State v. Weaver
| Decision Date | 17 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 20504,20504 |
| Citation | 128 Idaho 94,910 P.2d 766 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Walter WEAVER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen.; Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., argued, Boise, for respondent.
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress as evidence a handgun found when law enforcement officers conducted an inventory search of an automobile in connection with the automobile's impoundment. The impoundment was ordered following the arrest of the driver, Walter Weaver (Weaver) on a Pennsylvania warrant. Weaver contends that the impoundment and inventory of the automobile were unreasonable and violative of his Fourth Amendment rights because the vehicle could have been driven away by Weaver's mother, who was a passenger and the owner of the vehicle. Because we conclude it was permissible for the officers to impound the automobile based upon their reasonable determination that Weaver's mother was physically incapable of driving, we affirm the order denying the motion to suppress.
Testimony at the hearing on Weaver's suppression motion indicates the following. The Weaver family came to the attention of the Kootenai County sheriff's department in the fall of 1992, when Weaver's brother, Bob Weaver, took his wife, Charlotte, hostage during a domestic dispute. Sheriff's department personnel eventually killed Bob during the standoff. A few days after that incident, Charlotte contacted Sergeant Sopher at the sheriff's department about information she had received from members of Bob's family. They had informed Charlotte that Walter Weaver and his mother, Pearl Weaver, were on their way to Idaho to kill Charlotte in retaliation for Bob's death. They said that Pearl possessed a gun. Charlotte conveyed this information to Sergeant Sopher and gave him a description of the car in which Weaver and Pearl were travelling. Sopher contacted Pennsylvania authorities who informed him that Weaver was on parole from a burglary conviction and was in violation of parole terms for failing to maintain contact with his parole officer.
On October 1, 1992, Sopher received a warrant for Weaver's arrest from the State of Pennsylvania. On the same day Sopher received a telephone call from the Idaho State Patrol informing him that Weaver was at that moment standing in the State Patrol offices. Weaver was asking the location of Bob's remains and the address of Charlotte Weaver. Sopher requested that the State Patrol officer, under the guise of giving directions to Charlotte's house, direct Weaver to the Kootenai County sheriff's office. The State Patrol officer complied. Weaver and Pearl left, believing they were on their way to Charlotte's home, but actually driving toward the sheriff's office.
Their vehicle was stopped en route by Kootenai County sheriff's deputies. Weaver was removed from the vehicle and arrested on the Pennsylvania warrant. Pearl, who was over seventy years of age, was also removed from the car and placed in the rear seat of a patrol car for her comfort. Sergeant Sopher then ordered a deputy to inventory the vehicle. The deputy, using a standard sheriff's department inventory form, began searching the automobile and listing the items found. He discovered a handgun under the spare tire in the trunk of the vehicle. A telexed inquiry to the National Crime Information Center yielded information that the gun was stolen. The officer then arrested Pearl at the scene apparently On the basis of the handgun found in the automobile, Weaver was subsequently charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, I.C. § 18-3316, and grand theft by possession of stolen property, I.C. §§ 18-2403(4), 18-2407(1). He filed a motion to suppress the gun as evidence, contending that the warrantless search of the automobile was impermissible. The trial court denied the motion and held that the search was a valid inventory following impoundment of the automobile. Weaver then entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The grand theft charge against Weaver was dismissed.
[128 Idaho 96] for grand theft by possession of stolen property. 1
On appeal, Weaver argues that the impoundment was unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment because Pearl, the owner of the car and a licensed driver, was present at the scene and could have taken custody of the vehicle. Because the impoundment order was unlawful, he contends, the inventory search was impermissible and any evidence discovered in the process should have been suppressed. The State counters that Sergeant Sopher reasonably believed that Pearl was incapable of driving the vehicle after observing that she was physically infirm as she exited the vehicle and walked to the patrol car. Accordingly, the State asserts, the decision to impound the vehicle was reasonable under the circumstances and the evidence yielded by the inventory search was admissible.
