State v. Wilcox
| Decision Date | 26 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Yor-22-90 |
| Citation | 288 A.3d 1200,2023 ME 10 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Douglas E. WILCOX |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Tyler J. Smith, Esq. (orally), Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellant Douglas E. Wilcox
Kathryn Slattery, District Attorney and Mark E. Squires, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District 1, Alfred, for appellee State of Maine
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.
[¶1] Douglas E. Wilcox appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A)(1) (2022), entered by the trial court (York County, Sutton, J. ) upon a conditional guilty plea entered after the court (Moskowitz, J. ) denied Wilcox's motion to suppress evidence obtained through an Old Orchard Beach police officer's interactions with Wilcox in a convenience store parking lot. Because we conclude that the officer's actions were constitutionally sound and that the court properly denied Wilcox's motion to suppress, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
[¶2] On November 28, 2020, a police officer in Old Orchard Beach issued Wilcox a uniform summons and complaint alleging that he had operated under the influence the previous night. The State charged Wilcox by complaint on December 18, 2020, with both operating under the influence, id. , and operating while license suspended or revoked (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A)(1)-(4) (2022). Wilcox moved on multiple grounds to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of his interactions with the officer at the convenience store, including on the grounds that he was unlawfully seized based on an unreliable anonymous tip and was directed to perform field sobriety testing without being asked for his consent.
[¶3] The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. It heard testimony from the officer who interacted with Wilcox at the convenience store and admitted two videos from the officer's body and cruiser cameras.
[¶4] The officer testified to the following events,1 most of which are also depicted in the two videos that were admitted in evidence at the suppression hearing.2 The officer was dispatched to a particular 7-Eleven store on November 27, 2020, at about 10:20 p.m. The dispatcher informed the officer of an anonymous report that a brown Honda had struck something and was now in the 7-Eleven parking lot. The person who made the report also conveyed a belief that the driver was intoxicated. When the officer arrived at the 7-Eleven, he found two brown Hondas—a car and a sport utility vehicle. After confirming with dispatch that the vehicle in question was a car, the officer approached the brown Honda car and found a man—later identified as Wilcox—crouched by the front driver's side of the car looking at the front tire. There was extensive damage to the driver's side of the vehicle, with bare metal and no rust. The trunk of the car was open.
[¶5] The officer asked Wilcox what was going on. When Wilcox did not respond and began to walk away toward the store with his hands in his pockets, the officer told him to stop, keep his hands out of his pockets, and come toward him. Wilcox said that he was "just going into the store real quick," but he walked toward the officer at the rear of his car, and the officer told him to have a seat on the rear of the trunk.
[¶6] The officer asked what had happened and where the accident had occurred, and Wilcox said that it had happened on the highway. He was disheveled and emotional, and was slurring his speech as if his tongue were too large for his mouth. The officer asked Wilcox questions about his health and well-being, and Wilcox reported no injuries or ailments. The officer told Wilcox that he was going to conduct field sobriety tests and offered Wilcox no opportunity to decline. As a result of field sobriety testing, the officer conducted additional alcohol and drug testing.
[¶7] Based on the testimony and video recordings, the court found that, because the officer's observations were consistent with what the anonymous caller had said, the tip was sufficiently reliable for the officer to approach Wilcox. The court found that the police officer located the car parked in a dark area at the identified convenience store; noticed damage to the car, consistent with the report, after shining a light on it; and approached Wilcox in a friendly manner to ensure that he was okay and to see what had happened. The court concluded that Wilcox had not been seized until the officer asked him to complete field sobriety tests. It found that the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the field sobriety tests because Wilcox's speech was slurred and there was damage to his vehicle.
[¶8] After the court denied his motion to suppress, Wilcox entered a conditional guilty plea to operating under the influence, and the court (Sutton, J. ) entered a judgment of conviction on March 18, 2022. The court suspended Wilcox's license for 150 days and sentenced him to pay a $500 fine. The court dismissed the other count with the agreement of the parties. Wilcox timely appealed from the judgment of conviction. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2022) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).
[¶9] Wilcox argues that the court (Moskowitz, J. ) should have granted his motion to suppress because the officer who interacted with him violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution3 when he detained Wilcox at the convenience store, questioned him, and administered field sobriety tests.4 We consider the constitutionality of both (A) the officer's initial detention of Wilcox for questioning and (B) his administration of field sobriety tests. "We review questions of constitutional interpretation de novo." State v. Reeves , 2022 ME 10, ¶ 42, 268 A.3d 281.
[¶10] Wilcox first argues that he was unlawfully seized before the officer conversed with him and observed his speech because the officer directed him to stop, keep his hands out of his pockets, step toward the officer, and sit on the rear bumper. Wilcox argues that the officer did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to seize him at that time because the anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, particularly on the issue of intoxication.
[¶11] "A seizure of the person occurs when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen such that he is not free to walk away." State v. White , 2013 ME 66, ¶ 11, 70 A.3d 1226 (quotation marks omitted). As the State conceded at oral argument, the officer restrained Wilcox's liberty through a show of authority by ordering him to remove his hands from his pockets, stop, come toward the officer, and sit on the rear of his vehicle's trunk. See White , 2013 ME 66, ¶ 11, 70 A.3d 1226 ; see also State v. Patterson , 2005 ME 26, ¶ 14, 868 A.2d 188 (). The trial court erred in concluding that there was no seizure at that time. The question, then, is whether the court's findings nonetheless demonstrate that the seizure was lawful, because of either safety concerns or a suspicion of a violation of law.
[¶12] "Brief investigatory detentions are justified when they are based on specific and articulable facts, and can be solely for safety concerns as part of the community caretaking function[ ] of police officers, which includes investigat[ing] vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability." State v. Bragg , 2012 ME 102, ¶ 10, 48 A.3d 769 (quotation marks omitted). "Safety reasons alone can be sufficient if they are based upon specific and articulable facts." State v. Pinkham , 565 A.2d 318, 319 (Me. 1989) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶13] Brief investigatory detentions are also acceptable if they are based on specific facts that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct or a civil violation "has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur." State v. Sylvain , 2003 ME 5, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 984. "The suspicion need only be more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch." State v. LaForge, 2012 ME 65, ¶ 10, 43 A.3d 961 (quotation marks omitted). "[A] tip—even an anonymous one—may be reliable if the information is corroborated by the officer." State v. Vaughan, 2009 ME 63, ¶ 12, 974 A.2d 930.
[¶14] Because the officer had confirmed that the caller accurately identified the type of vehicle, its color, its location, and its involvement in a recent collision, it was reasonable for the officer to infer that the caller had observed the collision that resulted in damage to Wilcox's car and the car's progress to the convenience store. Based on the tip and the officer's observations, it was then reasonable for the officer to have Wilcox sit on the rear bumper to see if he was safe or required medical attention.5 The record supports the trial court's finding that the officer intended to ascertain Wilcox's safety and well-being; the evidence shows that the officer asked Wilcox what had happened and where, followed quickly by an inquiry into whether Wilcox was injured and needed an ambulance. Such an investigation of a reported accident can be as much a part of an officer's role as a community caretaker, see Bragg , 2012 ME 102, ¶ 10, 48 A.3d 769 ; Pinkham , 565 A.2d at 319, as it is central to an officer's task of ascertaining whether criminal conduct has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur, see State v. Swett , 1998 ME 76, ¶¶ 2, 4, 709 A.2d 729. The court thus found facts demonstrating a legitimate basis for the officer to seize Wilcox for investigatory questioning. We next consider the constitutionality of the officer's administration of field sobriety tests.
[¶15] To determine whether the field sobriety testing was constitutionally...
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