State v. Waters-Pierce Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1902
• Citation: 67 S.W. 1057
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. WATERS-PIERCE OIL CO.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

67 S.W. 1057

STATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. WATERS-PIERCE OIL CO.¹

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

April 2, 1902.

Appeal from district court, McLennan county; Sam R. Scott, Judge.

Action by the state, on the relation of the attorney general, against the Waters-Pierce Oil Company. From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the state appeals. Affirmed.

C. K. Bell, Atty. Gen., and T. S. Reese, for the State. John D. Johnson and Clark & Bolinger, for appellee.

KEY, J.

This suit was brought by the state to recover the penalties prescribed for violations of the anti-trust statute of March 30, 1899. There was also a prayer in the plaintiff's petition for the forfeiture and revocation of the defendant's permit to do business in Texas. However, in a supplemental petition filed by the state, it is admitted that the defendant's permit to do business in this state had already been forfeited by the judgment of another court in this state, and it is conceded by the state's counsel that the statutory penalty is the only recovery now sought. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant, and the state has appealed; and, as the suit is narrowed down to an action for the recovery of penalties, whether this court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal is a serious question. The constitution of this state, in express terms, denies to the state the right of appeal in criminal cases, and in like terms limits the jurisdiction of the courts of civil appeals to civil cases. Therefore, if, within the purview of the constitution, this is a criminal case, it is not appealable by the state, and this court can exercise no jurisdiction over it.

The overwhelming weight of authority seems to support the proposition that the term "criminal case," when other language is not used indicating a restricted meaning, includes every proceeding on behalf of the state for the enforcement of a penalty prescribed for the violation of a statute; and, therefore, unless some other provision of the constitution indicates that the term referred to was not used in its broad sense, but in a limited sense, it must be held that this is a criminal case, and without the jurisdiction of this court. At the time of, and long before, the adoption of the present constitution, crimes were classified by the Penal Code as felonies and misdemeanors, and these were defined,—the former as including every offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, and the latter as including every other offense; and it must be presumed that these terms were intended to have their statutory meaning when used by the framers of the constitution. Section 8 of article 5 of that instrument reads, in part, as follows: "The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases of the grade of felony; in all suits in behalf of the state to recover penalties, forfeitures and escheats; of all cases of divorce; of all misdemeanors, involving official misconduct; of all suits to recover damages for slander or defamation of character; of all suits for trial of the title to land and for the enforcement of liens thereon; of all suits for the trial of the right of property levied upon by virtue of any writ of execution, sequestration or attachment, when the property levied on shall be equal to or exceed in value five hundred dollars; of all suits, complaints or pleas whatever without regard to any distinction between law and equity, when the matter in controversy shall be valued at or amount to five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest; of contested elections." Now, if the framers of the constitution regarded an action by the state for the recovery of a pecuniary penalty as a criminal case, they must have also known that it was a misdemeanor; and, if they had so regarded it, it seems reasonable to suppose that they would have placed it in the class conferring jurisdiction over misdemeanors, and not have connected it with suits for the recovery of escheats, which are in no sense criminal proceedings. In other words, the framers of the constitution undertook to carve out and confer upon the district court jurisdiction over certain criminal cases. They understood that criminal cases were divided into felonies and misdemeanors, and they declared that the district court should have jurisdiction of all criminal cases of the grade of felony and of a particular class of misdemeanors; but they did not include suits by the state to recover penalties in the class conferring misdemeanor jurisdiction. This indicates that such actions were not regarded as criminal cases. Hence we conclude that the language of the constitution above quoted affords ground for the contention of counsel for the state that the term ...