State v. Davis

• Decision Date: 05 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 29152.,29152.
• Citation: 85 P.3d 1130,139 Idaho 731
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Billie Lou DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

85 P.3d 1130

139 Idaho 731

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Billie Lou DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 29152.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

December 5, 2003.

Matthews Law Offices, Boise; Griffard Law Offices, Boise, for appellant. Leo N. Griffard, Jr. argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Charles Edward Zalesky, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Charles Edward Zalesky argued. LANSING, Chief Judge.

Billie Lou Davis challenges her conviction for misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). She contends that the trial court committed error in denying her motion to suppress evidence and in excluding trial evidence. We affirm.

I.

BACKGROUND

Shortly after midnight on June 17, 2000, Officer Tim Davidson of the Idaho State Police was driving northbound through the city of McCall. He saw Davis's vehicle traveling toward him and believed that the vehicle was exceeding the speed limit. He turned his patrol car around to pursue Davis and followed her into a motel parking lot, where Davis stopped. Upon questioning Davis, Officer Davidson noticed the smell of alcohol on her breath. He conducted field sobriety tests and later arrested her for DUI. At the McCall police station, Davis submitted to a breathalyzer test, and the results showed a breath alcohol content of 0.13, well above the legal limit of .08. See Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a). Davis was charged with second offense DUI, I.C. §§ 18-8004, 18-8005.

Five days after the incident, Davidson prepared his police report. It stated that he had measured the speed of Davis's vehicle by pacing, and according to this estimate, she was traveling 32 miles per hour in a 25 mile-per-hour zone.

Davis moved to suppress all evidence acquired through the vehicle stop, contending that there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. Before the hearing on this motion, Officer Davidson met with the prosecutor, who asked how Davidson could have paced the Davis vehicle when it was coming toward him. At that time, Davidson told the prosecutor that he had paced the Davis vehicle after he turned his car around to pursue her. At the suppression hearing, however, Officer Davidson's testimony was quite different. He admitted that, after having reviewed a videotape of the stop made by the camera in his patrol car, it was not possible that he could have paced Davis's vehicle while she was exceeding the speed limit. This was so because the video showed that, by the time he began pursuing her, Davis had already slowed to turn into the motel parking lot. He testified that instead of establishing her speed by pacing, as stated in his report, he had used a radar gun to check the speed just before Davis came past him. Davidson admitted that he had been inaccurate, both in his police report and in his conversation with the prosecutor, when he said that he had paced the Davis vehicle. He said that it was only after viewing the videotape of the stop that he remembered having used the radar.

In rendering findings at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court recognized the discrepancy between the officer's report and his testimony, but nevertheless found credible Officer Davidson's testimony that he detected the speed of Davis's vehicle by radar. The court therefore held that the officer reasonably suspected that Davis was speeding and consequently was justified in conducting a traffic stop.

On the morning of trial, defense counsel moved to exclude evidence of the results of Davis's breathalyzer test because the State had failed to disclose a witness who was to provide foundational testimony regarding the test. The magistrate granted the motion and excluded the test results.¹ Later, the defense attempted to introduce testimony that Davis consented to a breathalyzer test, but the magistrate excluded that testimony. The jury found Davis guilty.

Davis appealed her conviction to the district court, which affirmed. On further appeal to this Court, Davis contends that the magistrate erred in denying her suppression motion and in excluding evidence that she agreed to submit to a breath test.

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Suppression Motion

Davis asserts that Officer Davidson's testimony at the suppression hearing was so in conflict with his report written five days after the arrest that his testimony cannot be viewed as substantial evidence to show that the stop of Davis's vehicle was justified.

In examining the magistrate's factual findings, this Court will not substitute its view for that of the magistrate as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995). We defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998); State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 686, 991 P.2d 870, 874 (Ct.App.1999). We exercise free review, however, over application of constitutional requirements to the facts found by the trial court. DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553, 961 P.2d at 644 (1998).

A traffic stop constitutes a seizure that is subject to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Therefore, a traffic stop must be supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to the traffic laws or that either the vehicle or an occupant is subject to detention in connection with violation of other laws. Id. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)

.

Davis does not claim that the facts as found by the magistrate would be insufficient to demonstrate reasonable suspicion justifying her detention by Officer Davidson. Her contention, rather, is that the magistrate should not have considered Officer Davidson's testimony to be credible.

Although the members of this Court, sitting as the fact finder, might have been more skeptical about the officer's credibility than was the magistrate here, we cannot say that the officer's testimony was so thoroughly impeached that the trial court was unjustified in placing any reliance upon it. Officer Davidson was vigorously examined by the court as well as by counsel. Although his police report made no mention of use of radar to gauge Davis's speed, Davidson testified that his memory of the use of radar was aroused by viewing the videotape of the incident. He also offered a plausible explanation for how the error in his report occurred— that he was very busy on the night in question, and that, when preparing his report, he either was not paying sufficient attention or became confused because he was writing reports on other cases at the same time. Although one might infer that Officer Davidson modified his testimony to conform with the police video and to prevent suppression of evidence, that is not the only permissible inference. Unlike this Court, the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and body language in assessing his candor and credibility. A reasonable explanation having been provided for the...