State v. Webber

Decision Date30 December 1998
Docket NumberNo. 21990,21990
Citation982 S.W.2d 317
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Terri WEBBER, a/k/a Annie Ames, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Larry Maples, Carthage, Attorney for Appellant.

Duane A. Cooper, Pineville, Attorney for Respondent.

Before SHRUM, P.J., MONTGOMERY, J., and GARRISON, C.J.

PER CURIAM.

Terry Webber, a/k/a Annie Ames ("Appellant"), was convicted by a jury of one count of the class A misdemeanor of resisting arrest and one count of the class D felony of unlawful use of a weapon. The trial court granted a new trial on the charge of unlawful use of a weapon and sentenced Appellant to time served on the resisting arrest charge. 1 Appellant now appeals from the judgment and sentence for resisting arrest.

On May 22, 1996, Sergeant Miles Parks of the Missouri Highway Patrol, along with two other Highway Patrol troopers and a deputy from the McDonald County Sheriff's Department, went to the property where Appellant was residing to arrest her on an outstanding warrant for failing to appear on a traffic citation. Sergeant Parks shouted an announcement of their arrival and identified himself and the others as law enforcement officers. All of the officers except Sergeant Parks were in uniform. Appellant appeared in a window of the home on the property and began yelling something to the effect of, "What do you want? You have no business here. You're trespassing." She also produced a handgun which was pointed in the general direction of the officers, although not aimed at any of them. She held the gun out the window for approximately thirty seconds, then removed the gun from the officers' sight. The officers informed Appellant that they had a warrant for her arrest, to which Appellant responded that the officers needed a search warrant to come in and get her, she was not going to jail, and the officers could have another "Ruby Ridge" if that is what they wanted. 2 The officers left the property shortly thereafter.

Later that day, Appellant called a local television station and asked that they come to the property. When the reporter arrived, Appellant was carrying a rifle and wearing a pistol on her hip and a knife on her back. During the interview, when asked what she would do if the officers came back, Appellant responded, "You see I'm armed don't you." Some clips from this interview were broadcasted on local news.

In her first point on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in making a comment in the presence of the jury with regard to testimony which Appellant's attorney was attempting to elicit from her. The comment in question is that which is italicized in the following quote from the trial transcript:

[Appellant's Counsel]: Now, let's talk about a little bit why you're here today. Okay? And I guess initially it started with a traffic citation?

[Appellant]: Right.

[Appellant's Counsel]: Okay. Just in a few words tell us what happened and what you did. Okay?

[Appellant]: What?

[Prosecutor]: I'm going to object to the relevance of this, Your Honor.

[Court]: I--I'm having trouble seeing the relevancy here. You want to--

[Appellant's Counsel]: Oh, Judge, all I want the witness to say is just that she had a citation, and then I don't want her to see--don't want her to tell how she got it, just that she has the citation and what--how she fought it to the upper Supreme Court.

[Court]: Well, just make it snappy because I don't think it amounts to much.

(Emphasis added.)

Appellant contends that this comment deprived her of a fair trial because it appeared to state the trial court's opinion on the testimony, and it indicated the court's impatience with Appellant's attorney. 3 She concedes, however, that she did not object to the comment at trial, and thus she requests that we review for plain error under Rule 30.20. 4 Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must impact so substantially upon the rights of the defendant that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice would result if left uncorrected. State v. Jackson, 836 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo.App. E.D.1992). In this instance, we will review for plain error pursuant to this standard.

A trial judge is to maintain absolute impartiality during proceedings to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. State v. Jones, 921 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Mo.App. W.D.1996). Accordingly, the court must maintain a position of neutrality and should avoid any conduct which might be construed as indicating a belief on the part of the judge as to the defendant's guilt. State v. Sykes, 628 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Mo.1982). The issue is whether the remarks by the trial judge could have prejudiced the minds of the jury against the defendant. Sykes, 628 S.W.2d at 655-56. Whether there was prejudice depends on the context and words in each case. Jackson, 836 S.W.2d at 6. There is no error as long as the trial judge does not express an opinion as to the nature, content, or truthfulness of evidence. Id. at 7.

