State v. West, 27243.
| Decision Date | 03 January 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27243. |
| Citation | 197 Wash. 595,86 P.2d 192 |
| Parties | STATE v. WEST. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Fred Hartzell West was convicted of robbery and was thereafter found to be an habitual criminal and was sentenced to life imprisonment, and he appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Robert M. Jones, judge.
Fred Hartzell West, Seattle, in pro per.
B. Gray Warner and John M. Schermer, both of Seattle, for the State.
On July 21, 1937, in a trial Before the Honorable Robert M. Jones, a judge of the superior court of King county, the appellant Hartzell West, was found guilty of the crime of robbery. A motion in arrest of judgment and for new trial was at once interposed by his then attorney, Will Lanning, supported by affidavits. Counter-affidavits were filed on behalf of the state. On October 16, 1937, the motion was denied by the trial judge, and judgment and sentence was, on motion of the state, postponed, pending the disposition of an habitual criminal charge filed the same day.
In this supplemental information drawn against the appellant as Hartzell West, alias Fred H. West, it was charged that, prior to the conviction of robbery, West had been convicted in the state of Oregon on March 17, 1924, of knowingly uttering and publishing a forged bank check, and, in Seattle, on September 5, 1930, of burglary in the second degree. In the trial on this information, heard Before the Honorable Howard M Findley, judge of the superior court of King county on April 14, 1938, Will Lanning having withdrawn as his counsel, the defendant conducted his own defense, assisted by Charles W Johnson, Jr., a regularly licensed attorney of good standing appointed by the court. The jury returned special verdicts, finding West had been duly and legally convicted at each of the prior times as charged, and a general verdict, finding him to be an habitual criminal. To this verdict was appended a statement, signed by the foreman of the jury, which reads as follows: 'The jury unanimously ask the court to extend extreme leniency.'
A motion for a new trial was duly filed. On April 28, 1938, the motion was denied, and West was sentenced to life imprisonment. Oral notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence was given in open court. The particulars in the foregoing statement are taken from a transcript of the records of the court.
If we are to accept the appellant's statement as true, he requested the presiding judge of the superior court to appoint an attorney to assist him on the appeal, and the request was refused, on the ground that there was no statute authorizing such an appointment. At any rate, no attorney of record appeared for him in this court. The appellant, according to his own statement, prepared his own briefs, assisted informally by some attorney whose name is not disclosed. He orally argued the case Before us with such ability and understanding as to make it rather difficult to believe that he has not had, at least, the rudiments of a legal education.
His assignment of errors is as follows:
'(c) He was guilty of instilling undue prejudice resulting in unjust condemnation.
'6. Evidence presented by the State was insufficient to justify the verdict.
There is no statement of facts in the record. There is a handwritten document signed by the appellant, which appears, from the file mark of the clerk of King county, to have been filed on June 17, 1938. The first division of this document, headed 'Statement of the Case,' contains two pages purporting to relate what happened at the trial of the habitual criminal charge. This is followed by one page 'Assignment of Errors,' which is followed by a general title 'Statement of Facts,' covering the trial on the original information concerning the robbery. This is told on three pages, and is followed by seven pages labelled 'Argument.' The document is signed by the appellant, but is not certified in any manner; nor are the matters which are sent here, purporting to be exhibits, certified to or in any way officially made a part of the record.
It follows, of course, that we cannot consider any of the assignments, except, possibly, the seventh. Obviously, we cannot accept the bare personal word of the appellant as to what occurred at the trial regarding his application for continuance (Assignment 1); or concerning the court's refusal to substitute counsel (Assignment 2); or that the court erred in rejecting evidence (Assignments 3 and 4); or that the prosecuting attorney was guilty of gross misconduct (Assignment 5); or that the evidence presented by the state was insufficient to justify the verdict (Assignment 6).
In view of the fact that appellant is appealing from a life sentence and acting as his own attorney, we have given the record most careful consideration. Plainly, there is but one alternative, either to affirm the judgment and sentence or to take some extraordinary and unprecedented step, such as remanding the matter to the trial court with some sort of a direction looking to the ultimate preparation and transmittal to this court of a certified statement of facts or, at least, the certification of the statement prepared by the appellant. Assuming that we have the power to do that, the question is, do the circumstances show that the power ought to be exercised? In answering this question, we are at liberty to consider everything in our files bearing upon the matter.
The rule which requires the appellant in a criminal case to file a certified statement of facts or bill of exceptions with the clerk of this court within sixty days after appeal is taken is a salutary one, enacted to insure that punishment for crime shall not be too long delayed, and thus, in some degree, fail of its purpose. Our reports are replete with cases where it has been rigidly enforced. No exception to it should be allowed, unless, at least, there is a very clear showing that to enforce it would constitute a denial of justice.
It is clear from our records...
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