State v. Weaver

• Decision Date: 03 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. A10–1053.,A10–1053.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,v.Gordon Douglas WEAVER, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

796 N.W.2d 561

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Gordon Douglas WEAVER, Appellant.

No. A10–1053.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

May 3, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

1. When the district court's stated reasons for an upward sentencing departure are improper or inadequate, an appellate court may independently examine the record to determine if there is sufficient evidence to justify the departure based on legitimate reasons, so long as the court does not engage in fact-finding.

2. General disagreement with the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, or the legislative policies on which the guidelines are based, is not a valid reason for departure.

Lori A. Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Mitchell L. Rothman, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.Paul C. Engh, Joseph S. Friedberg, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.Considered and decided by MINGE, Presiding Judge; LARKIN, Judge; and CRIPPEN, Judge.^*

OPINION

LARKIN, Judge.

In this post-remand appeal, appellant challenges his sentence of 225 months on one count of second-degree unintentional felony murder, which constitutes a 75–month upward-durational departure from the presumptive sentence. Appellant claims that the district court erred in relying on impermissible departure grounds and in refusing to grant a downward-durational departure. Because the upward departure is supported by valid departure reasons, the sentence is within the district court's discretion, and it is reasonable to conclude that the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent reliance on an allegedly improper aggravating factor, we affirm.

FACTS

In 2005, a jury found appellant Gordon Douglas Weaver guilty of second-degree unintentional felony murder for his role in the death of his wife, J.W. Weaver appealed, and this court reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial. On remand, Weaver waived his right to a jury trial on the issue of guilt, as well as his right to a sentencing trial on facts that might support a sentencing departure. The two pending charges of second-degree unintentional felony murder under Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (1998), which were based on the predicate offenses of first-degree arson and third-degree assault, were tried to the district court.

At trial, Weaver testified that he and his wife, J.W., had an argument in the laundry room of their home. He became angry and pushed her. J.W. stumbled, fell, and struck her head on a washtub. Weaver testified that after J.W. fell to the ground, she stopped breathing and went limp. J.W. appeared completely unresponsive, and Weaver could not detect her pulse. Weaver concluded that J.W. had died. Weaver testified that when he realized his wife was dead, he decided to burn down the house. Weaver poured solvents throughout the laundry room and ignited them.

J.W.'s sister and brother-in-law arrived at the home to look for J.W. when she did not arrive at a scheduled meeting with her sister. J.W.'s sister noticed that the home's windows were blackened and asked her husband to call 911. Firefighters responded and located J.W.'s body in the home. Much of the clothing on J.W.'s torso had been destroyed by the fire, and plastic from a light fixture had melted onto her body. She had multiple burns; some areas of her skin were completely burned away.

Dr. Susan Roe, who performed J.W.'s autopsy, testified that J.W. had suffered blunt trauma above her right and left eyes and a blunt-force injury to the back of her head. J.W. also had a skull fracture and associated brain swelling. Her lungs contained soot, and she had a lethal 61.4% carbon-monoxide blood level.

The cause of J.W.'s death was disputed at trial. The state called Dr. Roe and Ramsey County Medical Examiner Dr. Michael McGee. They testified that J.W. was alive during the fire and that she died from a lack of oxygen attributable to carbon monoxide inhalation during the fire. The defense called Dr. David Ketroser, a neurologist, and Dr. John Plunkett, a consultant and retired medical examiner. They testified that they could not say definitively whether J.W. died from her head injury or carbon-monoxide poisoning. Dr. Ketroser testified that the head injury and the carbon monoxide may have acted in concert to cause J.W.'s death. Dr. Plunkett testified that he could not say that both injuries caused J.W.'s death.

Weaver testified that when he lit the fire, J.W. was not breathing, she had bled extensively, and she had gone limp. Weaver also testified that he was unable to locate J.W.'s pulse. Dr. Ketroser confirmed that the pressure on J.W.'s brain stem would have made her eyes and pupils unresponsive, slowed her heart beat, and caused her breathing to become irregular. Dr. Roe agreed that, if Weaver observed the symptoms he described, it would have been possible for Weaver to think that J.W. was dead.

The district court found Weaver guilty of both counts of unintentional felony murder and made oral findings of fact in support of its verdict. The district court found that “[J.W.] died as a result of the asphyxiation by carbon monoxide poisoning due to a house fire.” The district court's finding that J.W. was alive during the fire was based on evidence that “[J.W.'s] lungs had soot and small particles of food[,] [w]hich indicated a terminal aspiration of food. Soot extended past the trachea into the main stem bronchi, and into the lungs, which confirmed that [J.W.] was alive at the time of the fire.” The district court also determined that “[J.W.] could have survived the head injury if given medical assistance with medical efforts to reduce swelling and use life support.” Although the district court determined that J.W. was alive when the fire started, it also determined that Weaver believed that she was dead. The district court found that “[Weaver] knew that he had caused the death of his wife, and had done something wrong. [Weaver's] intent was to burn the house, the entire structure and everything in it. Including the body of [J.W.]”

At sentencing, Weaver requested a downward-durational departure from the presumptive sentence of 150 months to 105 months. The state requested an upward-durational departure to 300 months. The district court denied Weaver's motion and imposed an executed prison sentence of 225 months on one count of felony murder with first-degree arson as its predicate offense.¹ The district court cited “particular cruelty” as the basis for its sentencing departure. This appeal follows, in which Weaver challenges his sentence. ²

ISSUES

I. Did the district court abuse its discretion in imposing an upward-durational departure?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for a downward-durational departure?

ANALYSIS

I.

We first address Weaver's claim that the district court erred in imposing a sentence of 225 months, which constitutes a 75–month upward-durational departure. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV (Supp.1999) (providing that the presumptive sentence for second-degree unintentional murder, a level IX offense, is 150 months where the offender has zero criminal history points).

“The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were created to promote uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn.2009). The legislature, through the use of guidelines, seeks to ensure that “sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender's criminal history.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines I (1998). Departures from the presumptive sentence are intended to be the exception, having application “to a small number of cases.” State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn.2002). Unless there are “substantial and compelling circumstances” to warrant an upward departure, the district court must order the presumptive sentence provided by the guidelines. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D (1998). Substantial and compelling circumstances exist when “the defendant's conduct in the offense of conviction was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.” Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d at 69.

We review sentencing departures for an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 588 (Minn.2003). “[I]f a district court's reasons for a departure are stated on the record, an appellate court must determine whether the stated reasons justify the departure.” State v. Grampre, 766 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Minn.App.2009), review denied (Minn. Aug. 26, 2009). But first, this court must determine whether the reasons provided are legally permissible and factually supported by the record. See Edwards, 774 N.W.2d at 601. We conduct a de novo assessment of the district court's decision as to whether a valid departure ground exists, relying on the factual findings that support the decision. Dillon v. State, 781 N.W.2d 588, 598 (Minn.App.2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). The district court abuses its discretion if it relies on an invalid departure ground. Id.

The district court provided two reasons to support its upward departure and categorized these reasons as “particular cruelty.” The district court explained:

[ (1) ] At the point [Weaver] realized that [J.W.] was hurt, [he] failed to summon aide that could have saved her life. [ (2) ] In addition, instead of calling for help [Weaver] callously poured accelerant throughout the laundry room and started a fire in an effort to destroy evidence, the home[,] and the body of [J.W.].

Weaver challenges each of the district court's stated departure reasons. We address each reason in turn.

Failure to Render Aid

Weaver argues that the district court is collaterally estopped from relying on failure-to-render-aid as a departure ground. “The doctrine of collateral estoppel will bar a prosecution where the second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual...