State v. Watson

• Decision Date: 01 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20190828-CA,20190828-CA
• Citation: 485 P.3d 946
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Malvin WATSON, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

485 P.3d 946

STATE of Utah, Appellee,

v.Malvin WATSON, Appellant.

No. 20190828-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed April 1, 2021

Nathalie S. Skibine and Melissa Stirba, Attorneys for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge Gregory K. Orme authored this Opinion, in which Judges David N. Mortensen and Jill M. Pohlman concurred.

Opinion

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Malvin Watson appeals from the district court's restitution order. He contends, in relevant part, that the State did not meet its burden of establishing that his bizarre road rage perpetrated against another driver (Victim) proximately caused Victim's need for mental health therapy. Without sympathy for Watson, we do agree with his legal position and therefore vacate the restitution order.

BACKGROUND¹

¶2 On April 27, 2018, Victim left for the gym in her "little four-door" vehicle. During the drive, Victim noticed Watson's SUV "way behind" her and proceeded to merge into the same lane. Watson disagreed with Victim's assessment of the distance between their two vehicles, instead believing that she had cut him off. Overcome by road rage, Watson began acting as if he were going to hit Victim's vehicle by repeatedly speeding up behind her and then suddenly braking. In response, Victim changed back into her original lane. Instead of getting on with his life, Watson followed Victim, and Victim observed (but could not hear) him screaming as he continually attempted to force her off the road by swerving his car toward hers.

¶3 Attempting once more to "get out of his way" and lose him, Victim sped up and made a right-hand turn at the next intersection. Watson pursued, charged at her at "full speed," struck her from behind, and then left the scene by making a U-turn.

¶4 Victim followed Watson to obtain his license plate number. When Watson realized that Victim was behind him, he hit his brakes and got out of his SUV. He approached Victim, who had also exited her vehicle, and he began threatening to "slam [her] head into the fucking car," called her various derogatory terms, and tried to grab her. Victim ran into the road and attempted to flag down passing vehicles for assistance. Watson was "still coming at [her]," so Victim ran back to the sidewalk and tried to use her vehicle "as a shield" to keep Watson away. Because Watson kept trying to go around the car to get to her, Victim ran into a neighborhood with the aim of knocking on a door for help. Watson was undeterred and followed Victim into the neighborhood.

¶5 Fortunately, a man (Bystander 1) and his cousin (Bystander 2) observed the confrontation between Watson, whom they described as "a big man," and Victim, whom they described as "a small young lady," from Bystander 1's driveway. They witnessed Watson push Victim and decided to intervene. As the two approached, Bystander 2 called out, "Hey, you don't hit a woman." Watson then pulled out a pocketknife.

¶6 A man (Bystander 3) who was driving by made a U-turn in response to Victim's earlier attempt to flag down passing vehicles and pulled up on the scene. Bystander 3 shouted at Watson, whose attention at the time was directed toward Bystander 1 and Bystander 2, and Watson then began approaching Bystander 3. One of the two other men warned Bystander 3 that Watson was in possession of a knife, so Bystander 3 retrieved his firearm and instructed a passenger in his vehicle to call the police. At that point, the situation deescalated, and Watson walked back to his SUV, stating that he was "going to move it up just a little bit." Bystander 2 followed Watson in his own vehicle, and the two pulled over approximately three blocks away and waited for police officers to arrive.

¶7 For his conduct toward Victim, the State charged Watson with one count each of assault and reckless driving, class B misdemeanors, and one count of following too closely, an infraction.² Following a trial, the jury convicted Watson of those charges, and the district court sentenced him to a suspended jail sentence and twelve months of probation.³ The court also ordered Watson, "subject to [his] objection," to pay $1,980⁴ plus interest in restitution to the Utah Office for Victims of Crime (UOVC), which represented the amount UOVC had paid for mental health therapy sessions for Victim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63M-7-519 (LexisNexis 2016).

