State v. Whitton

• Decision Date: 12 May 1888
• Citation: 38 N.W. 331,72 Wis. 18
• Parties: STATE v. WHITTON.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

72 Wis. 18

38 N.W. 331

STATE

v.WHITTON.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 12, 1888.

Case certified from municipal court of Milwaukee county.C. E. Estabrook, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

W. C. Williams, for defendant.

TAYLOR, J.

The defendant was tried and convicted in the municipal court of Milwaukee county upon the following information, viz., after the title of the case: “I, J. W. Wegner, district attorney for said county, hereby inform the court that on the third day of September, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty seven, at the said county, the said defendant, Richard Whitton, feloniously did buy, receive, conceal, and have, and did then and there aid in the concealment of goods, chattels, and property, to-wit, one hunting-case gold watch of the value of forty dollars, the said property, goods, and chattels being then and there the property of one J. P. Johnson, he the said Richard Whitton then and there knowing the said goods, chattels, and property had theretofore been feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Wisconsin.” The defendant pleaded not guilty. No objection appears to have been made to the sufficiency of the information until after a trial upon the merits and a verdict of guilty found against the defendant. After such verdict, the defendant moved in arrest of judgment and sentence, for the reasons “that the information does not charge the defendant with any crime known to the law, and is wholly insufficient to sustain the verdict herein, and the court cannot impose sentence upon the defendant upon such verdict under said information; that said information is wholly defective and void to sustain a conviction, in that it does not charge the property alleged to have been received by the defendant to have been stolen property as required by law, and the court cannot now proceed to sentence the defendant upon the verdict of the jury; and for other defects apparent on the face of the information.” Upon such motion being made, the judge of the said municipal court, being of the opinion that the questions of law so arising are so important and doubtful as to require the decision of the supreme court thereon, as provided by law, and at the request of the defendant, reported the case to this court under the provisions of section 4721, Rev. St., for the decision of this court upon the following questions: (1) “Does the aforesaid information in this case sufficiently charge the crime of receiving stolen property so as to sustain a conviction under section 4417, Rev. St. 1878?” (2) “Does the information aforesaid sufficiently charge any offense to warrant the municipal court to pronounce sentence upon the defendant upon such conviction?”

There can be no doubt but that the district attorney intended to inform against the defendant for the crime of receiving stolen property as defined by section 4417, Rev. St. 1878. There is certainly enough stated in the information to inform both the defendant and the court of the intention of the district attorney in that respect. That being admitted, can it be said that the defendant has been, or can be, prejudiced by the lack of definiteness in the information, after having a fair trial upon the merits of the charge as intended to be made by the prosecuting attorney? We certainly think he has not been prejudiced by the lack of a more full statement of the charge in the information; and unless there be some well-settled rule of law which forbids sentence...