State v. Webb
| Decision Date | 27 June 1924 |
| Docket Number | 26453 |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. WEBB |
Appeal from Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Union; S. L Digby, Judge.
Abner Webb was convicted of murder, and appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Elder & Everett, of Farmerville, for appellant.
Percy Saint, Atty. Gen., H. G. Fields, Dist. Atty., of Farmerville (Percy T. Ogden, of Crowley, and M. M. Irwin, of New Orleans of counsel), for the State.
OPINION
The defendant was convicted of murder with a qualified verdict, and from a sentence to imprisonment at hard labor for life prosecutes this appeal. There are twenty-one bills of exception complaining of errors committed by the trial judge during the progress of the trial.
Bills 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13.
These several bills are directed at the ruling of the court in sustaining objections to certain questions propounded to different jurors on their voir dire, touching their opinion and belief on the law of self-defense. The following is one of the questions propounded:
"Mr. Calloway, do you believe that a man has the right to defend himself when he is or may be suddenly or violently attacked?"
The ruling of the court in not permitting the question to be answered was entirely correct. It is not permissible for counsel to question jurors as to their individual opinion or belief as to what the law is or ought to be in a given case or under certain circumstances. It is true that the Constitution declares that jurors are the judges of both the law and the facts in a criminal case on the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused party, but this is true with respect to the law only in the sense that they are to accept the law as given to them in the charge by the court and apply it to the facts of the particular case.
"Jurors are not supposed to know the law, and are not incompetent because their crude opinions may not be in accord with the views of jurists and text-writers." State v. Perioux, 107 La. 601, 31 So. 1016; State v. Willie, 130 La. 454, 58 So. 147.
TheSyllabus by the Court in the first case above noted is:
"Jurors should not be examined as to their opinions on questions of law, such as the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, etc."
Bill 5.
This bill was reserved to the refusal of the court to permit a juror to answer the following question:
"Would you convict a man on circumstantial evidence alone?"
We fail to see wherein the accused has any interest in testing the views of the juror on circumstantial evidence. If the juror answered in the affirmative, he would but be obeying the requirement of the law, and this would afford the defendant no cause for challenge. On the other hand, if the juror was opposed to convicting on circumstantial evidence alone, the right of challenge for cause would rest with the state. At all events, we fail to see wherein the accused has suffered any injury or has been deprived of any substantial legal right by the ruling of the court.
Bill 12.
This bill recites that the clerk and sheriff were ordered by the court to draw forty tales jurors from the tales jury box; that counsel made timely objection to the drawing and based his objection upon the fact "that the box from which the names were drawn was not signed, locked, sealed, and delivered and certified to by the clerk of court and the jury commissioners." The judge states that the clerk alone was ordered to draw the tales jurors from the box, and he is confirmed by the entry on the minutes. The judge further states in his per curiam:
We find no error in the action of the court. Act 182 of 1914 only requires that the tales jury box be locked. State v. Bagwell, 154 La. 980, 98 So. 549.
Bill 14.
The basis of this bill is a challenge of the competency of the juror Grafton because his name appears in the jury list as a resident of ward 8, whereas he testified on his voir dire that he lived in ward 12. The judge's statement shows that the juror once voted at Shilo before a new precinct was created, and that since that time he had voted at Bernice; that some call it ward 12 and some ward 8. The judge understood that the Shilo end of the ward is known as justice ward 8 and the Bernice end of the ward as justice ward 12. The two comprise one and the same police jury ward.
A person to be a competent juror need not be an elector. It is sufficient that he has resided in the parish in which the court is held at least one year. Act 135 of 1898; State v. Willie, 130 La. 454, 58 So. 147. No claim is made that Grafton had not resided in the parish for as much as one year immediately before being called to serve as a juror.
Bill 15.
This bill complains at the failure of the court to sustain a challenge of cause made against the juror F. D. Antley. The juror testified that he sometimes signed his name as D. F. Antley and at other times as F. D. Antley. His correct name was Freeman David Antley and he appeared on the jury list as F. D. Antley. It is not pretended that there was any mistake as to the identity of the person being the one drawn and intended to be drawn as a juror. There was no other F. D. Antley in that ward or community.
Bill 16.
A state witness was asked in cross-examination the following question:
We approvethe ruling. The excluded evidence formed no part of the res gestae, and was purely hearsay.
Bill 17.
The defendant was sworn and testified in his own behalf. On cross-examination he was asked by the state why he had not left Mr. Holloway's farm at the time of the alleged insult to his wife. On redirect examination he was asked by his counsel if he had any means or money; the purpose of the testimony being to show that defendant was not in a position financially to leave the farm. An objection of irrelevency interposed by the state was sustained.
The general rule is that incriminating evidence introduced by the state is always open to rebuttal and explanation by the accused, and such rebuttal or explanatory evidence is not inadmissible on the score of being irrelevant.
In this case, however, we cannot see what possible pertinence or bearing the evidence sought to be introduced could have had. The defendant had the legal right to remain on the place he was cropping on under the share system, and was not compelled to leave because of insult offered his wife.
However, if there was error in excluding the evidence, the defendant suffered no injury, as we gather from counsel's brief that the defendant in answer to the state's question stated that he did not know of any reason why he did not leave the place.
Bill 18.
This bill shows that the wife of the defendant was called to testify by the state, and was asked the following question:
"What statement did he make to you" (referring to her husband) "with reference to the deceased having visited your house?"
Over the objection of the counsel for the accused that the conversation sought to be introduced was between husband and wife and under the law was a privileged communication, and inadmissible in evidence against the accused, and that the evidence was not in rebuttal, the witness was permitted to state the conversation, and answered the question as follows:
"He said that he came there on Monday night and slammed the door against the foot of his bed, and I told him not to do that as he would wake him up, and said Mr. Holloway said with an oath that he couldn't wake the son of a bitch and that I got up and walked out with him on the porch."
The judge in his per curiam gave as a reason for admitting the testimony the following:
The ruling of the trial judge was manifestly erroneous, and it must be assumed, under the circumstances, was greatly prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.
Act 157 of 1916 declares that the competent witness in any proceeding, civil or criminal, shall be a person of proper understanding. Under the express terms of this statute the wife was made a competent witness for or against...
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State v. Richey, 50938
...they are to accept the law as given to them in the charge by the court and apply it to the facts of the particular case.' State v. Webb, 156 La. 952, 101 So. 338, Our holdings, supra, with respect to voir dire, some before the enactment of our new Code of Criminal Procedure, have all been b......
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State v. Jones, 52286
...124, 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965) (question as to whether juror would feel the defendant guilty because he was charged) and State v. Webb, 156 La. 952, 101 So. 338 (1924) (question as to whether juror believed in the right of In State v. Webb, supra, this Court stated: '. . . It is not permissible......
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State v. Pizzolotto
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