State v. Whitt
Decision Date | 19 December 1893 |
Citation | 18 S.E. 715,113 N.C. 716 |
Parties | STATE v. WHITT. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from criminal court, Buncombe county; Thos. A. Jones, Judge.
George Whitt was convicted of murder in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed.
Chas A. Webb, for appellant.
The Attorney General, for the State.
The prisoner was indicted for murder, and was convicted of murder in the second degree. There was a special venire of 150 men ordered and drawn from the box by the court. Code, § 1739; State v. Brogden, 111 N.C. 656, 16 S.E. 170. The prisoner challenged the array: (1) Because one of the men named on the special venire had removed from the county, and another was dead at the time the jury list had been revised by the county commissioners. (2) Because the sheriff had indorsed on the writ and list of special venire "Received 25th October, 1890, executed 30th October 1890, by summoning a jury of 150 men." The solicitor moved that the sheriff be allowed to amend his return, so as to show those of the list furnished him by the clerk who were actually summoned, and those of said list not summoned, with the reasons why they were not. The sheriff was permitted to amend his return as moved, and the prisoner again excepted. (3) Because one of those named on the venire was not summoned. (4) Because the sheriff, in copying the list of the venire, by mistake, failed to copy the name of one man, who in consequence, was not summoned. The jury was selected before the prisoner had exhausted his peremptory challenges.
1. The first ground of exception was expressly held adversely to the prisoner in State v. Hensley, 94 N.C. 1021. The amendment of the sheriff's return was in the discretion of the court at this term, and removed the second ground of objection, if it had any merit. The other two grounds assigned likewise did not "affect the integrity and fairness of the entire panel," and were properly disallowed. State v. Hensley, supra. The prisoner excepted because the court refused to charge the jury that there was not sufficient evidence to go to them to show a conspiracy between the prisoner and John Llewellen to murder the deceased. A consideration of the evidence sent up justifies such refusal. The prisoner also excepted to the charge of the court, in that the court charged that, "if the jury should find from the evidence that there was no conspiracy between the prisoner and John Llewellen, it would then be their duty to consider whether he was an aider and abetter in the killing of Charles Brockers,--that is, as principal in the second degree,--and in determining that fact they should not be influenced by the fact that John Llewellen had been acquitted of the murder of Brockers; that the acquittal of John Llewellen should have nothing to do with their verdict in this case." Brockers was a deputy marshal, who had arrested John Llewellen on a warrant, and had been killed in attempting to carry him to jail. John Llewellen and his father had been tried and acquitted. The prisoner was charged, not as an accessory before or after the fact, but as a coprincipal. What another jury had done as to Llewellen was inadmissible for or against one charged as a principal. The case of State v. Jones, 101 N.C. 719, 8 S.E. 147, therefore, has no application. A principal in the second degree is not an accessory, but a coprincipal. 1 Bish. Crim. Law, § 604, (4.) Even if the prisoner had been charged as principal in the second degree, he could have been convicted when the principal in the first degree had been acquitted. 1 Whart. Crim. Law, § 222, note 2, and numerous cases there cited; 9 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 574, note 2.
2. The prisoner further excepted because the court charged the jury ...
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