State v. West

Decision Date21 November 1969
Docket NumberNo. 40897,40897
Citation173 N.W.2d 468,285 Minn. 188
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. William G. WEST, Appellant.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under the plain language of Minn.St. 595.07, the prosecutor has a right to cross-examine a defendant regarding the fact of conviction, the nature of the offense, and the identity of the defendant. Only questions relating to the details of the prior crime which are so improper that prejudice results in the minds of the jurors require a reversal.

2. The evidence overwhelmingly establishes defendant's guilt. Since it appears that the weight of the evidence is such that he would have been found guilty regardless of allegedly improper argument by the prosecutor, a new trial will not be granted on that ground.

Robins & Meshbesher, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George M. Scott, County Atty., Henry W. McCarr, asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

OPINION

NELSON, Justice.

Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion for a new trial and from a judgment of conviction of burglary and theft. An information charging him with commission of these crimes was filed January 25, 1967.

The evidence upon which the jury returned verdicts of guilty may be summarized as follows: Officers David Simondet and Ronald Pavlock of the Golden Valley Police Department, while on general patrol in their squad car at 3:35 a.m. on the morning of January 16, 1967, were approaching the eastbound lane of U.S. Highway No. 12 from the southernmost roadway of County Road No. 18 on the cloverleaf when they observed a 1966 Pontiac car driving west in the eastbound lane of Highway No. 12. As the car approached in the wrong lane, the patrolmen turned on their red light and followed the vehicle approximately one block, at which time the right front door of the vehicle opened and an object, some 2 feet square, fell out. The patrolmen pursued the vehicle, which subsequently made a turn into the westbound lane. They noticed nothing unusual about the way the driver turned or controlled his car. Finally, half a mile from the point where the officers commenced the 'chase,' defendant pulled over.

The officers observed that the trunk of defendant's vehicle was open approximately 4 to 5 inches and was held together with either a wire or a rope. There appeared to be a polished cabinet of some type inside the trunk. The officers also noticed an odor of alcohol when talking to defendant and asked him if he had been drinking. He said he had had one beer.

Officer Pavlock directed defendant to get into the squad car, after which, according to his testimony--

'* * * I then took my flashlight and searched inside the car, observed in the car. There was some brown wrapping paper on the back seat. I looked under the front seat, and there was a pair of gloves and a pipe wrench under there. I then closed the door of the vehicle, walked back to the squad car, wrote down what I observed on a pad of paper letting Officer Simondet know what I had observed.'

Another officer who was driving east on Highway No. 12 observed a television set lying alongside the roadway. He retrieved the set and took it to the place where defendant had been apprehended. Defendant was placed under arrest and given a Miranda card. Thereupon, the arresting officers searched defendant's automobile. The trunk contained a colored television set and a mall with a shortened handle. Two screwdrivers, one with a bent tip used for entry and termed 'a latch picking screwdriver,' and two walkietalkies were found in the glove compartment.

Upon further search the officers found a pipe wrench under the front seat, a pair of black gloves, and two more screwdrivers. Following this, Sergeant Melvin Kilbo commenced a search of the general vicinity and found that the door of Northern States Radio Service, inc., a television and radio dealership located in the shopping center near Turner's crossroads, 'came open in his hands.' Tire tracks could be seen 'at an angle to the front entrance of the store.' There were marks around the lock assembly of the door, making it apparent that forcible entry had been made into the store. A mat was found at the entrance and marks across the floor, indicating that objects had been dragged across the floor with the mat. A pry bar was also discovered lying on a bench just outside the entrance.

William Forsyth, part owner and secretary-treasurer of Northern States Radio Service, Inc., was called and upon arrival at the store determined that two television sets were missing.

Defendant testified that he attended a party with several friends on the evening of January 15, 1967, at Art Song's Tea House in Hopkins, and that he was drinking continually throughout the evening. He declared that he could not recall when he left the party, adding that he knew he was intoxicated. He said the next thing he recalled was a truck coming toward him. Realizing he was on the wrong side of the highway and noticing a red light behind him, he turned over to the right side of the highway rather than stop on the wrong side. Defendant insisted that he had no recollection of a burglary.

Two friends of defendant testified in his behalf, stating that they were with him at the party on the night of January 15, 1967; that he 'was drunk' but refused their offers of a ride home; that the party lasted until about 2 or 3 a.m.; and that they left at the same time as defendant. One of them described defendant as 'very drunk,' stating that he could 'hardly walk.' The other said defendant left the party at 2:30 a.m. in a state of intoxication '(a)s bad as I've ever seen him.' This witness said that defendant 'could hardly even talk.'