Motions to suppress evidence are reviewed under a bifurcated standard. While we accept the district court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, we freely review the application of the law to the facts found. State v. Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 666 P.2d 1139 (1983); State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121, 795 P.2d 15 (Ct.App.1990). Where, as here, the State conducts a search without a warrant, a presumption arises that the search is per se unreasonable. State v. Huskey, 106 Idaho 91, 675 P.2d 351 (Ct.App.1984). The burden of proof is thus shifted to the State to demonstrate that the search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981); State v. Limberhand, 117 Idaho 456, 788 P.2d 857 (Ct.App.1990).
When the police have lawfully impounded an automobile in carrying out their community caretaking function, they are permitted to inventory its contents. Such warrantless inventory searches, when conducted in compliance with standard police procedures and not as a pretext for criminal investigation, do not offend Fourth Amendment strictures against unreasonable searches and seizures. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 80-81, 813 P.2d 888, 891-92 (1991); State v. Bray, 122 Idaho 375, 834 P.2d 892 (Ct.App.1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 916, 113 S.Ct. 1272, 122 L.Ed.2d 667 (1993); Department of Law Enforcement v. $34,000 U.S. Currency, 121 Idaho 211, 214-15, 824 P.2d 142, 145-46 (Ct.App.1991). An inventory following impoundment is a reasonable and legitimate means to safeguard the owner's property, to prevent claims against the police for lost or stolen property, and to protect the police and others from dangerous instrumentalities that may be inside the vehicle. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-73, 107 S.Ct. at 741-42; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369-71, 96 S.Ct. at 3097-98. Smith, 120 Idaho at 80, 813 P.2d at 891. However, the impoundment itself must be lawful. An impoundment of a vehicle constitutes a seizure and is thus subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment. If the impoundment violates the Fourth Amendment, the accompanying inventory is also tainted, and evidence found in the search must be suppressed. State v. Teeter, 249 Kan. 548, 819 P.2d 651, 653 (1991); State v. Anderson, 377 So.2d 837, 838 (La.1979); People v. Toohey, 438 Mich. 265, 475 N.W.2d 16, 25 (1991); Lee v. State, 628 P.2d 1172 (Okla.Crim.App.1981); State v. Smith, 72 Or.App. 130, 694 P.2d 1013 (1985).
In order to comport with the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures, an impoundment must be reasonable under all the circumstances known to the police when the decision to impound was made. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372-73, 96 S.Ct. at 3098-99; Teeter, 819 P.2d at 653-54; Starks v. State, 696 P.2d 1041 (Okla.Crim.App.1985); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985); State v. Thompson, 24 Wash.App. 321, 601 P.2d 1284, 1287 (1979). Our decisions establish that an impoundment is reasonable if it is necessary to protect the automobile from possible damage or theft, to avoid a risk to the travelling public, or to prevent an obstruction of normal traffic flow which would arise if the vehicle were left on or near the roadway. Bray, 122 Idaho at 378, 834 P.2d at 895; Smith, 120 Idaho at 80-81, 813 P.2d at 891-92. 2
At the hearing on Weaver's motion to suppress, officers testified that the vehicle created a traffic hazard because it was parked partially within the traffic lane on a two-lane street. Further, because Weaver was being arrested on the Pennsylvania warrant for parole violations, it would not be possible for him to quickly return and move the vehicle to a safe and secure location. Weaver maintains that the impoundment was nonetheless unnecessary and unreasonable because the automobile could have been turned over to Pearl.
A number of jurisdictions have held that where the arrested driver can make alternative arrangements for the car to be taken by a friend or relative, or where such alternatives are readily apparent to the officer, the officer may not impound the vehicle. See generally, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.3(c) p. 89-90 (1987) and cases cited therein. Thus, where the driver has been arrested but there is present a passenger who is authorized to drive the vehicle, impoundment has been found unreasonable. State v. Volk, 291 So.2d 643 (Fla.Ct.App.1974); People v. Velleff, 94 Ill.App.3d 820, 50 Ill.Dec. 222, 419 N.E.2d 89 (1981); State v. Boster, 217 Kan. 618, 539 P.2d...
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