State v. Weldon

• Decision Date: 05 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 12PA84,12PA84
• Citation: 333 S.E.2d 701,314 N.C. 401
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Supora WELDON.

Page 701

333 S.E.2d 701

314 N.C. 401

STATE of North Carolina v. Supora WELDON.

No. 12PA84.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 5, 1985.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by George W. Lennon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the state.

Adam Stein, Appellate Defender by Lorinzo L. Joyner and Gordon Widenhouse, Asst. Appellate Defenders, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.

EXUM, Justice.

This case presents two dispositive issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that on two occasions other than that for which defendant was convicted, police found heroin in or near defendant's house; and (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of police officers that defendant's house had a reputation as a place where illegal drugs were bought and sold? We answer the first question no and the second yes. However, finding this latter error to be harmless, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I.

Defendant was arrested and charged with trafficking in heroin on 8 February 1982 after police, armed with a search warrant, discovered thirty (30) bindles (6.1 grams) of heroin hidden beneath a pile of clothing in defendant's living room. Police obtained the search warrant after an informant advised them that he observed a sale of heroin at defendant's house earlier in the day. In addition to the heroin, police found $449 in cash on defendant's person.

Defendant shared the house, which was leased solely to her, with a boyfriend, four adult children, a teenaged daughter and a nephew. Friends of defendant's adult children habitually congregated to drink alcoholic beverages beside a large oil drum which stood in front of defendant's house and in which a fire was maintained in cold weather.

At trial, police officers were allowed to testify over objection that defendant's house had a reputation as a place where illegal drugs could be bought or sold. Police also testified that on two other occasions, a search of defendant's house led to the discovery of heroin. On 9 December 1981, police discovered a number of bags of heroin beneath a sofa on which defendant was seated with two other people. On a table in front of defendant police on this occasion also found two bags of marijuana, a needle and syringe, and $648. On 30 May 1982, police discovered heroin under a garbage container five feet from the rear door of defendant's house and found approximately $200 on defendant's person.

Defendant testified in her defense. She denied knowing to whom the heroin belonged or how it got into her house. She also testified that on 8 February she had $449 in cash because she had recently received her government fuel assistance check for almost $200, a Social Security check for her grandson for $239; and her daughter had given her $25 to pay off a parking ticket.

II.

In her first assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing police officers to testify about their discoveries at defendant's premises on two occasions other than the one for which defendant was on trial. Defendant contends this testimony amounted to evidence that defendant committed other distinct crimes and was therefore inadmissible.

To convict defendant of trafficking in heroin, a violation of N.C.G.S. 90-95(h)(4)a, the state was required to prove that defendant knowingly possessed the 6.1 grams of heroin found in her house on 8 February 1982. "Felonious possession of a controlled substance has two essential elements. The substance must be possessed, and the substance must be knowingly possessed." State v. Rogers, 32 N.C.App. 274, 278, 231 S.E.2d 919, 922 (1977). "An accused's possession of narcotics may be actual or constructive. He has possession of the contraband material ... when he has both the power and intent to control its disposition or use." State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 12, 187 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1972). "The requirements of power and intent necessarily imply that a defendant must be aware of the presence of an illegal drug if he is to be convicted of possessing it." State v. Davis, 20 N.C.App. 191, 192, 201 S.E.2d 61, 62 (1973), disc. rev. denied, 284 N.C. 618, 202 S.E.2d 274 (1974). "When such materials are found on the premises under the control of the accused, this fact, in and of itself, gives rise to an inference of knowledge and possession which may be sufficient to carry the case to the jury on a charge of unlawful possession." State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. at 12, 187 S.E.2d at 714.

Defendant here did not deny that the heroin was found on her premises on all three occasions. She does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence. Her entire defense was directed toward persuading the jury that she had no knowledge of the presence of the heroin and, in the words of her brief, "would not knowingly allow anyone to use drugs in her house."

