State v. White

• Decision Date: 20 November 1929
• Citation: 152 A. 393,34 Del. 316
• Court: Court of General Sessions of Delaware
• Parties: STATE v. HARRY WHITE

152 A. 393

34 Del. 316

STATE v. HARRY WHITE

Court of General Sessions of Delaware, New Castle County

November 20, 1929

Court of General Sessions for New Castle County, No. 23, September Term, 1929.

Case heard on motion of defendant for new trial.

The prosecuting witness was in the company of the defendant and of other people, on the evening of January 25, 1929. He testifies that his watch was stolen on that night. Nothing was heard of the watch, until May 11, 1929, when it was found in the possession of the defendant as he was attempting to pawn it.

There was no direct evidence of the larceny of the watch by the defendant and the State relied in part upon the principle that when recently stolen goods are found in the possession of another person, such person is presumed to be the taker unless he satisfactorily accounts to the jury for his possession of the property.

A new trial granted.

Charles F. Richards, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.

J. Paul Green for the defendant.

RODNEY J., sitting.

OPINION

RODNEY, J.

I propose to give some brief consideration to the question as to what effect the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods has upon the guilt of the accused. Many courts have considered the subject with a surprising looseness of expression and a lack of harmony in decision. I do not propose to go into a detailed citation of many cases. These may be found in 36 Corpus Juris, 870-920; Chamberlayne's Modern Law of Evidence, §§ 1121-1136; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 5 p. 509; 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence p. 1508. More lengthy treatises may be found in 45 Central Law Journal, p. 388; 28 Justice of the Peace, p. 450; 6 Albany Law Journal, 218.

It is universally recognized that the exclusive possession of the recently stolen goods by one who cannot satisfactorily account for having them is entitled to a very considerable degree of probative value. The exact character of the inference of guilt in such cases is the line of cleavage between the different jurisdictions. Many courts have held that the exclusive and unexplained possession of recently stolen goods raises an inference of fact of the guilt of the defendant upon which a jury will be justified in acting. Other courts have held that the possession of stolen goods under the given circumstances raises a presumption of law as to the guilt of the defendant which must be acted upon by the jury in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Any inference of fact or presumption of law (whichever it may be called) looking toward the guilt of a defendant by reason of the possession of recently stolen goods can only arise from an unexplained possession after an opportunity for explanation has been given. The inference or presumption of guilt has its birth in the failure to satisfactorily explain the possession.

During the conduct of a trial where the presentation of the State's case has proven goods to have been stolen and that these goods were soon thereafter found in the exclusive possession of the defendant, the Court must hold as a procedural matter that such possession creates a prima facie case against the defendant and casts upon the defendant the burden of explanation of such possession by him. When the defendant enters upon an explanation of such possession, such explanation, with its satisfactory or unsatisfactory character, together with all other matters of fact are for the consideration of the jury to determine the innocence of the prisoner or his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

I can find no case in Delaware in which the Court has been called upon to discuss the question here involved but in a number of cases the courts of this state have used very similar, if not identical, language in discussing the principle under discussion. A characteristic charge from State v Carr, 4 Penne. 523, 57 A. 370, 371, is

"Where recent stolen property is found in the possession of a person, the rule of law is that such person is presumed to be the one who stole it, unless he accounts satisfactorily to the jury for his possession."

Other cases are State v. Briscoe, 3 Penne. 7, 50 A. 271; State v. Spencer, 4 Penne. 92, 53 A. 337; State v. Wright, 6 Penne. 251, 66 A. 364; State v. Wolf, 6 Penne. 323, 66 A. 739; tate v. De Luca, 25 Del. 158, 2 Boyce 158, 77 A. 742; State v. Robinson, 7 Boyce 106, 103 A. 657.

There...