¶8 Watson objected to the restitution order and requested a hearing on the matter. See id. § 77-38a-302(4) (Supp. 2020).⁵ At the hearing, the State presented a list of the 25 mental health therapy sessions UOVC had paid on Victim's behalf. The list provided the date of each session, ranging between June 12, 2018, and May 1, 2019, and the amount paid for each session. The list did not include provider information other than to simply note "Mental Health Therapy" under that column, and it did not include information regarding the topics addressed in each session or the treatment plan. There was also no indication whether Victim had a prior counseling relationship with the provider.

¶9 The State also presented testimony from the UOVC restitution specialist (Restitution Specialist) who prepared the list. Her familiarity with this case was limited to her preparation of the list upon the State's request, and she stated she did not "remember any details about it." Restitution Specialist did, however, testify concerning UOVC's standard procedure. She explained that when UOVC receives a request for payment from a victim, a claims analyst will "review each invoice that comes in for crime relatedness" and will authorize payment only if the claims analyst determines that the claim "is related to the specific crime." Regarding mental health treatment, Restitution Specialist testified that UOVC "require[s] a mental health treatment plan to be filled out by the therapist that [the victim would] like to go to" and will authorize payment only if the plan indicates that the victim's need for therapy "is crime related or that it is therapy that they're attending because of this traumatic incident that they had." If the foregoing requirements are met, UOVC will "automatically" approve 25 therapy sessions for a primary victim and will pay a maximum of $300 for the initial session and a maximum of $70 for each of the remaining 24 sessions.

¶10 Here, a claims analyst, and not Restitution Specialist, had reviewed Victim's treatment plan. Accordingly, Restitution Specialist could not testify to Victim's specific treatment plan or vouch for its crime-relatedness. Instead, she could only testify that as a matter of standard procedure, there must have been a treatment plan that the claims analyst approved prior to authorizing payment. Restitution Specialist also testified that a claims analyst reviews each treatment invoice for crime-relatedness before authorizing payment. In this case, UOVC did not request progress notes for Victim, which it typically does only if the invoices contain questionable medical codes. Against this backdrop, Restitution Specialist conceded that it was possible for Victim to have discussed issues in therapy that were unrelated to the crimes Watson perpetrated against her.

¶11 Watson objected to the restitution amount, arguing, among other things, that the State did not establish the requisite causation. He asserted, in relevant part, that UOVC approved the maximum benefit of 25 therapy sessions without proof that each session was proximately caused by the crimes. The district court rejected Watson's arguments, holding that Watson's actions "absolutely caused" Victim's need for therapy. Accordingly, the court ordered Watson to pay $1,980 to UOVC in restitution. Watson appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 Watson challenges the district court's order that he reimburse UOVC for Victim's mental health therapy sessions on the ground that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish proximate cause.⁶ "We will not disturb a district court's restitution determination unless the court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion." State v. Ogden , 2018 UT 8, ¶ 25, 416 P.3d 1132 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶13 At an intuitive level, the district court's belief that Watson's actions "absolutely caused" Victim's need for therapy rings true. And it should be pointed out that Victim received mental health services that were paid for by UOVC. The only issue in this appeal is whether the State properly established that those costs should be shifted from UOVC to Watson.

¶14 The Crime Victims Restitution Act requires district courts to order restitution "[w]hen a defendant enters into a plea disposition or is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020). The act defines pecuniary damages as "all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, including those which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities," including "medical and other expenses" but not "punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering." Id. § 77-38a-102(7).

¶15 Furthermore, "[a] trial court's restitution award must rely on a sufficient evidentiary basis," State v. Ogden , 2018 UT 8, ¶ 52, 416 P.3d 1132, and it may award restitution "only in cases where liability is clear as a matter of law and where the commission of the crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages," State v. Becker , 2018 UT App 81, ¶ 17, 427 P.3d 306 (quotation simplified). Our Supreme Court has clarified that the standard of causation under the act is that of proximate cause. See Ogden , 2018 UT 8, ¶¶ 39, 48, 416 P.3d 1132. "Proximate cause is that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produced the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred." Becker , 2018 UT App 81, ¶ 13, 427 P.3d 306 (quotation simplified). It requires proof of...