State v. Welty, 9416-9-II
| Decision Date | 08 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 9416-9-II,9416-9-II |
| Citation | 726 P.2d 472,44 Wn.App. 281 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Raymond WELTY, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Gary P. Burleson, Pros. Atty., and Victoria Meadows, Deputy Pros. Atty., Shelton, for appellant.
Charles Williams, Tumwater, for respondent.
Raymond Welty was determined by the sentencing judge to be a first-time offender (RCW 9.94A.030(12); RCW 9.94A.120(5)), after he pleaded guilty to five non-violent felony charges alleged in two informations. Accordingly, the sentence imposed was below the range set by the Sentencing Reform Act for the same crimes committed by a defendant with a prior felony conviction. The State filed an appeal, contending that Welty was not a first-time offender, because he was sentenced on multiple felony convictions. The sentence in question is not appealable. RCW 9.94A.210(1). However, because the issue raised is of first impression and a decision will be of assistance to the profession, we elect to treat the State's notice of appeal as a motion for discretionary review. RAP 6.2. We accept review, and affirm.
RCW 9.94A.120(5) provides:
In sentencing a first-time offender, other than a person convicted of a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW [sexual offenses] or RCW 9A.64.020 [incest], the court may waive the imposition of a sentence within the sentence range and impose a sentence which may include up to ninety days of confinement [and] up to two years of community supervision, ...
RCW 9.94A.030(12) defines "first time offender" as:
[A]ny person convicted of a felony not classified as a violent offense under this chapter, who previously has never been convicted of a felony in this state, federal court, or another state, and who has never participated in a program of deferred prosecution for a felony offense.
The State concedes that the offenses in question were not classified as violent, and that Welty was not sentenced under Chapter 9A.44 RCW or RCW 9A.64.020, has not been previously convicted of a felony in any jurisdiction, and has never participated in a deferred prosecution program. However, it argues that because he was simultaneously convicted and sentenced on five felony counts, he does not fall within the statutory definition of first offender.
The State contends that "any person convicted of a felony" clearly means "any person convicted of one, and only one, felony." We cannot agree. Legislatures often use "a" in the sense of "any," and apply it to more than one individual object. Black's Law Dictionary p. 1 (4th ed. 1969). In most cases, courts will construe "a" as applying to the plural as well as the singular, unless a contrary intention appears on the face of the statute. See RCW 1.12.050; 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Stat Const § 47.34 (4th ed 1984). No such contrary intention appears on the face of RCW 9.94A.030(12). At most, the statute is ambiguous. In construing an ambiguous criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires us to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the defendant. State v. Hartley, 41 Wash.App. 669, 673, 705 P.2d 821 (1985).
The State also contends that its interpretation is supported by the general purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. It notes that a principal goal of the Act is to achieve uniform, commensurate punishment for all offenders--in other words, to punish like crimes alike, and different crimes differently. RCW 9.94A.010. To sentence Welty as a first-time offender, the State argues, would be to treat him like someone who has been convicted of only one crime, thus violating the principles of uniformity and proportionality.
The State is partly right. The Act generally renounces the rehabilitative ideal of punishment, by which judges were given broad discretion to tailor sentences to the individual defendant, in favor of a policy of uniformity and proportionality of punishment. D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington §§ 2.1-2.5 (1985). The Act greatly restricts a sentencing judge's discretion, setting specific sentence ranges for each offender that depend on his crime and criminal history.
However, where first-time offenders are concerned, the Legislature has recognized that the rehabilitative ideal has potential efficacy. Boerner, § 7.1. Pre...
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