The arresting officers, however, who were experienced in arresting intoxicated persons, had a different view of defendant's state of sobriety. one of them noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant and the officer candidly added that he did not believe defendant's scene-of-apprehension claim that he 'had one beer to drink.' Nevertheless, this officer stated on redirect that he observed nothing unusual about defendant's appearance, his walk, or his talk--that he walked directly to the squad car after turning across the highway and coming to a stop. The other officer agreed that defendant did not appear to be intoxicated.

On cross-examination defendant was questioned about a prior burglary conviction occurring some 4 years earlier. Upon objection, the following took place at the bench:

'MR. MESHBESHER (counsel for defendant): I would request the Court for an order forbidding the County Attorney from asking any questions with respect to prior convictions on the ground that the sole purpose of this inquiry is to prejudice the Jury. It has no probative value in this matter. There is a prior conviction for the crime of burglary some three, four years ago, but there's actually no probative value for this testimony. It's offered solely for the purpose of allowing the Jury to draw inference that--from the fact that once convicted of a burglary must indicate that he was again guilty of this particular charge. And I think any probative value with regard to so-called credibility is completely outweighed by the highly prejudicial and inflammatory nature of the testimony involved in this case, and I think it should be forbidden from testimony from this Court.

'THE COURT: What is the purpose of the testimony, credibility?

'MR. RAPOPORT (assistant county attorney): Oh, definitely, Your Honor.

'THE COURT: Is that the purpose of it?

'MR. RAPOPORT: Similar crime.

'THE COURT: No, no. Credibility?

'MR. RAPOPORT: Credibility, yes.

'THE COURT: Credibility as a witness?

'MR. RAPOPORT: Oh, definitely, sir. We have a very unusual case here.

'THE COURT: Well, I know it, but that's the only legitimate purpose of this--

'MR. RAPOPORT: Well, it would definitely be for the credibility of this witness' testimony.

'MR. MESHBESHER: I think the County Attorney also mentioned something about similar crime, and that's what I'm afraid of.

'THE COURT: Well, he has--

'MR. RAPOPORT: I have a case here.

'THE COURT: Just a minute now. It is the Court's understanding that they do have the right to ask if you have been convicted of a crime going to the question of credibility. It is also the law, as the Court understands it, that they have the right to say, 'What was that crime?"

Defendant's objection was overruled. The court's instructions to the jury included the following language:

'* * * In evaluating testimony, ladies and gentlemen, and deciding the believability and the weight to be given to testimony, you may consider evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime. In doing so, you may consider whether the kind of crime committed indicates the likelihood of his telling or not telling the truth. This evidence, ladies and gentlemen, may be considered by you only for the purpose of testing the believability and the weight of the witness' testimony and for no other purpose. In other words, this defendant is only on trial in this case for the crimes charged in this particular Information. But this testimony as to the fact that he has been convicted of other crimes is limited solely to the purpose as to how it may affect his credibility as a witness in this particular case.'

Following the prosecuting attorney's closing argument to the jury, defendant moved for a mistrial based on prejudice because the prosecutor, defendant claims, continually expressed his own viewpoint as to the guilt of defendant rather than directing his argument to the evidence admitted and what that evidence in fact proved. The motion for a mistrial was denied. The jury, after deliberating, convicted defendant on both counts.

The issues raised by defendant on this appeal appear to be as follows: (1) Can a defendant in a criminal case, testifying on his own...

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    ...v. West, 357 Mass. 245, 258 N.E.2d 22 (1970); Bustillos v. State, 464 S.W.2d 118, 124 (Tex.Cr.App., 1971); State v. West, 285 Minn. 188, 173 N.W.2d 468 (1969); but See State v. Stewart, Minn., 209 N.W.2d 913 (1973); People v. Yeager, Colo., 513 P.2d 1057 (1973); State v. Busby, 486 S.W.2d 5......
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    ...A.2d 682 (1967); State v. Morris, 460 S.W.2d 624 (Mo.1970); Commonwealth v. West, 357 Mass. 245, 258 N.E.2d 22 (1970); State v. West, 285 Minn. 188, 173 N.W.2d 468 (1969) (expressing disfavor, but feeling compelled to defer to legislature). But the same analysis applies in assessing the fai......
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    ...Commonwealth v. West (1970) Mass., 258 N.E.2d 22.12 Bustillos v. State (Tex.Cr.App.1971), 464 S.W.2d 118, 124.13 State v. West (1969), 285 Minn. 188, 173 N.W.2d 468. The Michigan Supreme Court has asserted its paramount power over practice and procedure, including statutory rules of evidenc......
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