State v. Whitney

Decision Date06 November 1968
Citation249 A.2d 238,157 Conn. 133
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Russell M. WHITNEY.

John D. Salling, Norwalk, for appellant (defendant).

Donald A. Browne, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on brief, was Otto J. Saur, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

KING, Chief Justice.

On April 6, 1965, Russell M. Whitney was charged with having under his control certain narcotic drugs in violation of § 19-246 of the General Statutes. A jury found him guilty as charged, and he assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to set aside that verdict.

The facts are substantially as follows: A known narcotics user, Carmen Parisi, agreed to cooperate with state and federal authorities in the investigation of illegal narcotics activities and proceeded to work with two federal agents. One method of investigation used by the agents was to take Parisi around the Norwalk area in an automobile and have him point out narcotics violators. On one such occasion, Parisi identified the defendant as a violator.

Sometime later, Parisi introduced Gerald F. Carey, one of the agents, to the defendant, and at that meeting Carey gave the defendant $10, and the defendant promised to purchase some narcotics for Carey and deliver them later that evening. The defendant did not deliver the narcotics that night. On the following evening, Agent Carey and Parisi went to the defendant's home and asked the defendant what he had done with the money given him on the previous night. The defendant said that he had spent the money, but he agreed to meet them later that evening and see what he could do to make up for their $10 loss.

They met as planned, and the defendant, Agent Carey, Parisi and Patrick Stack, a friend of the defendant and known to Parisi as a narcotics user, proceeded to drive to Bridgeport, where the defendant said that he would obtain narcotics for them. On the way to Bridgeport, the defendant asked Carey for another $10 with which to purchase the narcotics. Carey gave him the money. On arriving in Bridgeport, after leaving Carey and Stack in the automobile, the defendant and Parisi together went to meet a man to whom the defendant paid the $10 and who delivered two small glassine bags to the defendant. On the way back to the automobile, the defendant handed these bags to Parisi, who delivered them to Agent Carey in the automobile. After the return to Norwalk, Agent Carey and others made tests which showed that these bags contained heroin.

The defendant claims that evidence of entrapment precluded the rendition of the verdict of guilty and required that it be set aside for lack of evidence to support it.

Entrapment is inconsistent with guilt in a criminal case and if it existed entitles the defendant to an acquittal. State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 4, 89 A.2d 219, 31 A.L.R.2d 1206. Although entrapment is generally referred to as a defense, it is more properly treated as a fact inconsistent with guilt. Therefore, as soon as substantial evidence of entrapment comes into the case, the burden of proving the essential elements of the crime charged, which rests throughout upon the state, necessarily includes the negation of the issue of entrapment, in the same way as if substantial evidence of insanity had come into the case. See Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 373 (lst Cir.); State v. Joseph, 96 Conn. 637, 639, 115 A. 85.

Entrapment has been defined as "the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him for the mere purpose of instituting (a) criminal prosecution against him." State v. Marquardt, supra (quoting State v. Jarvis, 105 W.Va. 499, 500, 143 S.E. 235); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413, 86 A.L.R. 249. Read literally, this definition might seem to include all situations where the actions of a government agent induce an individual to commit a particular crime. If that were so, then clearly the defendant here would be entitled to an acquittal since no one claims that he would have performed, or even contemplated the performance of the particular acts in question involving Parisi and Agent Carey had it not been for their actions. See DeFeo, 'Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application,' 1 U. San Fran. L.Rev. 243, 259.

The doctrine of entrapment is not so narrowly and mechanically defined and applied in the cases as the defendant claims. Rather, it has a broader meaning more in keeping with the recognized need that 'a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.' Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372, 78 S.Ct. 819, 821, 2 .lEd.2d 848. The general rule is: '(I)f the criminal intent or the willing disposition to commit the crime originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that the opportunity is furnished or the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him for it constitutes no defense. On the other hand, if the evil intent and the criminal design originate in the mind...

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12 cases
  • State v. Hageman, 206A82
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 3, 1982
    ...Ill.2d 235, 184 N.E.2d 833 (1962); Story v. State, 355 So.2d 1213 (Fla.App.), cert. denied, 364 So.2d 893 (Fla.1978); State v. Whitney, 157 Conn. 133, 249 A.2d 238 (1968); State v. Talbot, supra; United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933); Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513 (9th......
  • Com. v. Weiskerger
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • January 30, 1989
    ... ... at 433, 93 S.Ct. at 1643. Accordingly, policy choices regarding the defense and the standards governing entrapment are left to state judiciaries and legislatures. See State v. Little, 121 N.H. 765, 435 A.2d 517 (1981) ...         The availability of the defense ... See also State v. Mendoza, 109 Ariz. 445, 511 P.2d 627 (1973); Bailey v. People, 630 P.2d 1062 (Colo.1981); State v. Whitney, 157 Conn. 133, 249 A.2d 238 (1968); State v. Lopez, 522 So.2d 537 ... (Fla.1988); State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309, 275 S.E.2d 646, on remand 158 ... ...
  • State v. Carr
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1977
    ...to show the defendant's state of mind. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848; State v. Whitney, 157 Conn. 133, 137, 249 A.2d 238; annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 883, 908, § 6. Under such circumstances, all of the conversation between the detective and the defendant i......
  • State v. Mullen
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 27, 1974
    ...475 F.2d 1022 (9 Cir.); United States v. Cooper, 321 F.2d 456 (6 Cir.); Demos v. United States, 205 F.2d 596 (5 Cir.); State v. Whitney, 157 Conn. 133, 249 A.2d 238; Commonwealth v. Miller, 282 N.E.2d 394 (Mass.); State v. Van Regenmorter, 465 S.W.2d 613 (Mo.); State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, ......
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