Price v. State

• Decision Date: 10 May 1913
• Citation: 131 P. 1102,9 Okla.Crim. 359,1913 OK CR 118
• Parties: PRICE v. STATE.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

131 P. 1102

9 Okla.Crim. 359, 1913 OK CR 118

PRICE v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

May 10, 1913

Syllabus by the Court.

(a) The common-law doctrine of a strict construction of criminal law and all proceedings in criminal cases, and that an indictment should be certain to a certain intent in every particular, is not in force in Oklahoma.

(b) If an indictment is framed in such language as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended thereby, and sufficiently certain to enable a defendant to prepare his defense, and to plead a judgment of acquittal or conviction in bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, such indictment is sufficient.

(c) Judges are naturally in sympathy with lawyers, and are always anxious to do all that they reasonably can to please them and to promote the interests of the legal profession, but it is a gross misconception to suppose that they should allow a desire to make business for lawyers to in the least influence their decisions. Courts are established and supported by the people for the sole and exclusive purpose of administering justice, and thereby giving equal protection to all classes occupations, and professions. The judge who does not recognize and live up to this ideal is a disgrace to the position which he occupies, and is a menace to the state in which he holds office.

The fact that a person may have been convicted of any felony except that of perjury does not disqualify him from testifying as a witness in the courts of Oklahoma.

Where the evidence clearly shows that a defendant is guilty of knowingly receiving stolen property, a conviction will not be reversed because there may be some evidence in the record which tends to establish the fact that he was a principal in the original larceny.

An instruction applicable to the law of circumstantial evidence should only be given in cases where the state relies entirely upon such evidence.

(a) In order to sustain a conviction for knowingly receiving stolen property, manual possession by the defendant of such property is not necessary. It is sufficient if such property be received by an authorized agent or representative of the defendant.

(b) Where a defendant receives stolen property under such circumstances that he must have believed that it was stolen a conviction for knowingly receiving stolen property will not be reversed for want of evidence.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pittsburg County; P. D. Brewer, Judge.

J. W Price was convicted of receiving stolen property, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Wilkinson & Keith, of McAlester, for appellant.

Smith C. Matson and C.J. Davenport, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

FURMAN J. (after stating the facts as above).

First. The charging part of the information in this case is as follows: "Comes now Robert Tarter, the duly qualified and acting county attorney in and for Pittsburg county, state of Oklahoma, and gives the superior court of Pittsburg county, state of Oklahoma, to know and be informed that J. W. Price and Isaiah Vaughn did, in Pittsburg county, and in the state of Oklahoma, on or about the 30 day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eleven and anterior to the presentment hereof, then and there unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly receive and buy from Len Wallace, Dave Coleman, and Archie Johnson the following described property, to wit: Certain salt and fresh meats, consisting of sausages, neck bones, and bacon, of the value of $50.00, the property of and taken from the possession of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, a corporation, the said J. W. Price and the said Isaiah Vaughn then and there well knowing the said property to have been then and there recently stolen from the said Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, a corporation, contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the state." To this information appellant demurred upon the ground that the facts set forth in the information do not constitute a public offense, and that said information is indefinite and uncertain. This demurrer was by the court overruled, to which appellant excepted.

Under the old common-law doctrine of strictly construing criminal law and all proceedings in criminal cases, and that an indictment or information should be certain to a certain intent in every particular, the objection now urged to this information would undoubtedly be good. But these doctrines have long since been repudiated in the state of Oklahoma. It is true that an indictment should be reasonably certain as to the offense charged in order that the defendant may not be surprised and may be able to prepare to make his defense, and also to enable him to plead a judgment of acquittal or conviction in bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. This is all that a defendant is in reason and justice entitled to. If an indictment is couched in such language as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, it is all that the law requires. See section 6696, Comp. Laws 1909. See, also, section 6704, Comp. Laws 1909. See, also, Bowes v. State, 8 Okl. Cr. 277, 127 P. 883. The prosecution in this case was based upon section 2603, Comp. Laws 1909, which is as follows: "Every person who buys or receives, in any manner, upon any consideration, any personal property of any value whatsoever, that has been stolen from any other, knowing the same to have been stolen, is punishable by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding five years, or in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment." The essential elements of this crime consists in receiving property that had been stolen from any other person, knowing such property to have been stolen. We do not see how it is possible for any person of common understanding to read this information and not understand exactly what appellant was charged with. We also think that the offense is sufficiently described to enable appellant to plead this judgment in bar of a second prosecution for the same offense, and we think the information is sufficient.

An instructive case in support of our views is that of State v. Whitton, 72 Wis. 18, 38 N.W. 331. The information in that case was as follows: "I, J. W. Wegner, district attorney for said county, hereby inform the court that on the third day of September, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty seven, at the said county, the said defendant, Richard Whitton. feloniously did buy, receive, conceal, and have, and did then and there aid in the concealment of goods, chattels, and property, to wit, one huntingcase gold watch of the value of forty dollars, the said property, goods, and chattels being then and there the property of one J. P. Johnson, he, the said Richard Whitton, then and there knowing the said goods, chattels, and property had theretofore been feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Wisconsin." And the court sustained its sufficiency, and said: "There can be no doubt but that the district attorney intended to inform against the defendant for the crime of receiving stolen property as defined by section 4417, Rev. St. 1878. There is certainly enough stated in the information to inform both the defendant and the court of the intention of the district attorney in that respect. That being admitted, can it be said that the defendant has been, or can be, prejudicated by the lack of definiteness in the information, after having a fair trial upon the merits of the charge as intended to be made by the prosecuting attorney? We certainly think he has not been prejudicated by a lack of a more full statement of the charge in the information; and, unless there be some well-settled rule of law which forbids sentence upon this information, judgment ought not to be arrested. * * * The only possible objection to the information under that section is that it omitted to state in the language of the statute that the defendant received, etc., 'stolen money, goods, or property,' that being the language used in said section 4417, Rev. St. We think that the allegation that he received the goods of a stranger, knowing that they had been theretofore stolen, is a substantial statement of the offense defined by section 4417. We do not think there could have been any doubt either in the minds of the court or of the defendant as to what offense he was charged with."

In State v. Allemand, 25 La. Ann. 525, the court in the first paragraph of the syllabus held: "An indictment charging that defendants received the property stolen with a felonious intent knowing the same to have been stolen at the time is in sufficient conformity with the statute." In the body of the opinion the court said: "The first second, and fourth grounds of the assignment of errors are substantially the same--that the indictment was fatally defective in not stating that the defendants received the property feloniously taken or stolen. The charge in the indictment is that defendants 'unlawfully and feloniously did receive and buy a cow, of a red color,' etc.; 'they, the said Charles Allemand, Louis Allemand, and Joseph Allemand, then and there, well knowing that the aforesaid cow had been taken, stolen, carried away or killed, contrary to the form of the statute,' etc. The object of an indictment is to advise the party accused of the charge against him, to enable him to prepare his defense, and to enable him to plead autre fois acquit or convict in any subsequent proceedings against him for the same...