State v. Weed
| Decision Date | 27 September 1940 |
| Docket Number | No. 32660.,32660. |
| Citation | 294 N.W. 370,208 Minn. 342 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. CARLTON v. WEED, Justice of Peace. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Frank L. King, of Alexandria, for relator.
C. Fred Hanson, Co. Atty., and R. S. Thornton, City Atty., both of Alexandria, for respondent.
This is a proceeding for a writ of prohibition against Frank A. Weed, a justice of the peace in the city of Alexandria, restraining him from proceeding in an action then pending in his court entitled State of Minnesota v. J. M. Carlton. Defendant Carlton is the relator here.
Carlton was prosecuted for failure to pay for lodging. He was brought before justice of the peace Youtz, where he entered a plea of not guilty. Youtz set the case for trial on July 2, 1940, at which time defendant voluntarily appeared and the case was heard by respondent, justice of the peace Frank A. Weed, without objection. Respondent found Carlton guilty as charged, and ordered a 30-day sentence suspended upon condition that Carlton pay the innkeeper, the complainant in the criminal action, the sum of money determined to be due. Relator did not pay the money, but applied for this writ of prohibition.
Alexandria is incorporated under a home rule charter. Shortly before the filing of the complaint in the criminal action, a municipal court was established there pursuant to the laws of 1895, and a judge thereof appointed.
Relator raises several questions, but as we view the case, only one is determinative. That is the question whether the justice of the peace had jurisdiction. Mason Minn.St.1927, § 221, provides: This statute as it appeared in R. L.1905, § 131, did not contain the words "without a jury" (above italicized). L. 1913, c. 104, made that addition, and in all other respects substantially re-enacted the statute as found in R.L.1905, § 131.
General Statutes 1894, § 5093, defined the general jurisdiction and operation of justice courts in criminal matters. Subsection [4] of that section provides: "To cause to come before them persons who are charged with committing any criminal offence, and commit them to jail, or bail them, as the case may require." Laws 1905, c. 104, § 1, amended this subsection by adding thereto the following "Provided, however, that no justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction of any offenses committed within the limits of any city or village wherein a municipal court is organized and existing, but such offenses, otherwise cognizable by justices of the peace, and those arising under the charter ordinances or by-laws of the city or village shall be examined or tried by the municipal court therein existing; provided, this act shall not apply to territory within one-half mile of the outer limits of the state fair grounds." By L.1907, c. 234, the law was changed to the form now found in § 9110[4], Mason Minn.St.1927, by the addition of the further limitation that "this act shall not apply to any cities or villages having justice of the peace courts established by home rule charter * * *."
We therefore have three enactments to consider: The law prior to 1907 which deprived justices of jurisdiction where municipal courts were established, the 1913 amendment thereof eliminating jury trials in prosecutions under ordinances, and the intermediate act of 1907 which excepted justices in home rule municipalities from such deprivation of jurisdiction. Statutes are said to be in "pari materia" when they relate to the same matter or subject even though some are specific and some general and even though they have not been enacted simultaneously and do not refer to each other expressly. Crawford on Statutory Construction, § 231; Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 32 S.Ct. 27, 56 L.Ed. 110; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N.E. 469, 33 L.R.A. 313. Although there is some authority to the contrary, the majority, and we think the wisest, rule is that resort may be had to statutes in pari materia. The reason is that all statutes which relate to the same subject matter were presumably enacted in accord with the same general legislative policy, and that together they constitute an harmonious and uniform system of law. Crawford, Statutory Construction, § 232, p. 435; Sedgwick on Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, 2 Ed., p. 209, et seq. See also our opinion in Christgau v. Woodlawn Cemetery Ass'n, 293 N.W. 619, filed July 26, 1940.
Apparently the sole purpose of the 1913 act was to eliminate jury trials in cases involving ordinances. It took no cognizance of the 1907 act. The question then is whether the enactment of 1913, (Mason Minn.St.1927, § 221) abrogates the 1907 law (Mason Minn.St.1927, § 9110 [4]). Repeal by implication is not favored by the courts, nor is the ousting of jurisdiction of a court. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 8th Ed., c. VII. On page 140, Maxwell says: "Where a section in a statute is merely a reenactment of a section in a previous statu...
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