State v. Watts
| Decision Date | 15 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 74117,74117 |
| Citation | 558 So.2d 994 |
| Parties | 15 Fla. L. Weekly S140 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. James WATTS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Donna A. Provonsha and Stephen A. Baker, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for petitioner.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Andrea Steffen, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for respondents.
We have before us two cases consolidated by the Second District Court of Appeal in Watts v. State, 542 So.2d 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The issue presented is whether a 1985 amendment to the Youthful Offender Act limits the discretion of the trial court in resentencing a defendant upon violation of probation or community control. Watts certified a conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision of Franklin v. State, 526 So.2d 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), approved on other grounds, 545 So.2d 851 (Fla.1989). Because our approval of Franklin did not directly address the issue raised in the instant case, we will do so now to clarify the law. In so doing, we approve Watts. 1
Codefendants James Watts and Steven Smith were charged with committing an armed robbery in April 1985. Both men were convicted in separate jury trials and were adjudicated guilty. The circuit court classified Watts and Smith as youthful offenders and sentenced them to four years' incarceration to be followed by two years' community control, pursuant to chapter 958 of the Florida Statutes (1983). We have called this kind of sentence a probationary split sentence. Franklin v. State, 545 So.2d 851 (Fla.1989); Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla.1988).
After Watts and Smith were released from prison, a community control officer in 1988 alleged that they violated community control. Watts and Smith admitted the violations in open court, and the circuit court revoked community control under the authority of Brooks v. State, 478 So.2d 1052 (Fla.1985). The defense argued that section 958.14 of the Florida Statutes (1987), part of the Youthful Offender Act, imposed a ceiling of six years' imprisonment, thereby limiting the trial court's discretion in resentencing. Section 958.14 provides:
A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06(1). However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department [of Corrections] for such violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated.
The state argued that section 958.14 was not intended to limit the circuit court's discretion, and that the court was free to resentence the defendants under section 948.06(1) to any sentence that the court might have originally imposed before it put the defendants on community control. The state contended that because both Watts and Smith had extensive nonscorable juvenile records, they should be resentenced to ten years' imprisonment with credit for time served, even though such sentences far exceeded the guidelines. The guidelines sentence range was three-and-one-half to four-and-one-half years for Watts, and two-and-one-half to three-and-one-half years for Smith.
For both Watts and Smith, the circuit court revoked community control, declined to continue their status as youthful offenders, and resentenced them to ten years in Florida State Prison with credit for time served, predicating the guidelines departures on the fact that both had extensive nonscorable juvenile records. That was a four-cell upward departure for Watts, and a five-cell upward departure for Smith. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.988(c).
Watts and Smith appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for resentencing, certifying a conflict with the Fifth District Court's decision in Franklin. The state petitioned this Court to resolve the conflict.
In our approval of Franklin, we held that upon a violation of probation during a probationary split sentence, a trial court may resentence the defendant to any term falling within the original guidelines range, including a one-cell upward increase, but that "no further increase or departure is permitted for any reason." Franklin, 545 So.2d at 853 (emphasis supplied); Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838, 841-42 (Fla.1989). See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(14). The circuit court's imposition of sentence on Watts and Smith is a clear violation of that holding.
However, this disposition does not resolve the certified conflict, and so our analysis cannot end there. Although the district court's decision in Franklin involved primarily double jeopardy considerations, it also interpreted section 958.14 in a manner that conflicts with the instant case and with Cole v. State, 550 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), review granted, No. 74,299 (Fla. Jan. 16, 1990); Hunnicutt v. State, 549 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), dismissed, 554 So.2d 1169 (Fla.1989); Kerklin v. State, 548 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Haynes v. State, 545 So.2d 949 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Dixon v. State, 546 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (on rehearing), review granted, No. 74,608 (Fla. Dec. 26, 1989); 2 Boffo v. State, 543 So.2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Warren v. State, 542 So.2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), review granted, No. 74,212 (Fla. Oct. 9, 1989); Miles v. State, 536 So.2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review granted, 544 So.2d 201 (Fla.1989); 3 Hall v. State, 536 So.2d 268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Reams v. State, 528 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Buckle v. State, 528 So.2d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Watson v. State, 528 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); and Brown v. State, 492 So.2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). 4 Since the only question argued and addressed in Franklin was the certified question, we did not reach the district court's interpretation of section 958.14. We do so now.
Florida statutes provide the circuit court with jurisdiction to revoke the community control status of a defendant who violated community control after being sentenced as a youthful offender pursuant to chapter 958. Brooks, 478 So.2d at 1053. Although we said in Brooks that a circuit court may treat the youthful offender as though it had never placed the defendant on community control, our opinion was limited to the controlling law at the time, which was the pre-1985 version of section 958.14. That statute provided in its entirety:
A violation or alleged violation of the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06(1).
§ 958.14, Fla.Stat. (1983). The controlling law changed effective July 1, 1985, when the legislature amended section 958.14 to add, in pertinent part, a second sentence:
However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department [of Corrections] for such violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated.
§ 958.14, Fla.Stat. (1985). See ch. 85-288, § 24, Laws of Fla. The question is whether the legislature intended this second provision in section 958.14 to limit the application of the sentence preceding it. We believe that it did.
The intent of the legislature should be derived from the plain language of the statute in question. The plain and ordinary meaning of section 958.14 is clear. The sole function of the language added in 1985 is to restrict the sentence of youthful offenders who violate probation or community control to no more than six years' imprisonment. See Cole, 550 So.2d at 1129; Hunnicutt, 549 So.2d at 1138; Kerklin, 548 So.2d at 689; Haynes, 545 So.2d at 949; Dixon, 546 So.2d at 1194; Boffo, 543 So.2d at 435; Warren, 542 So.2d at 429; Miles, 536 So.2d at 262; Hall, 536 So.2d at 268; Reams, 528 So.2d at 558; Buckle, 528 So.2d at 1285; Watson, 528 So.2d at 101; Brown, 492 So.2d at 822. "When the language of a penal statute is clear, plain and without ambiguity, effect must be given to it accordingly," Graham v. State, 472 So.2d 464, 465 (Fla.1985), and there is no need to resort to other tools of statutory interpretation. State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1973). Even if we did look to other tools of statutory construction, we note the basic rule that "[c]riminal statutes are to be construed strictly and in favor of the accused." State v. Jackson, 526 So.2d 58, 59 (Fla.1988).
This interpretation is fully consistent with the policy of the Youthful Offender Act, which, we have said, was intended
to provide a "sentencing alternative," see section 958.021, Florida Statutes (1985), that is more stringent than the juvenile system and less harsh than the adult system. See A Report Submitted to the House Committee on Corrections, Probation and Parole on Senate Bill 165 (May 10, 1978). Clearly, the limitation on the time period for confinement is a primary benefit of the youthful offender alternative.
Allen v. State, 526 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla.1988). See also Reams, 528 So.2d at 559 (Ervin, J., specially concurring).
Our conclusion is fortified by the timing of the 1985 amendment. As the district court observed in Watson, the legislature amended section 958.14 after two district court decisions questioned whether a circuit court could resentence a youthful offender as an adult upon revocation of youthful offender status and revocation of community control. See Clem v. State, 462 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Brooks v. State, 461 So.2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), approved, 478 So.2d 1052 (Fla.1985). We agree with Watson, in which the court said:
[T]he only logical conclusion is that the legislature intended to change the case law interpretation of § 958.14, or in any event to change the law, so that once the circuit court has given a defendant youthful offender status and has sentenced him as a...
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