The Court of Appeals, in upholding the trial court's admission of the contested evidence, said: "The evidence complained of was expressly offered by the state to show defendant's 'guilty knowledge' of the presence and character of the drugs found during the February 1982 search." 65 N.C.App. at 378, 309 S.E.2d at 265. The Court of Appeals concluded that evidence of other discoveries of heroin at defendant's house was relevant to the issue of defendant's guilty knowledge.

The well-established rule in North Carolina is that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible on the issue of guilt if its only relevance is to show defendant's bad character or disposition to commit an offense similar to the one charged. State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954). McClain also teaches, however, as defendant acknowledges, that the general rule prohibiting admission of "other crimes" evidence does have exceptions. See State v. McClain, 240 N.C. at 174-76, 81 S.E.2d at 366-68. Two of those exceptions, held applicable to the present case by the Court of Appeals, were discussed by this Court in State v. Willis, 309 N.C. 451, 456, 306 S.E.2d 779, 782-83 (1983):

The rule in McClain establishes that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible if its only relevance is to show the character of the accused. The exceptions to this rule of inadmissibility, also set out in McClain, are as well established as the rule itself. Two of these exceptions read as follows:

2. Where a specific mental intent or state is an essential element of the crime charged, evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of the accused as tend to establish the requisite mental intent or state, even though the evidence discloses the commission of another offense by the accused....

3. Where guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime charged evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of the accused as tend to establish the requisite guilty knowledge, even though the evidence reveals the commission of another offense by the accused.... 240 N.C. at 175 .

Defendant contends that notwithstanding these exceptions, admission of the disputed evidence in this case was error because there is no direct evidence linking defendant to commission of the other crimes offered by the state to show guilty knowledge. Where "other crimes" evidence does not sufficiently connect defendant to the other crimes, it is not admissible for any purpose, defendant argues.

Defendant relies heavily upon State v. Breeden, 306 N.C. 533, 293 S.E.2d 788 (1982). In Breeden, defendant was being tried for the armed robbery of Horne's Grocery and Package Store on Person Street in Fayetteville. The evidence tended to show that defendant and an accomplice entered the store, wearing ski-type masks and, at gunpoint, took money from the cash register and personal items from two employees and two customers. Three of the victims identified defendant as one of the perpetrators. As further evidence of defendant's identity, the state sought to offer evidence which it contended tended to show that defendant and his accomplice had within fourteen hours of the grocery store robbery also robbed a Wiener King located approximately 100 yards from the grocery store. The state contended that the two robberies were so similar that the jury could infer both offenses were committed by the same persons; therefore evidence that defendant had committed the Wiener King robbery tended to prove that he also committed the grocery store robbery. Further the state argued that the evidence tended to show that both robberies were the product of a common scheme or plan; therefore evidence that defendant committed one tended to show that he also committed the other.

The witness to the Wiener King robbery, Thomas Odom, was not able positively to identify defendant as one of the two robbers of that establishment. He testified to certain circumstances which tended to indicate that defendant might have been one of the robbers but as this Court noted there was "no direct evidence that defendant was one of the two men who robbed the Wiener King." 306 N.C. at 536, 293 S.E.2d at 791. This Court concluded, therefore, that evidence of the "other crime" was not admissible on the issue of identification. The Court said, "Had the defendant been identified as one of the participants in the Wiener King robbery, the evidence of that crime would have been admissible here on the issue of identification ... but the failure to identify defendant as a participant in the Wiener King robbery ... makes the evidence inadmissible...." 306 N.C. at 537, 293 S.E.2d at 791.

Defendant argues the evidence offered by the state in this case to show her guilty knowledge suffers from the same fatal flaw as that offered in Breeden to show identity. She says there is no direct evidence that she knowingly possessed the contraband on the other occasions and the evidence relating to these other occasions is at best circumstantial on the issue of her guilt of these other possessions, like it was in Breeden.

Defendant fails to appreciate the difference between the theories upon...