State v. Westfall
| Decision Date | 28 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 84078.,SC 84078. |
| Citation | 75 S.W.3d 278 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Reginald WESTFALL, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Dave C. Hemingway, Asst. Sp. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. General, Susan K. Glass, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, for respondent.
Reginald Westfall appeals from the trial court's judgment convicting him of first-degree assault and armed criminal action for which he was sentenced to two concurrent twenty-year terms in prison.1 The judgments as to these convictions are reversed and the case is remanded.2
After completing a job interview on the morning of February 2, 1999, Westfall walked to St. Pius School, which one of his daughters attended. According to Westfall, he saw his car, which appeared to be vacant, parked in the school parking lot.
He entered the front passenger side of the vehicle intending to wait there until his wife returned. Westfall and his wife were separated but their marriage had not been dissolved.
At trial Westfall would testify that as he entered the car he discovered Robert Jenkins, a man his wife had been seeing at various times during their separation, in the driver's seat leaning over into the rear seat. An altercation between the two men broke out after Westfall told Jenkins to get out of his car. Westfall claimed that Jenkins ended up kneeling over him in the front passenger seat, which had collapsed into the back seat, while beating him with what felt like a hard object. Westfall testified that in self-defense he pulled a carpet knife out of his overalls and blindly struck out with it cutting Jenkins several times around the head and neck in an attempt to "get him off me." Jenkins fled.
Jenkins's version of the event was that Westfall got into the car stating, "I'm going to teach you about messing with my wife," and that he then started cutting him. Jenkins testified that Westfall was the initial aggressor and it was only after Westfall attacked him with the carpet knife that he fought back.
The jury found Westfall guilty of first-degree assault and armed criminal action in connection with the fight. On appeal Westfall argues that the trial court erred in refusing to tender his proposed self-defense instruction, with respect to the first-degree assault charge, and for failing to conduct a hearing on newly discovered evidence demonstrating perjury in Jenkins and his wife's testimony. This Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. article V, section 10.
The Court will reverse due to instructional error "if there is error in submitting an instruction and prejudice to the defendant."3 To ascertain whether or not the omission of language from an instruction is error, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant and "the theory propounded by the defendant." 4
If the evidence tends to establish the defendant's theory, or supports differing conclusions, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on it.5
The general rule is that an instruction must be based upon substantial evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom.6 Substantial evidence of self-defense requiring instruction may come from the defendant's testimony alone as long as the testimony contains some evidence tending to show that he acted in self-defense.7 Moreover, an instruction on self-defense must be given when substantial evidence is adduced to support it, even when that evidence is inconsistent with the defendant's testimony.8 Even if no objection is made, the failure to instruct upon a defense supported by the evidence is plain error affecting substantial rights.9 This Court has also recognized that jury instruction, as to all potential convictions and defenses, is so essential to ensure a fair trial that if a reasonable juror could draw inferences from the evidence presented the defendant is not required to put on affirmative evidence to support a given instruction.10
The MAI self-defense instruction provides a selection of four formats with differing language to be used depending upon the evidence in any particular case. The instruction language proposed by Westfall, and refused by the trial court, must be used when "there is an issue as to whether the defendant used deadly force," and it authorized the jury to find that he used self-defense based on either the use of non-deadly force or deadly force.11 The trial court, however, instructed the jury with the formatted language used only "when the evidence is clear that deadly force was used by the defendant and there is no dispute as to that issue," 12 and the language used in that format predetermines for the jury that deadly force was used. Westfall claims that the evidence supports a factual dispute as to if deadly force was used and that the failure to give his tendered instruction was reversible error.
The heart of the matter is a factual question. Whether Westfall's use of the carpet knife during the physical altercation with Jenkins was "deadly force," or if Westfall's actions, several quick strikes with the knife inflicting superficial wounds around the face and neck, could constitute non-deadly force, or "physical force," for purposes of the alternative self-defense instruction? The distinction is critical because the standard for justifying non-deadly self-defense is much lower.
Section 563.031.1 authorizes the use of physical force when and to the extent a person reasonably believes such force is necessary to defend from what that person reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by the other person. In contrast, deadly force may only be used in self-defense when necessary to protect oneself against death or serious physical injury.13 The use of deadly force also requires "[s]ome affirmative action, gesture, or communication by the person feared, indicating the immediacy of the danger, the ability to avoid it, and the necessity of using deadly force." 14
"Deadly force" includes physical force that a defendant uses either with the purpose of causing or with knowledge it will "create a substantial risk of causing death or serious physical injury."15 "Serious physical injury" is statutorily defined as "physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part of the body."16 "[T]he question of whether deadly force was used depends not only on the amount of force used but also on the defendant's purpose to cause, or awareness of the likelihood of causing, death or serious physical injury."17
While not arguing for a per se rule that use of a knife automatically equates with the use of deadly force, the State urges that Westfall used the carpet knife intentionally to direct the blows to Jenkins's face and throat knowingly creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury. The State contends that the lacerations produced by Westfall resulted in facial scarring constituting "serious disfigurement" for purposes of the definition of "serious physical injury" and that their location proves the injuries were life-threatening. The State maintains this evidence unequivocally establishes that Westfall used deadly force and that no alternative instruction was required. It seeks support for its theories based upon analogy to prior case precedent, relying particularly on State v. Bledsoe.18
The physician who examined and treated Jenkins after the incident testified that the cuts were not deep or serious, that they produced no nerve or blood vessel damage, and that they were not life threatening.19
While the physician acknowledged that Mr. Jenkins would have permanent scars, he also testified that his experience was utilized to ensure the scars would be less visible.
The jury may have reasonably found from the physician's testimony that the injuries Jenkins sustained did not create a substantial risk of death or serious injury, and that they constituted the appropriate quantum of physical force, not deadly force, for Westfall's self-defense. Additionally, based upon Westfall's testimony, a jury could reasonably find that in carrying this knife, a tool of his trade he possessed in anticipation of being called to work following his job interview, Westfall had no contemplation that he would use it as a weapon. The jury might have also found that Jenkins kept beating Westfall, overpowered him, and that Westfall spontaneously used the only means at hand to protect himself without any opportunity for reflection on the possible consequences.
The evidence establishes questions of fact as to whether deadly force was used, whether serious disfigurement resulted sufficient to support a conclusion that Westfall's actions created a substantial risk of death or serious injury, and whether Westfall was aware of any likelihood of causing death or serious physical injury. By submitting the jury instruction without the language tendered by Westfall, the trial court treated these questions of fact as matters of law and essentially removed these crucial decisions from the province of the jury.20
There is no authority that the use of a knife constitutes the use of deadly force as a matter or law. The citation of State v. Bledsoe strongly relied on by the State, not only is of no help in supporting its position, but it also has a positive tendency to mislead. That case simply holds that, in a court-tried case, the judge could have concluded that deadly force had been used. There is not the least intimation that the trial court had to make a finding that deadly force was used, and the failure to provide the alternative instruction removed this issue from the jury's consideration.
The court must have also implicitly concluded, as a matter of law, that Westfall's actions "create[d] a substantial risk of death or serious injury," as required in the statutory definition of "deadly force." The evidence...
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...error under plain error review when the instruction is requested by the defendant and refused by the circuit court. State v. Westfall , 75 S.W.3d 278, 281 n.9 (Mo. banc 2002). However, a party invites error by submitting a patently incorrect instruction. "It is axiomatic that a defendant ma......
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