In State v. Moseley, 705 S.W.2d 613 (Mo.App. E.D.1986), the prosecution objected to the testimony of a defense witness on the ground that the witness had no basis to form an opinion as to the defendant's reputation. The judge questioned the witness and sustained the objection. On redirect examination, however, the defense counsel again sought to elicit testimony from the witness regarding the defendant's reputation. The judge again questioned the witness, but this time, he admitted the testimony stating, "I'll leave it in for whatever it's worth." There, the court stated that the judge's comment fell short of violating the standard of fairness and impartiality required of the trial court. Id. at 616.

In State v. Wren, 486 S.W.2d 447 (Mo.1972), the following exchange occurred:

[Defense Counsel]: What do you [police officers] ask them [suspects] when you stop [chasing them]?

[The Court]: You will have to develop that it serves some useful purpose. I can't see any useful purpose in this line of inquiry.

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, it will become relevant, because the defendant was afraid.

[Prosecutor]: I object to the question on the grounds of immateriality, Your Honor.

[The Court]: I think the objection is well justified, but I will overrule you and allow you to develop this ad nauseum. Go ahead and proceed. Ask your questions.

The Missouri Supreme Court held that the trial court's conduct degraded the defense counsel as a person and detracted from the evidence's worth in the eyes of the jury. The Court stated that "[t]he defense being offered was tenuous at best; but, if admissible at all, defendant was entitled to have it presented to the jury free of the stamp of disapproval placed there by the trial court." Id. at 449.

The comment in the instant case falls short of that in Wren. The comment did not indicate the court's belief with regard to the guilt of Appellant, and it was not degrading to the defense. It does not appear to have been so prejudicial to Appellant that it impacted so substantially upon her rights that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice would result if left uncorrected. No plain error being demonstrated, Appellant's first point is denied.

For her next point on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling her motion for a mistrial when Sergeant Parks violated a motion in limine by referring to a man named Robert Joos in his testimony. From the record, it appears that Mr. Joos was well-known to area law enforcement officials in that they had been to his property on several occasions. Furthermore, Mr. Joos had recently been involved as the defendant in a highly publicized trial, and a local television station had done a story on Annie Ames and Robert Joos. Appellant argues that she had a right not to be convicted based on her association with others, and that the trial court had previously granted Appellant's motion in limine to exclude any reference to Robert Joos and Appellant's association with him.

On the day of trial, counsel for Appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude any mention of Robert Joos. The trial court agreed that no reference should be made to him during trial except that the court would ask during voir dire whether any of the jurors had heard of him. If any had heard of him they were to be individually questioned outside the presence of the other jurors. Furthermore, the Prosecutor was to tell her witnesses not to make any mention of Robert Joos.

During voir dire, the trial court asked the jurors if any of them knew Robert Joos. Five jurors had heard of him, but none of these jurors served on the twelve-member jury at Appellant's trial.

During trial the following occurred:

[Sergeant Parks]: We went to Annie Ames' residence.

[Prosecutor]: And where is that located?

* * *

Okay. And how did you get there?

[Sergeant Parks]: I think we went out down double--or K through Huckleberry Ridge Forest and back up a gravel road through four or five miles of gravel road to the Robert Joos property.

[Prosecutor]: Okay. When you arrived at the property, how do [sic] you get to the house?

[Sergeant Parks]: You travel down a gravel lane. It's a mile off the county road.

[Defense Counsel]: Judge, can we approach? ... I think we had a motion in limine and they instructed the Prosecutor to instruct his witnesses not to make any reference to Robert Joos. The first opportunity this officer had is to get this surname in [sic]. I think it's malicious. It's done purposely to pressure the jury to get this client convicted because of the association with Mr. Joos. There was no--It wasn't necessary for him to make that comment. And I think this officer, he's--He knows better. He has been a law enforcement officer 25(sic) years. This is not the first time he's testified.... But I'm saying I'm just going to ask for a mistrial because we explicitly said not to make any reference to Robert Joos during...

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