State v. Waters

• Decision Date: 02 August 2022
• Docket Number: AC 44342
• Citation: 214 Conn.App. 294,280 A.3d 601
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Rodney WATERS
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

214 Conn.App. 294

280 A.3d 601

STATE of Connecticut

v.Rodney WATERS

AC 44342

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 11, 2022

Officially released August 2, 2022

James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, with whom was Juan Carlos Leal, certified legal intern, for the appellant (defendant).

Nathan J. Buchok, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom were Kathleen E. Morgan, deputy assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Patrick J. Griffin, former state's attorney, Timothy F. Costello, senior assistant state's attorney, and Kevin M. Black, Jr., former special deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Prescott, Alexander and Clark, Js.

PRESCOTT, J.

The defendant, Rodney Waters, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1), and, following a plea of guilty to a part B information, of being a second time offender pursuant to § 14-227a (g) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that his conviction under § 14-227a (a) (1) is not supported by sufficient evidence. He also claims that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony related to the defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) in contravention of § 14-227a (c), restricted his cross-examination of the state's expert witness, and denied his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to the police. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. At approximately 8:45 p.m. on May 18, 2019, Tion Adlam was driving on Dixwell Avenue in New Haven with her mother, daughter, and stepfather when she observed the car ahead of her being driven recklessly and attempting a U-turn. Adlam stopped her car, but the other driver, later identified as the defendant, drove his car into the left side of her car, causing it to "jerk ...." After the initial impact, the defendant's car struck her car at least once more. Adlam was forced to reverse her car to get out of the way. Before the defendant fled from the scene, Adlam saw him and took a photograph of his car's license plate.

Adlam called 911 to report the incident. Officers Christopher Troche, Marco Correa, and Robert Stratton of the New Haven Police Department arrived on the scene at approximately 9 p.m. and spoke with Adlam. At approximately 9:05 p.m., twenty minutes after the accident occurred, the defendant appeared at the scene on foot, and Adlam identified him as the driver of the other car involved in the accident.

The officers then approached the defendant. Upon speaking with him, they observed him acting aggressively, slurring his speech, and moving unsteadily. After this initial interaction with the police, the defendant walked away from the scene but returned about ten minutes later. Upon his return, the police placed the defendant in handcuffs while Stratton confirmed that the defendant's address matched the registered address of the suspect's vehicle.¹ After receiving confirmation, Stratton and Troche had the defendant perform three field sobriety tests:² (1) the horizontal gaze nystagmus test,³ (2) the walk and turn test,⁴ and (3) the one leg stand test.⁵ The defendant failed all three field sobriety tests.

As a result of failing the field sobriety tests and being identified as the driver of the other car involved in the accident, the defendant was transported to the police station and brought to the "intoxilyzer room."⁶ Shortly after arriving at the station, Correa read the defendant his Miranda rights.⁷ The defendant declined a breath analysis test, despite Stratton's warning that it would be deemed a refusal. Although the defendant initially agreed to submit to a urine test, he proceeded to get angry, raise his voice, and tell the officers to "unshackle" him because he was a "linebacker." Stratton asked him if he would be "alright" if he removed the defendant's handcuffs. The defendant replied, "yes," but remained aggressive, once again stating that he was a linebacker. Stratton deemed this behavior as a refusal to do the urine test.

Correa then proceeded to ask the defendant questions from an A-44 form,⁸ including whether he was injured, suffered from any medical conditions, and if he had taken any drugs. The defendant answered most of the questions, despite a reminder from Correa that he could refuse to answer. The defendant subsequently was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence in violation of § 14-227a (1). The state also charged the defendant, by way of a part B information, with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs as a second offender pursuant to § 14-227a (g) (2).

On February 6, 2020, a jury trial commenced. The state called three witnesses to testify: Adlam, Stratton, and Troche. After the state rested its case, the defendant testified on his own behalf. According to the defendant, he had not begun to consume alcohol on May 18, 2019, until after he returned home following the incident with Adlam. Specifically, the defendant testified that he returned home immediately after the accident and quickly consumed a "Jamaican splash," a mixed drink that consisted of about ten to twelve ounces of high-proof rum, wine, and cranberry juice. After finishing the mixed drink, he testified that he smoked a "spliff" and sipped from a half pint bottle of vodka.

In response to the defendant's testimony, the state offered, and the court admitted, rebuttal evidence from Robert Lockwood, a forensic toxicologist employed at the state's forensics laboratory. Lockwood testified about the amount of time after the consumption of alcohol that it typically takes for the alcohol to have observable effects on an individual's motor functions and typical behaviors associated with certain BAC levels.

The jury found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of § 14-227a (a) (1). The defendant then pleaded guilty to being a second time offender under § 14-227a (g) (2). The court, B. Fischer, J. , later sentenced the defendant to two years of incarceration, execution suspended after nine months, 120 days of which was the mandatory minimum sentence, followed by two years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 14-227a (a) (1). With respect to this claim, the defendant makes three related arguments. First, the defendant asserts that the only evidence of his intoxication while driving was Adlam's testimony and that her testimony was insufficient and lacked credibility. Second, the defendant argues that the officers’ observations and the defendant's performance on field sobriety tests were not sufficient to establish that the defendant was intoxicated while driving because they did not take place until one-half hour after the defendant had stopped driving. Third, the defendant argues that Lockwood's testimony did not establish that the defendant was intoxicated due to drinking that occurred before, rather than after, the defendant stopped driving. We are not persuaded that the evidence in the present case was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the well established legal principles for assessing an insufficiency of the evidence claim. "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Petersen , 196 Conn. App. 646, 655, 230 A.3d 696, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 921, 232 A.3d 1104 (2020).

"In particular, before this court may overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, it must conclude that no reasonable jury could arrive at the conclusion the jury did.... Although the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense ... each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rhodes , 335 Conn. 226, 233, 249 A.3d 683 (2020).

"If it is reasonable and logical for the [finder of fact] to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the [finder of fact] is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Petersen , supra, 196 Conn. App. at 655, 230 A.3d 696.

"[E]stablished case law commands us to review claims of evidentiary insufficiency in light of all of the evidence [adduced at trial]." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 656, 230 A.3d 696. "Moreover, even improperly admitted evidence may be considered ... since [c]laims of evidentiary insufficiency in criminal cases are always addressed independently of claims of evidentiary error." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morelli , 293 Conn. 147, 153, 976 A.2d 678 (2009).

Turning to our evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence, we begin with the elements of the...