State v. Weathers

Docket NumberA-2566-19
Decision Date25 August 2023
PartiesSTATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JONATHAN WEATHERS, a/k/a JONATHON WEATHERS, JONATHAN TAPIA, JONNY TAPIA, MATTHEW WEATHERS, and BASHAUN WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

Argued May 10, 2023

Rochelle Watson, Deputy Public Defender II, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Kyle A. Petit, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney; Kyle A. Petit, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Accurso, Firko and Natali.

PER CURIAM

A grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant Jonathan Weathers with purposeful murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); first-degree robbery N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; and third-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a)(1). After the court denied defendant's motion to suppress his recorded statement, a jury convicted him of felony murder, and the lesser included offense of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), and acquitted him of the murder, first-degree robbery and witness tampering charges, as well as the lesser included offenses of aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) and reckless manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1). The court, after merger, sentenced defendant to an aggregate fifty-year prison term with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility and assessed applicable fines and penalties.

In addition to challenging the court's decision to deny his suppression application, defendant argues he was deprived of a trial by an impartial jury when the State unconstitutionally exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective black juror. Finally, he argues the court's sentence is excessive and contrary to the Code of Criminal Justice.

Defendant specifically contends:

POINT I
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT TO THE POLICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE (1) . . . DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE HIS RIGHTS; (2) THE POLICE CONTINUED TO INTERROGATE DEFENDANT EVEN AFTER HE HAD MADE AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST FOR COUNSEL, AND (3) THEY FAILED TO SCRUPULOUSLY HONOR HIS UNEQUIVOCAL ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE.
A. Defendant's Statement.
B. The State Failed To Meet Its Burden Of Showing That Defendant Knowingly And Intelligently Waived His Rights, Especially Given That The Detective Intentionally Misled Him About The Nature Of The Interrogation.
C. The Interrogation Should Never Have Gone Forward After Defendant Made An Unequivocal Assertion Of The Right To Have Counsel Present.
D. The Detective Failed To Honor Defendant's Unequivocal Assertions Of His Right To Remain Silent.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WHEN THE PROSECUTOR USED A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO EXCLUDE A[]
[BLACK] JUROR WHO HAD QUALIFIED FOR JURY SERVICE.
POINT III
THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY IMPOSED SENTENCE BASED UPON HIS BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT HAD "BRUTALLY ATTACKED "THE VICTIM DESPITE THE JURY'S VERDICTS FINDING THAT HE DID NOT PURPOSELY, KNOWINGLY, OR RECKLESSLY INFLICT, OR ATTEMPT TO INFLICT, SERIOUS BODILY INJURY ON THE VICTIM.

After reviewing the record in light of these contentions and the applicable law, we reject defendant's arguments in Point I.B. and I.C., but remand for the court to address in the first instance defendant's argument detailed in Point I.D. and make necessary factual findings and legal conclusion. We also remand for further factual findings required to address defendant's contentions in Point II. Finally, we have considered defendant's sentencing arguments detailed in Point III and conclude they are without merit.

I.

We detail only those portions of the record necessary for our resolution of the issues raised by the parties. Shortly after midnight on August 2, 2016, while driving around Trenton with his girlfriend, Nishelle Dowling, in her Nissan Maxima, defendant spotted the victim, Stephen Merrill, walking home from a bar. Nishelle and defendant followed Merrill as he walked home. While Nishelle was driving, defendant exited the car and directed her to drive with the headlights off. He approached Merrill and violently assaulted him, causing him to fall to the ground. He also robbed Merrill of his cell phone and wallet. Merrill, who defendant left in street before fleeing, was discovered approximately two hours later, and rushed to the hospital where he lapsed into a coma and died weeks later.

The Trenton police later obtained surveillance videos which showed the Nissan Maxima and defendant in the vicinity where Merrill was walking, and Detective Brian Jones requested officers look out for a gold 1999 Nissan Maxima with a sunroof and broken taillights. At Detective Jones' instruction, on August 5, 2016, The Trentonian published a press release about the crime, which stated "the victim was assaulted and robbed, the date and the location, and . . . a cell phone and wallet was taken." Detective Jones included his contact information with the release. He then received a message on his answering machine the following day from a woman who stated that "she believed her daughter's boyfriend was the one responsible for the incident and that he had a wallet and cell phone." The message cut off without any contact information, and the woman never called back.

