banc) (citing Williams, 791 So.2d at 1091 ). Custody begins when a person is either arrested or served with a notice to appear in lieu of physical arrest. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d). The rule is a “procedural protection and, except for the right to due process under the rule, does not reach constitutional dimension.” State v. Bivona, 496 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla.1986) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521–25, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) ). Its purpose is to “ ‘promote the efficient operation of the court system and to act as a stimulus to prosecutors to bring defendants to trial as soon as practicable, thus minimizing the hardships placed upon accused persons awaiting trial.’ ” State v. Agee, 622 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1993) (quoting Lewis v. State, 357 So.2d 725, 727 (Fla.1978) ). In Florida, the speedy trial rule requires the State to bring a defendant to trial on a felony within 175 days where the defendant has not demanded a speedy trial. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a)(1).
It is well settled that the State may not circumvent the purpose and intent of the speedy trial rule by taking no action after the defendant is arrested and waiting until after the speedy trial period has expired to file formal charges. See Willi...
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