State v. Webb
| Decision Date | 15 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | (SC 14409) |
| Citation | 750 A.2d 448,252 Conn. 128 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DANIEL WEBB |
McDonald, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Sullivan and Callahan, Js. Mark Rademacher, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Rosita M. Creamer and Dennis J. O'Connor, senior assistant state's attorneys, for the appellee (state).
In State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 680 A.2d 147 (1996), we affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence of death for the crime of capital felony. We remanded the case to the trial court, however, for a hearing concerning the validity under the state constitution of lethal injection as a means of execution. We retained jurisdiction. Id., 551. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court, Fasano, J., denied the defendant's constitutional challenge to General Statutes § 54-100,1 which establishes lethal injection as the state's present method of execution. The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to this court. In the present appeal, we must decide whether lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The procedural posture of this case prior to our remand was set forth in State v. Webb, supra, 238 Conn. 392-401. Id., 394-96.
Subsequent to the defendant's conviction and sentencing but prior to our decision, the legislature amended § 54-100,4 changing the method of capital punishment from death by electrocution to death by lethal injection. On July 23, 1997, the department of correction (department) approved its lethal injection execution protocol, directive 6.15 (protocol).5 Because the defendant sought the opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of execution by lethal injection, we remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing as to that issue.
The trial court, Fasano, J., on remand, conducted an evidentiary hearing concerning the constitutionality of the department's protocol as well as the constitutionality of death by lethal injection, generally. The defendant offered testimony from the following witnesses at the hearing: Peter Matos and Jack Tokozn, deputy commissioners of correction, who were responsible for organizing and assembling the task force that ultimately formulated the protocol; Bret Rayford, a psychologist, who screened department employees who would participate in the procedure; Thomas Macura, a pharmacist, who was responsible for developing the process and selecting the chemical agents used in lethal injection; Edward Blanchette, a physician, who would be responsible for the certification of death subsequent to any execution by lethal injection; and Edward Brunner, an anesthesiologist, who testified to the risks associated with the method of lethal injection dictated by the protocol.6 The state offered testimony from Jeffrey Gross, an anesthesiologist, who testified regarding the amount of pain to a defendant who is subject to execution by lethal injection under the protocol, the safeguards included in the protocol, and the skill and training necessary successfully to carry out the procedure.
According to Matos, state officials conferred with officials of at least six other states that employed lethal injection. The state ultimately selected a manifold system for the administration of the agents. Although other states utilize a manual process, which requires that each chemical agent be administered individually through separate syringes, the task force selected the manifold system because that system minimized the potential for problems associated with the administration of the agents. The manifold locks the agents in a particular order and, as a result, eliminates the risk of inserting a syringe in an improper sequence. Matos also described the type of catheter selected by the state, which was designed and intended for delivering fluids sequentially and rapidly.
Brunner and Gross testified about each chemical agent prescribed by the protocol, the effect of those agents and the result of introducing those agents in the dosage and order prescribed by the protocol. The first agent, thiopental sodium, typically induces a state of unconsciousness through depression of the central nervous system. The protocol prescribes 2500 milligrams of thiopental sodium. This dosage of thiopental sodium is approximately nine times the typical dosage for surgery for an individual weighing 150 pounds, and would take effect within fifteen to twenty seconds and then dissipate after five to seven minutes. Because the effect of thiopental sodium varies from person to person, there is no known lethal dosage. The second agent, pancuronium bromide, causes skeletal muscle relaxation, in essence, paralysis. The protocol prescribes 100 milligrams of pancuronium bromide. This dosage of pancuronium bromide is approximately ten times the normal dosage and would take effect within two minutes. The third agent, potassium chloride, is intended to cause a decrease in blood pressure, shock, cardiac arrhythmia and complete heart blockage. The protocol prescribes 120 milliequivalent of potassium chloride, a lethal dose, which would stop the heart instantly. Both anesthesiologists concluded that, if properly administered, the combination of agents together with the prescribed dosage would result in a quick, painless death.
The protocol requires the insertion of the intravenous catheter by persons trained to the satisfaction of a Connecticut licensed and practicing physician. See footnote 5 of this opinion. According to Matos, the state intends to employ either emergency medical technicians, paramedics or nurses to insert the intravenous catheter and administer the agents. At a minimum, therefore, those employed by the state previously will have demonstrated or previously will have acquired certification in obtaining intravenous access. Gross testified that the procedure is commonly taught to lay people in advanced life support courses, which many emergency medical technicians and paramedics complete.
After the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's state constitutional challenge to Connecticut's method of execution by lethal injection. The trial court, recognizing that the state constitution does not contain a specific prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, addressed the defendant's arguments on due process grounds. Relying on its previous decision in State v. Breton, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CR4-147941 (November 14, 1997), the court concluded that the defendant had failed to satisfy his burden of proving § 54-100 unconstitutional. The trial court also rejected the defendant's other arguments. As to the defendant's argument, that using or incorporating medical procedures for the purpose of killing inmates is so abhorrent and shocking to the conscience as to constitute a violation of substantive due process, the trial court reasoned that the employment of tested procedures used in the practice of medicine is consistent with the purpose behind the imposition of death by lethal injection, which is to impose death in as humane a manner as possible.7 The trial court also rejected the defendant's argument that § 54-100 is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it provides no notice to the inmate as to the specific procedures for carrying out the sentence of death or any opportunity to challenge the method because of the ability of the commissioner of correction to change the procedures of execution. The trial court noted the lack of authority to support the proposition that the legislature constitutionally was required to provide the defendant with any detailed form of notice with respect to the procedures of execution. Finally, the trial court declined to address the defendant's argument that § 54-100 violates the state's separation of powers doctrine, reasoning that that claim was beyond the scope of the remand from this court.
On appeal, the defendant argues that execution by lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under both the state and federal constitutions because the protocol developed by the commissioner of correction carries an unacceptably high risk that the execution procedure will be "botched." The defendant argues that there is a high risk that the defendant will experience excruciating pain and a lingering death because the protocol: (1) does not require that the procedures be administered by highly trained medical professionals; (2) does not ensure that a sufficient amount of thiopental sodium will be administered to render the defendant unconscious; (3) does not require that the agents be administered in a timely manner, in the correct order and...
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