State v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 31 July 2006
• Docket Number: Docket No. 31700.
• Citation: 141 P.3d 1086,143 Idaho 217
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Scott WATKINS, Real Party in Interest-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

141 P.3d 1086

143 Idaho 217

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Scott WATKINS, Real Party in Interest-Appellant.

Docket No. 31700.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, April 2006 Term.

July 31, 2006.

Wiebe & Fouser, PA, Caldwell, for appellant. Tyrel D. Stevenson argued.

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

SCHROEDER, Chief Justice.

Scott Watkins appeals from an order of the magistrate court that he go to jail for refusing to take a drug test as part of his son's juvenile probation terms.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Tyler Watkins, a juvenile, was charged under the Juvenile Corrections Act and admitted to charges of unlawful entry, disturbing the peace, curfew violation, and being under the influence of a controlled substance. His father, Scott Watkins (Watkins), appeared in the proceedings and signed an "Acknowledgment of Rights Form" which included the following provisions:

4. The juvenile and the juvenile's parent . . . may be required to sign a probationary contract which provides that a violation or breach of the terms and conditions of the contract shall result in liability of the juvenile's parent . . . for a specific sum not in excess of one thousand dollars ($1000) in addition to any other fines, penalties, or sanctions as provided by law.

9. The judge may make an additional order setting forth reasonable conditions to be complied with by the juvenile, his/her parent . . . which may include but are not limited to . . . requirements to be observed by the parent . . .

10. The judge may make any other reasonable order which is in the best interest of the juvenile or is required for the protection of the public.

11. The willful failure of a parent . . . to comply with orders of the court may result in the violator being punished by fine and/or jail.

After Tyler admitted to the charges, a presentence/social history investigation was ordered and the court set the matter for sentencing. The report revealed that Watkins admitted to recent illegal drug use and to a history of drug use. The juvenile probation officer preparing the report recommended that Tyler be placed on probation and that the court order his father to sign a "parental contract" with certain conditions, including the condition that he, the father, would submit to random drug testing analysis.

At sentencing the court placed Tyler on probation and ordered, among other conditions, that Watkins sign a "parental contract" Watkins was presented with a proposed "parental contract" which included a number of conditions dealing with his responsibility to attend counseling, supervise Tyler, and generally cooperate with the juvenile probation officer. It also included the provision "[t]he parent, Scott Watkins, shall submit to random drug analysis tests." In addition, the following language appeared in capital letters at the bottom of the listed conditions:

IF THE JUVENILE OR THE JUVENILE'S PARENT . . . VIOLATES OR BREACHES THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS PROBATIONARY CONTRACT, THE JUVENILE'S PARENT . . . SHALL BE LIABLE TO THE COURT FOR A SPECIFIC MONETARY SUM NOT IN EXCESS OF ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1000) FOR THE BREACH OF CONTRACT. THE COURT MAY ALSO ORDER THE JUVENILE'S PARENT . . . TO ATTEND PARENTING CLASSES OR UNDERGO OTHER TREATMENT OR COUNSELING.

The following language appeared just above the space provided for the juvenile's and parent's signatures on the last page of the contract: "We understand, agree, accept and will abide by the terms and conditions of the above probationary contract and the order of the Court." Nowhere on the proposed "parental contract" was jail mentioned as a possible sanction against the juvenile's parent.

Watkins informed the court that he agreed to all the terms of the "contract" except for the requirement that he submit to random drug testing, which he stated was a breach of his privacy. He refused to sign the parental contract without advice of counsel. The deputy prosecuting attorney in attendance took the position that Watkins was entitled to refuse to sign the contract, but that his refusal would result in the State changing its sentencing recommendation regarding Tyler.

The hearing was continued to allow Watkins to obtain legal advice, and on July 31, 2003, the parties reappeared in court on the issue. Watkins questioned whether the State was providing any consideration on its side of the contract, and the judge indicated that he was not going to provide Watkins with legal advice. Watkins further questioned the $1,000.00 possible penalty for violation of the contract on his part. At that point, the court indicated that either Watkins would sign the contract or the court would order him held in jail until such time as he agreed to sign the parental contract; Watkins signed the contract. Thereafter, the court ordered Watkins to immediately submit to a drug test at the juvenile probation department pursuant to the terms of the contract.

Watkins failed to submit to the drug test as ordered by the court and an order to show cause was issued requiring Watkins to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failure to submit to the drug test. Watkins appeared without counsel and admitted that he refused to take the drug test. He then requested court-appointed counsel, which the court summarily denied. The court immediately found him in contempt for willful violation of its order and sentenced him to five days in jail, to commence immediately, and to submit to a drug test upon booking at the jail. The court set an appeal bond of $10,000.00.

The following day, Watkins was returned to court, apparently still in custody, at which time the court reconsidered the request for court-appointed counsel. The court appointed the public defender and released Watkins from jail, giving him credit for one day served, and continued the show cause hearing for a later date to allow Watkins to appear with counsel. Watkins moved to set aside the contempt order. The court denied the motion. Watkins appealed. The court stayed further execution of the sentence pending appeal.

On appeal the district court found the magistrate court had the statutory and constitutional authority to compel Watkins to sign the "parental contract" under the threat of civil contempt sanctions, including jail. The district court also found that the magistrate court has the authority to sanction willful violation with jail if such a sanction is included in the parental contract. The parental contract in this case did not provide jail as a remedy for a violation or breach of the contract. Therefore, the district court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its order, which it stated should be limited to the sentencing alternatives listed in the parental contract. Watkins appealed to this Court, maintaining that the magistrate court did not have the authority to order him to sign the probationary contract or to order...