State v. Watkins
| Decision Date | 02 March 1992 |
| Citation | 827 S.W.2d 293 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. George Prince WATKINS, Jr., Defendant/Appellant. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Hughie Ragan, Jackson, for defendant/appellant.
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Joel W. Perry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for plaintiff/appellee.
The primary issue raised by this appeal is whether the warrantless police search of an automobile passenger compartment violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. That question turns on whether the search was incident to a lawful arrest or was an unreasonable inventory search. The defendant, George Prince Watkins, Jr., was convicted of possession of an electrical device with a defaced serial number and possession of a controlled substance, both of which were products of the search in question and the object of a motion to suppress, which the trial court overruled. The convictions were affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, because they determined that the search was incident to a lawful arrest and therefore reasonable. We agree and affirm.
On April 29, 1989, while driving his mother's car, the defendant was stopped in Jackson, Tennessee, by two police officers. After learning of the defendant's identity, the officers arrested him because they knew a capias had previously been issued for his arrest. After placing the defendant in the back seat of their police cruiser, the officers searched the passenger compartment of the car. The search revealed a stereo equalizer with missing serial numbers located in the front floorboard on the hub of the transmission and a gram of marijuana in a plastic bag under one of the front seats.
The defendant contends that the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress use of the marijuana and the stereo equalizer as evidence was error, because the items were seized as a result of an unconstitutional stop, as well as an unconstitutional search of the vehicle which he was driving.
The defendant first contends that the investigatory stop of the automobile he was driving was an unconstitutional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the officers observed no traffic violation, nor any other suspicious conduct; the officers could not identify the defendant as the driver until after the stop was made; and the car he was driving was not registered in his name.
A police officer may make an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968); Griffin v. State, 604 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tenn.1980). In determining whether a police officer's reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable facts, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981). This includes, but is not limited to, objective observations, information obtained from other police officers or agencies, information obtained from citizens, and the pattern of operation of certain offenders. Id., 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695, 66 L.Ed.2d at 629. A court must also consider the rational inferences and deductions that a trained police officer may draw from the facts and circumstances known to him. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Ted Maxwell, one of the arresting officers, testified he had personal knowledge that a capias was outstanding for the defendant's arrest. He further testified that other police officers had informed him the defendant frequently drove a black Cadillac which had the words, "The Duke," written on the vehicle. On the day in question, Officer Maxwell said he and his partner were parked in a church parking lot when they observed that particular black Cadillac being driven past the lot. Because of the outstanding capias, the officers decided to stop the vehicle and investigate the identity of the driver.
After stopping the car, Officer Maxwell asked the defendant for his driver's license. He responded that he did not have one, and Officer Maxwell then requested his name. When the defendant identified himself, Officer Maxwell made a call on his police radio to verify the capias. Upon verification, Officer Maxwell placed the defendant under arrest and escorted him to the police car.
Considering the totality of these circumstances, we find that the police officers had the required reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle and that he was the person wanted on the outstanding capias. Therefore, we find no merit in the defendant's contention that he was subjected to an unconstitutional stop.
The defendant next contends that the search of the automobile was an unconstitutional inventory search which violated the Fourth Amendment and, as a result, the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. Officer Maxwell testified that he arrested the defendant and informed him that the vehicle would have to be towed. Because it is against departmental procedure, Officer Maxwell denied the defendant's request to have his mother come and pick up her car. After placing the defendant in the back seat of the police car, Officer Maxwell said he and his partner "started inventorying his vehicle."
Since warrantless searches and seizures are presumed to be unreasonable, the prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the search and resulting seizure were justified pursuant to one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971); Hughes v. State,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Pittman v. Holloway, Case. No. 1:13-cv-01019-JDB-egb
...may draw from the facts and circumstances known to him. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906.State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992). "Likewise, a frisk is warranted under Terry if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articu......
-
State v. Bridges
...offense has been or is about to be committed. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880; Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn.1992). Likewise, a frisk is warranted under Terry if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable......
-
State v. Yeargan
...conclusion, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn.1992). Thereafter, we granted the defendant permission to appeal and for the reasons that follow, now affirm the decision of the t......
-
State v. Crutcher
...that follows a lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn.1992). When police officers make a lawful custodial arrest, they are permitted, as incident to the arrest, to search the person a......