State v. Widner

Decision Date10 December 2013
Docket NumberNo. 39908.,39908.
Citation317 P.3d 737,155 Idaho 840
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals
Parties STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Daniel L. WIDNER, Defendant–Appellant.

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Deborah A. Whipple argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming argued.

PERRY, Judge Pro Tem.

Daniel L. Widner appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in marijuana, felony, Idaho Code § 37–2732B(a)(1)(A), (D), and concealing a dangerous weapon in a motor vehicle, misdemeanor, I.C. § 18–3302(9), (14). Widner argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine that sought to exclude from evidence the 2.25 pounds of marijuana officers found in his car. We affirm.

I.BACKGROUND

Detective Christopher Jessup had entered into an agreement with a confidential informant who was "working off" a delivery of marijuana charge with the local police. The identity of the confidential informant was known to police but not disclosed at the hearing.1 As part of their arrangement, Jessup and the confidential informant organized a series of controlled buys where the confidential informant purchased marijuana on behalf of police. The confidential informant identified Widner as a potential investigative target. On October 19, 2010, and on December 14, 2010, the confidential informant purchased marijuana from Widner.

On January 11, 2011, the informant told Jessup that Widner was planning a trip to California in order to purchase marijuana which he would, in turn, sell in Idaho. The informant believed Widner would go on the upcoming weekend or the weekend after. Jessup directed the informant to confirm the information and report back. The informant did not immediately report back. Instead, on January 21, the informant told Jessup that Widner was probably out of marijuana. Jessup asked the informant to attempt to gather additional information. Later, on the same day, the informant contacted Jessup a second time and stated that Widner was still in town, but planned to travel to California. The informant did not specify any particular date.

The informant did not contact Jessup again until Wednesday, January 26. On that day, he informed Jessup that he had not spoken to Widner for "a couple days" but believed that Widner would travel to California that weekend. On Saturday, January 29, the informant once again told Jessup that he had not heard from Widner in a few days, but he believed Widner had left Mountain Home. In response, officers began conducting surveillance of Widner's home. Later that day, the informant called Jessup and stated that Widner was still in Mountain Home, but that he planned to leave early the next morning and would return later that day or the day after, January 31.

On January 30, Jessup attempted to verify the information he had been provided. He drove by Widner's home and observed that both of Widner's vehicles were parked at the home. Jessup called the informant and asked him to confirm that Widner had left, and to determine what car he had taken. At that time, the informant did not have any new information regarding Widner's whereabouts nor did he know what car was being driven. However, later that day, the informant called Jessup and told him that Widner and his roommate, Alex Stewart, had taken Stewart's vehicle to California and had left that morning.

From prior surveillance, Jessup was familiar with Stewart's vehicle. Jessup drove by Widner and Stewart's home and observed that Stewart's vehicle was not at the home, nor was his car at either of Stewart's places of work. After confirming that the vehicle was not in any of its ordinary locations, Jessup and his partner planned to intercept Widner upon his return to Mountain Home. They decided to wait at opposite ends of town and look for the vehicle. They also informed the patrol shift supervisor that they were looking for Stewart's car.

The case was discussed at a "pass-along meeting" where officers from an earlier shift relate information regarding ongoing cases. The patrol shift supervisor instructed Officer Ryan Melanese, among others, to be on the look out for Stewart's car and provided him with the license plate number. At the meeting, Melanese was informed that detectives suspected Stewart's vehicle contained a large amount of marijuana. Accordingly, the shift supervisor told Melanese to develop his own probable cause before making a traffic stop, and if he could not, then to radio the detectives.

On January 31, Melanese was engaged in patrol activities using a radar gun to determine the speed of passing vehicles. While doing so, he observed Stewart's vehicle. Melanese followed the vehicle for three quarters of a mile and noted that the car was travelling below the speed limit. Melanese became suspicious that the driver might be intoxicated, but this suspicion was not confirmed by weaving or erratic driving. Thereafter, Melanese observed the vehicle travel down a street which broadened from a one-lane road into a two-lane road. Melanese believed the driver was required to signal when that occurred. Likewise, the vehicle travelled down a street which intersected a second street and angled off to the right. The driver continued down the street, angling his car to the right without signaling. Melanese believed this too was a traffic violation. Believing he had a sufficient basis to make a stop, Melanese activated his overhead lights and stopped the vehicle.

Melanese approached the vehicle to speak with Widner, who was the driver. Melanese observed that the driver's window was open a few inches and smelled a slight odor of marijuana through the open window. He then asked Widner to roll the window down further to speak with him. Widner said that the window was broken and could not be rolled down any further. The officer replied by asking Widner to open the door. Widner complied with the request and when he did so, the officer smelled a heavy odor of marijuana.

After the door was opened, the officer also requested that both Widner and Stewart produce identification. After receiving the identification, Melanese asked dispatch to run records checks on Widner and Stewart. Dispatch indicated that neither had any active warrants so Melanese returned to the car and ordered Widner out of the car. Melanese asked Widner if he had smoked marijuana and Widner denied doing so. Melanese began to observe Widner for other signs of impairment. He noted that Widner was shaking. Given the weather, the officer believed the shaking could be caused by the cold and asked Widner if he wanted his jacket from inside the car. Widner said that he wanted the jacket, but only if he could retrieve it himself. In response, Melanese offered to retrieve the jacket for Widner. Widner declined the offer and admitted that there was a small plastic bag containing marijuana in his jacket pocket. Thereafter, Widner was permitted to get his jacket from inside the vehicle and he turned over the marijuana. Then, Widner was handcuffed and placed into a patrol car.

Thereafter, another officer arrived on scene with a drug detection dog. That officer took the dog around the car and the dog alerted, indicating the presence of drugs. After the alert, the officers searched the car and found 2.25 pounds of marijuana in boxes in the backseat of the vehicle.

Widner was charged with trafficking in marijuana, felony, Idaho Code § 37–2732B(a)(1)(A), (D), and concealing a dangerous weapon in a motor vehicle, misdemeanor, I.C. § 18–3302(9), (14). Widner entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the validity of the traffic stop.

II.ANALYSIS

On appeal, Widner's sole claim is that the police lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop him. In the district court, the State offered two bases upon which the stop was justified. The first basis was the alleged traffic infractions, i.e., the two times Officer Melanese believed Widner was required to signal. The trial court ruled that neither of the alleged traffic infractions violated the law. The State does not challenge this determination on appeal. Therefore, on appeal, the issue is whether the alternative basis for the stop, suspicion founded on reports by the confidential informant, was a sufficient basis for the stop. Widner argues that the confidential informant's tips did not create reasonable and articulable suspicion.

Although the original motion was entitled a motion in limine, the parties and the trial judge treated this motion as a motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, we treat this motion as a suppression motion. The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a suppression motion is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez–Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).

A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979) ; Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop must be supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to the traffic laws or that either the vehicle or an occupant is subject to detention in connection with violation of other laws. State v. Davis, 139...

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2 cases
  • State v. Loewe
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • February 25, 2021
    ...and dispatchers involved." State v. Baxter, 144 Idaho 672, 678, 168 P.3d 1019, 1025 (Ct. App. 2007); see also State v. Widner, 155 Idaho 840, 844, 317 P.3d 737, 741 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004). "When gauging whether information k......
  • State v. Stewart, Docket No. 39887
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • June 25, 2014
    ...the same argument to this Court in his appeal from his convictions stemming from the stop of Stewart's vehicle. In State v. Widner, 155 Idaho 840, 317 P.3d 737 (Ct. App. 2013), we determined that under the totality of the circumstances, the information from the confidential informant was re......

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