State v. Watson

• Citation: 102 Iowa 651,72 N.W. 283
• Parties: STATE v. WATSON.
• Decision Date: 05 October 1897
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

102 Iowa 651

72 N.W. 283

STATE

v.WATSON.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 5, 1897.

Appeal from district court, Jefferson county; Frank W. Eichelberger, Judge.

The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of burglary, and appeals from the sentence imposed. Affirmed.W. G. Ross, for appellant.

Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., and Jesse A. Miller, for the State.

DEEMER, J.

About 1:30 o'clock in the morning of the 22d day of November, 1895, two persons broke and entered the depot of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company in the town of Fairfield, Iowa, and robbed two men who were in the ticket office. Defendant was arrested, and, upon trial, convicted of being one of the guilty parties. His main defense was an alibi, and he produced witnesses who testified that he was in the city of Moberly, in the state of Missouri, on the 21st and 22d days of November, 1895. The jury evidently discredited this testimony, for the trial resulted in a verdict of guilty. The main contention now is that the verdict lacks support, and is contrary to the weight of the evidence adduced on the issue of the whereabouts of the defendant during the night the crime was committed. The men who were robbed both gave it as their opinion that defendant is one of the men who perpetrated the offense. In addition to this, another witness testified to having seen him in the vicinity of Fairfield early in the morning of the 22d of November. Other witnesses testify that they saw defendant at the city of Washington, in this state, on the 22d. Now, while it is true that many of defendant's witnesses testified that they saw him at Moberly at a time when it would have been quite impossible for him to have left there and arrived at Fairfield in time to have taken part in the burglary, yet few if any of them are certain of having seen him later than 2:45 in the afternoon of the 21st, nor are any of them very positive of having seen him on the morning of the 22d. Defendant could have left Moberly at 2:45 p. m., November 21st, and arrived at Fairfield in time to have had a part in the crime. The conflict in the evidence required the submission of the case to a jury, and with its conclusion we cannot interfere.

2. The indictment charges that the building broken and entered was “the office of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, situated at Fairfield, in Jefferson county.” The proof shows that it was the depot in which was located the ticket office of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, and that one of the occupants of the building which was located in Fairfield was the night telegraph operator for that company. True, there is no evidence that the company is incorporated, nor is there any proof of its ownership of the building. But this is not required. Proof of occupancy is sufficient to establish an allegation of ownership. State v. Rivers, 68 Iowa, 611, 27 N. W. 781;State v. Teeter, 69 Iowa, 717, 27 N. W. 485. And it is not necessary to prove the exact status of the owner. State v. Semotan, 85 Iowa, 57, 51 N. W. 1161;State v. Franks, 64 Iowa, 39, 19 N. W. 832;State v. Emmons, 72 Iowa, 265, 33 N. W. 672;State v. Jelinek (Iowa) 64 N. W. 260. Under our statute (Code 1873, § 4302) an erroneous allegation with reference to ownership is not fatal, if the crime is described in other respects with sufficient certainty.

3. Defendant offered to prove that shortly after the commission of the crime one of the witnesses for the state, who was one of the persons robbed, gave or assented to a description of the offenders which did not correspond with the one given on the trial, and did not in fact characterize the defendant. This evidence was purely impeaching, and, as no proper foundation was laid for it, the evidence was properly rejected. In other words, the witness was not allowed to say whether or not he made any such contradictory statements. If proper foundation had been laid, still the ruling was not erroneous, for the reason that the questions propounded to the witness called for impeaching purposes were not in proper form.

4. The county attorney was allowed to cross-examine the defendant, who was a witness on his own behalf, with reference to his various places of residence, his going under assumed names, and his whereabouts at particular times, at considerable length. This examination was perfectly proper, and the court did not abuse the...