On the evening of August 9, 2016, the police spotted a parked car matching the description of the Nissan Maxima and saw it again in the early hours of August 10, 2016, when they observed defendant driving the vehicle without a seatbelt. After confirming that the car matched the description in the bulletin, the police pulled the vehicle over for the seatbelt infraction. They then discovered defendant did not have a proper driver's license and arrested him. Defendant was handcuffed, placed in the police car, and transported to the police station for questioning.

Detective Jones interviewed defendant commencing at 11:00 a.m. on August 10, 2016. Detective Jones' interview with defendant started with defendant asking if he was arrested for "anything else" and Detective Jones responded, "Not right now, no." The detective then showed defendant a Miranda[1] rights form, and the following exchange occurred:

[Defendant]: So whadda you mean, Miranda [r]ights form if I'm not gettin[g] arrested for nothin[g]?
[Jones]: Cause I'd like [to] speak to you about somethin[g].
[Defendant]: Alright, so I'm not signin[g] no, I'm not signin[g] that wit[h] you. I'm not gettin[g] arrested, so what am I signin[g] somethin[g] for?
[Jones]: This is if you wanna talk [to] me.
[Defendant]: So what, I'm talkin[g] [to] you for, whadda, whadda am I being questioned for?
[Jones]: I'm gonna talk [to] ya about that, but I have [to] read ya your rights first.
[Defendant]: I'm not, I'm not signin[g] nothing though man. I don't need [to] know my Miranda [r]ights, that's for gettin[g] arrested. I'm not, I'm not gettin[g] arrested for nothin[g]. Ya just told me that.
[Jones]: Ok, but I'd like [to] speak to ya about somethin[g].
[Defendant]: Alright, you can speak [to] me, I'm tellin[g] [you], you can speak [to] me, but I'm not signin[g] that. You talkin[g] about Miranda [r]ights, you could speak [to] me, I'm not signin[g].
[Jones]: Ok, well, let me read; let me read the [r]ights form first, ok? Right now, it's 11 o'clock, alright. And it says, before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent.
[Defendant]: Hold on, so what did you . . . you readin[g] me Miranda [r]ights, which means you arrested me for somethin[g]?
[Jones]: No, it's not.
[Defendant]: Yes, it is!
[Jones]: No, it's not. Just cause I'm reading your Miranda [r]ights doesn't mean you're being charged wit[h] anything.
[Defendant]: So, I'm gettin[g] charged or I'm bein[g] questioned, which one?
[Jones]: You're being questioned.

[(Emphasis added).]

Following this exchange, Detective Jones read the form to defendant, and asked if he understood it, to which defendant responded "Um, hum." After Detective Jones asked if defendant had any questions, they discussed whether defendant was willing to speak to Detective Jones without a lawyer present:

[Defendant]: Yeah, so as far as a lawyer, whatcha' you mean by a lawyer? Like for, so if I, if I gotta pick, if I don't have a lawyer, a lawyer would come here?
[Jones]: If you wanna speak [to] me without a lawyer present you can. At any time during . . .
[Defendant]: So, if I wanna speak [to] you, I could have a lawyer here too?
[Jones]: If you wanna speak [to] me wit[h] a lawyer prese\nt, then I will walk outta' this room and this interview is over.
[Defendant]: So why can't I speak [to] you wit[h] a lawyer present?
[Jones]: You can.
[Defendant]: So why?
[Jones]: Just not right this immediate moment.
[Defendant]: So why then? You said, you said I can speak to you.
[Jones]: You can. If you wanna get a lawyer, you can get a lawyer; when you get a lawyer . . .
[Defendant]: I got a lawyer already . . .
[Jones]: . . . we can talk.
[Defendant]: . . . his name [is] Cleveland.
[Jones]: Ok.
[Defendant]: Yeah.
[Jones]: Is he gonna come down here right now and sit with you during questioning?
[Defendant]: I'm pretty sure, if I make a phone call.
[Jones]: Ok.
...

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