State v. Wheeler
| Decision Date | 21 March 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 27750.,27750. |
| Citation | 230 N.W. 91,179 Minn. 557 |
| Parties | STATE by YOUNGQUIST, Atty. Gen., v. WHEELER et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Blue Earth County; Henry A. Johnson, Judge.
Condemnation proceeding by the State, by G. A. Youngquist, Attorney General, against Maria Wheeler, Waldo R. Adams, and others. From the judgment, in so far as it fixes amount of damages to the land of defendant last named, the State appeals.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Henry N. Benson, Atty. Gen., C. E. Phillips, of St. Paul, and Harry J. Acton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
H. L. & J. W. Schmitt, of Mankato, for respondents.
The state of Minnesota condemned a strip of land 100 feet wide across the farm of Waldo R. Adams for right of way for trunk highway No. 5, and appeals from the judgment fixing the amount of damages. A motion for a new trial had been made and denied.
The Adams farm contains about 200 acres, is located about three miles from Mankato, and is used as a dairy, stock, and grain farm. It consists of an approximately square tract of some 160 acres, with an additional 40-acre tract adjoining the northwest 40 of the larger tract on the west. The farm buildings are located near the center of this additional 40-acre tract. The highway runs diagonally across the 160-acre tract from a point a short distance west of the northeast corner thereof to a point on the westerly line thereof, a little more than half way south of the north line. The ground taken for the highway amounts to 6.76 acres. By running the road through the farm, there are left approximately 84.5 acres, with the farm buildings thereon, north of the highway, and about 109.5 acres, without any buildings thereon, south of the highway. A public highway, a town road, runs along the north line of the farm.
1. The trial of the case commenced on April 2, 1929, at the then pending general February, 1929, term of the court. The next general court term would open on June 6, 1929.
The respondent, Waldo R. Adams, was a member of the regular panel of petit jurors for the February term of the court, the term at which his case was noticed for trial. He served as such throughout the term, and served on a number of juries trying cases prior to April 2, 1929. The petit jury commenced serving on February 11th, and respondent had been in attendance and associated and served with the other jurors for a period of seven weeks before his case was brought on for trial. On March 28th, a few days before the case was reached for trial, the state, appellant here, made a motion for a continuance of the case until the June term, based on an affidavit showing the facts stated and alleging that, because of his service and association with his fellow jurors, respondent had such intimate acquaintance and relations with them that a fair and impartial trial of the issues in the case could not be had before the jurors on the panel then in attendance. The motion was denied.
We have been cited to the cases of Zinn v. Updegraff, 113 Kan. 25, 213 P. 816, Crowder v. Williams, 116 Kan. 241, 226 P. 774, and Garrett v. Patton, 81 W. Va. 771, 95 S. E. 437, as throwing some light on the question whether the denial of such a motion was error. In the West Virginia case, a state statute (Code W. Va. 1913, c. 116, § 28 [sec. 4667]) provided that no person should serve as a juror, except in felony cases, at any term of court at which he had any matter of fact to be tried by jury. The court, in considering the statute, said that one serving as a juror during a term of court is in many cases thrown into intimate relations with his fellows, and that such recent intimate relations might have undue influence upon the other jurors with whom he had served. It expressed the opinion that all the other jurors on the panel with whom the one in question had so served were incompetent to sit in the trial of his case. The court, however, held that defendant there had waived any error by failing to move for a continuance or to take advantage of the disqualification before the jury was sworn. In Zinn v. Updegraff, supra, the court criticizes the practice of permitting one who has an action to be tried at a term of court to serve as a juror at that term; but, in view of the fact that no application for a continuance had been made, and that the court had taken pains to see that no juror who had served with the litigant on any case tried was placed on his jury, and no showing that the matter was ever referred to between him and the other jurors, it was considered too remote to constitute misconduct. The matter is summed up in the later Kansas case of Crowder v. Williams, supra, in the statement that some showing of prejudice other than conjecture would be required before reversible error could be predicated on such an incident.
We agree with the courts mentioned that one who has an important case for trial at a term of court should not be permitted to serve upon the jury panel at that term, associate and serve with his fellow jurors for many weeks, and then have his case tried before them. If it could be supposed that a litigant, not a juror, should associate daily with the jurors on the panel for several weeks during a court term and be present and take part in their deliberations, such close association with the jurors, irrespective of any question of right or propriety, would be held to disqualify the jurors from hearing his case. It would also be such misconduct on the part of the litigant as to preclude him from having his case so tried. Here the respondent had the right to associate and serve with his fellow jurors on all other cases. He was clearly in the right in so doing. But, when it came to the trial of his own case, it is difficult to see why his association with them might not result in the same situation as if he were not a member of the jury panel. The law intends and seeks to safeguard juries from contact with, or influence by, litigants and others, except what is brought out before them in open court in the trial of actions. Whether such contact and opportunity for influence is had by a litigant who is a member of the jury panel, or by a litigant who is not such member, can make little difference. It is the close contact and association with the jurors who are to sit on his case, and not his position as a member of the jury panel, that is objectionable. The public interest in preserving the integrity of, and the high regard for, the jury system of trial is a material factor to be considered.
In State v. Snow, 130 Minn. 206, 153 N. W. 526, and Magnuson v. Bouck, 168 Minn. 39, 209 N. W. 896, the importance of preserving the purity of jury trials, and the respect of the litigants and the public for jury verdicts, is pointed out. It is held that undue familiarity between jurors and a litigant is very likely to breed distrust of the result of jury trial; that a litigant should not be permitted to have a part in causing suspicion; that the purity of jury trials must be jealously guarded; and that the court should not only see to it that the parties have a fair trial, but also that nothing occurs to shake public confidence in the integrity of the verdict rendered.
Cases involving rulings on challenges of jurors are not strictly in point, but have some bearing. Jurors, in order to be qualified should be indifferent both as to the parties and the cause to be tried. 35 C. J. 327. Bias and prejudice may arise from such a variety of causes and depend so much upon the particular facts and circumstances that no definite rule can be laid down. 35 C. J. 328. A juror is incompetent if he admits such friendship for one of the parties or members of his family, as, other things being equal, would influence his verdict. Musser v. Musser, 92 Neb. 387, 138 N. W. 599. Where it appears that the relations between a juror and one of the parties are so intimate as would reasonably be calculated to influence his verdict, the juror should be excused. Rooker v. Deering S. W. Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 247 S. W. 1016; Rosenberg v. Rubin (Sup.) 164 N. Y. S. 201; Commonwealth v. Mosier, 135 Pa. 221, 19 A. 943. Courts are vigilant to preserve the impartiality of the jury. International Agricultural Corp. v. Willette, 120 Me. 423, 115 A. 170. The court, and not the juror, must be satisfied that a challenged juror is free from bias. State v. Caron, 118 La. 349, 42 So. 960. The court is governed by the facts shown, and not by the opinion of the juror as to the effect thereof. Lingafelter v. Moore, 95 Ohio St. 384, 117 N. E. 16; Texas Cent. R. Co. v. Blanton, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 307, 81 S. W. 537.
The trial court, in passing upon a motion for continuance, or ruling upon the competency of jurors, has great discretion. The only limitation is that the court must exercise a sound discretion upon the facts and circumstances shown to exist.
It is also the general rule that an order or ruling upon a motion for continuance, or upon the competency of jurors, will not be disturbed by this court unless the...
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