State v. Wilde, A19-1509
| Decision Date | 13 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | A19-1509 |
| Citation | 947 N.W.2d 473 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jordan Christopher WILDE, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica M. Surges, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge.*
Appellant challenges his conviction of criminal vehicular homicide, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the results of a urine test because (1) the urine sample was collected under a warrant that was insufficiently particular because it mistakenly named his father as the person to be searched and (2) exigent circumstances did not justify the search. We affirm.
Around 11:00 p.m. on December 31, 2016, 19-year-old appellant Jordan Christopher Wilde was driving on a highway when he veered out of his lane and collided with another vehicle. Sergeant Michael Morrow of the Olmsted County Sheriff's Department was the first to arrive at the scene. He observed that the sole occupant of the other vehicle appeared to be deceased. Wilde was the sole occupant of his vehicle and told Sergeant Morrow that he had been driving. He was injured, but his injuries did not appear critical. And he was disoriented but denied drinking; a preliminary breath test confirmed that there was "no alcohol in his system." Sergeant Morrow asked Wilde if he was under the influence of narcotics, and he indicated that he had smoked marijuana before the accident. Shortly thereafter, an ambulance took Wilde to a nearby hospital for medical treatment. Sergeant Morrow asked Deputy Christopher Anderson to follow Wilde to the hospital because he intended to obtain a search warrant for Wilde's blood or urine. Deputy Anderson watched as hospital personnel transferred Wilde to a treatment room, and he remained outside the room monitoring Wilde until Deputy Nick Jacobson, a law enforcement phlebotomist, relieved him.
Meanwhile, Sergeant Morrow contacted Detective Michael Ranfranz, the on-call detective, to begin drafting a warrant application. Sergeant Morrow briefly summarized the incident and told Detective Ranfranz he would email him a probable-cause statement. Detective Ranfranz did not have Wilde's name, so he used the license-plate number of the vehicle Wilde was driving to look up the registered owner—Chris James Wilde, who is Wilde's father. He inserted that name into the warrant application form, which automatically populated it into all name fields on the application and proposed warrant.1 He also stated that "Wilde was the only occupant of [the vehicle with the indicated license plate] and admitted he was the driver," the other driver was pronounced dead at the scene, and "Wilde admitted using marijuana." To establish the details of the incident, Detective Ranfranz referenced the statement he anticipated receiving from Sergeant Morrow: "SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT."
Sergeant Morrow's affidavit correctly identified Wilde by name and birth date, detailed the facts of the accident, including Wilde's statements to him, and indicated Wilde was being transported to a particular hospital due to "a possible broken ankle and other minor injuries." When Detective Ranfranz received the affidavit, he compared it to the application he had prepared. Seeing both "Chris" or "Christopher" and "Wilde" on both, he "assumed they were the same names." He attached the affidavit to the application and sent them to a judge with the proposed warrant. The judge signed the application, witnessing the detective's oath, and issued the warrant at 1:10 a.m. Detective Ranfranz printed the documents and drove to the hospital.
At the hospital, he met Deputy Jacobson, who indicated that Wilde's injuries were more serious than they had initially appeared and he was heading into surgery. Deputy Jacobson explained that he had attempted to obtain a blood sample; when that proved unsuccessful, he asked hospital staff to secure a urine sample from Wilde, telling them that "a search warrant was on its way." But when Deputy Jacobson reviewed the warrant, he noticed that it did not state the name of the person they intended to search. Detective Ranfranz went to obtain a corrected warrant, and Deputy Jacobson continued to seek assistance from hospital staff in obtaining a urine sample from Wilde.
At 2:18 a.m., a nurse brought Deputy Jacobson a container of Wilde's urine. He noted that the container identified Wilde with the name and birthdate that he knew to be associated with the driver involved in the accident. Deputy Jacobson transferred the urine to his approved urine collection kit. Shortly thereafter, Detective Ranfranz returned with a new warrant, issued at 2:29 a.m., that correctly identified Wilde. Subsequent testing confirmed that Wilde used marijuana before driving.
Wilde was charged with criminal vehicular homicide. He moved to suppress the results of the urine test, arguing that the warrant in effect at the time the urine was collected was insufficiently particular because it misidentified the person to be searched and exigent circumstances did not justify a warrantless search. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the error did not invalidate the warrant because it created no reasonable possibility that police would search the wrong person. Wilde subsequently waived a jury trial and submitted the charge to the district court on stipulated facts. The district court found him guilty. Wilde appeals.
Did the district court err by concluding that the warrant was sufficiently particular?
When reviewing a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress evidence, we independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in not suppressing the evidence. State v. Askerooth , 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. 2004). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
The United States Constitution provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Minnesota Constitution states a nearly identical two-part particularity requirement. Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Both provisions prohibit "general or exploratory searches." State v. Bradford , 618 N.W.2d 782, 795 (Minn. 2000). "By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the [particularity] requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications[.]" State v. Sexter , 935 N.W.2d 157, 163 (Minn. App. 2019) (quoting Maryland v. Garrison , 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1016, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) ), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2019). Requiring particularity with respect to the place to be searched also minimizes the risk "that officers executing search warrants will by mistake search a place other than the place intended by the magistrate." State v. Gonzales , 314 N.W.2d 825, 827 (Minn. 1982).
But errors in the description of the place to be searched do not necessarily invalidate a warrant. Id. When determining whether a search warrant is sufficiently particular, we consider whether the description in the warrant "is sufficient so that the executing officer can ‘locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort’ with no ‘reasonable probability that [other premises] might be mistakenly searched.’ " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gitcho , 601 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1979) ). Under this analysis, we consider not only the warrant itself but also the warrant application and supporting affidavits if they are expressly incorporated into and attached to the warrant. State v. Fawcett , 884 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Minn. 2016) (citing Groh v. Ramirez , 540 U.S. 551, 557-58, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1290, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) ). We view these documents "in a common sense and realistic fashion rather than a grudging or negative attitude that otherwise will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting." State v. Doust , 285 Minn. 336, 173 N.W.2d 337, 339-40 (1969) (quotations omitted); see also Fawcett , 884 N.W.2d at 385 ().
We also consider the circumstances of the case when determining whether the warrant is sufficiently particular. Fawcett , 884 N.W.2d at 387. In doing so, we account for the possibility the warrant would lead officers to search the wrong location. If the intended location is the only one that fits within the scope of the warrant, there is no reasonable probability that the executing officer will mistakenly search other premises. See Gonzales , 314 N.W.2d at 827 (); Doust , 173 N.W.2d at 339-40 (); State v. Schnorr , 346 N.W.2d 380, 382-83 (Minn. App. 1984) ().
We also account for the executing officer's...
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State v. Thompson
...We review factual findings in support of a decision to suppress evidence for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. State v. Wilde, 947 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Minn.App. 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2020). The district court suppressed the evidence here because it believed that police obt......