State v. White, No. 25421.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: Chief Justice TOAL.
• Citation: 348 S.C. 532,560 S.E.2d 420
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Ronald P. WHITE, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 04 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 25421.

348 S.C. 532
560 S.E.2d 420

The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Ronald P. WHITE, Appellant

No. 25421.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard November 14, 2001.

Decided March 4, 2002.

Rehearing Denied March 21, 2002.

348 S.C. 534

Jared S. Newman, of Daugs, Tedder, & Newman, of Port Royal, for appellant

Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson, all of Columbia, Solicitor E.L. Clements, III, Twelfth Judicial Circuit, of Florence, for respondent.

Chief Justice TOAL.

Ronald P. White ("Appellant") appeals his conviction for violation of section 16-17-700 of the South Carolina Code, prohibiting the tattooing of another person except by a licensed physician for cosmetic or reconstructive purposes. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-17-700 (Supp.2000). We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant was indicted by the grand jury for the Court of General Sessions of Florence County for violating section 16-17-700 of the South Carolina Code. Appellant was arrested sometime after WBTW TV aired a clip of him tattooing

348 S.C. 535

another person in his Florence County residence as part of a series WBTW prepared on tattooing. At trial, Appellant admitted he violated the statute, but argued the statute was unconstitutional on several grounds. Appellant made a motion to quash the indictment at the beginning of trial, arguing the statute was unconstitutional because (1) it impermissibly restricted his freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the South Carolina Constitution, (2) it restricted interstate commerce, and (3) it violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution

The trial court found the statute constitutional. First, it found that tattooing was not speech, and, second, even if it were, prohibition of tattooing was a valid exercise of state power because of its impact on public health. The court dismissed Appellant's other constitutional claims on the same grounds, stating that the legislature may use "appropriate means" to "regulate or prohibit, if necessary" any occupation to protect public health. Finally, the court found that all contract and property rights are subject to "fair exercise of the police power to promote the general welfare." As Appellant admitted he violated the statute, he was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to one year imprisonment and fined $2,500.00, suspended to five years of probation and a fine of $500.00.

The trial court did not hear any expert medical testimony regarding the dangers of tattooing or the risks to public health caused by the process of tattooing. In finding tattooing posed a risk to public health, the trial court relied on Appellant's own concession that there were risks to unregulated tattooing and on the general notion that it is the legislature's responsibility to decide what is injurious to public health.

Appellant appeals the trial court's decision, raising the following issue:

Did the trial court err in finding section 16-17-700 of the South Carolina Code¹ does not violate Appellant's freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution² and Article I, Section 2 of the

348 S.C. 536

South Carolina Constitution³?

LAW/ANALYSIS

Appellant argues the trial court incorrectly upheld section 16-17-700 of the South Carolina Code, insisting the act of tattooing constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment. Appellant argues tattoos are a form of art or expression protected by the First Amendment. Assuming tattoos are protected expression, Appellant reasons those who create them should be afforded the same protection that he claims the creators of other protected expression enjoy (e.g., writers, painters, and sculptors). Appellant contends the process of tattooing cannot be separated from the display of the tattoo itself and both are protected under the First Amendment. We disagree.

The State argues that the trial court correctly upheld the statute, finding tattooing is not speech, and a rational relationship exists between the statute and public health. For support, the State cites several out of state, appellate and trial level opinions in which similar statutes have been upheld. State v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34 (Ind.App.1986); People v. O'Sullivan, 96 Misc.2d 52, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y.Sup.App. Term 1978); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F.Supp. 1248 (D.Minn. 1980). In each of these opinions, the court found tattooing did not constitute speech and then proceeded to analyze the statute applying a rational basis standard. Id. Each court determined (largely based on their common knowledge) that there are inherent risks to tattooing and gave the state's legislature wide latitude to determine how to best protect the general welfare of the state's inhabitants. Id. We agree with this position.

Our precedent establishes a general presumption of validity for legislative acts when subjected to constitutional attack, which can be overcome only by a clear showing that the act violates some provision of the Constitution. Main v. Thomason, 342 S.C. 79, 535 S.E.2d 918 (2000); State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 451 S.E.2d 888 (1994). This presumption places the initial burden on the party challenging the constitutionality

348 S.C. 537

of the legislation to show it violates a provision of the Constitution. If the challenging party is able to show the act is invalid, leaving "no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution," the burden shifts to the state. Thomason, 342 S.C. at 86, 535 S.E.2d at 921 (citing Westvaco Corp. v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 321 S.C. 59, 467 S.E.2d 739 (1995)). If the challenging party is unable to do so, however, it has not met its burden, and the challenge fails under this analysis

Whether or not tattooing qualifies as speech, symbolic speech, or otherwise protected expression under the First Amendment is an issue of first impression in South Carolina. We look to the United States Supreme Court for guidance in analyzing this issue. According to the United States Supreme Court, the First Amendment protects speech, including conduct, if sufficiently communicative in character. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974). The threshold question then is whether the conduct in issue is "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 409, 94 S.Ct. at 2730, 41 L.Ed.2d at 846. Admittedly, this test requires line drawing. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this implicitly, but held it could not "accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled `speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 679 (1968) (upholding defendant's conviction for burning his draft card on the courthouse steps against the challenge that the conduct amounted to expression protected by the First Amendment).

In determining whether certain conduct is within the boundaries of First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court has "asked whether [a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2539, 105 L.Ed.2d 342, 353 (1989) (citing Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-411, 94 S.Ct. at 2730, 41 L.Ed.2d at 846) (finding defendant's burning of the American flag during the Republican party's renomination of Ronald Reagan for President to be sufficiently imbued

348 S.C. 538

with elements of communication to qualify as protected conduct). In Johnson, the Supreme Court found the traditional use of flags for the communication of beliefs and the context in which the flag was burned to be instructive in determining the conduct was protected. Id. Additionally, the Supreme...