State v. Weathers
| Decision Date | 09 May 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 45645,45645 |
| Parties | The STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Robert Chester WEATHERS, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The legislature, acting in the exercise of the police power of the state, is empowered to enact measures in furtherance of the public welfare and safety, and its enactments in such areas are not to be judicially curtailed where they reasonably relate to the ends sought to be attained.
2. Classifications honestly designed to protect the public from evils which might otherwise arise are to be upheld unless they are unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.
3. Due process permits the exercise of a wide scope of discretion on the part of the legislature in establishing classifications under the police power of the state and courts will not invalidate what is done in such connection unless there is no rational basis for its support.
4. The provisions of K.S.A. 21-2611 do not offend against the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
Richard D. Ewy, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Richard K. Hollingsworth, Deputy County Atty., argued the cause and Kent Frizzell, Atty. Gen., Keith Sanborn, County Atty., and Donald Foster, Deputy County Atty., were with him on the brief for appellee.
On July 16, 1968, the defendant, Robert Chester, weathers, pleaded guilty to charges of first-degree robbery and possession of a pistol after conviction of a felony. He was sentenced on both charges, the sentences to run consectively. The present appeal is from both convictions.
The principal point raised in this appeal concerns the defendant's conviction of possessing a pistol after having previously been convicted of robbery. The relevant statute, K.S.A. 21-2611, provides:
'It shall be unlawful for any person who has previously been convicted in this state or elsewhere of committing or attempting to commit murder, manslaughter (except manslaughter arising out of the operation of an automobile), kidnaping, mayhem, forcible rape, assault to do great bodily harm, or any other felonious assault, robbery, burglary, extortion, grand larceny, receiving stolen property, aiding escape from prison or unlawfully possessing or distributing habit-forming narcotic drugs or cannabis sativa, commonly known as marihauna, to own a pistol, or to have or keep a pistol in his possession or under his control. * * '
The thrust of the defendant's argument is, very simply, that the statute fails to meet constitutional standards of equal protection. Although we have held the statute to be constitutional on other grounds (State v. Bolin, 200 Kan. 369, 463 P.2d 978) the exact point now before us has not heretofore been raised on appeal, nor have we passed upon it.
It is now urged that invidious discrimination exists between persons who have previously been convicted of the specific offenses named in the statute, and those who have been convicted of other offenses not named therein. The defendant argues that so far as prohibiting the possession of a pistol is concerned there is no rational basis for distinguishing between persons previously convicted of one of the offenses delineated in K.S.A. 21-2611 and persons convicted of other offenses. In other words, the defendant avers the classification of felionies spelled out in K.S.A. 21-2611 is unreasonable within the purview of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Reliance for this viewpoint is largely predicated on the decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655, where the United States Supreme Court determined that an Oklahoma statute which authorized the sterilization of habitual criminals after notice and trial, was unconstitutional. The statute defined an habitual criminal as any person having had two or more convictions for felony, but specifically exempted embezzlement, political offenses and violations of the prohibitory and revenue laws, from the provisions of the act.
In deciding that the statute...
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