State v. Wiles

• Decision Date: 27 July 1921
• Docket Number: 16506.
• Citation: 199 P. 749,116 Wash. 387
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. WILES.

199 P. 749

116 Wash. 387

STATE v. WILES.

No. 16506.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 27, 1921

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; A. W. Frater, Judge.

Frederick S. Wiles was convicted of violation of the motor vehicle license law, and appeals. Affirmed.

Elias A. Wright and Sam A. Wright, both of Seattle, for appellant.

Malcolm Douglas and Arthur Schramm, Jr., both of Seattle, for the State.

BRIDGES J.

Appellant was charged by information with unlawfully using and operating a motortruck on the public highways of the county of King, state of Washington, without first obtaining a license therefor, as required by the state laws. He was found guilty, and has appealed from a judgment imposing a fine.

The facts are simple and stipulated, and are as follows: Prior to his arrest appellant had entered into a written contract with the United States government, whereby, for certain considerations, he agreed to carry the United States mail in the city of Seattle, Wash., between the various depots wharves, docks, post office, and substations therein. In carrying out his contract with the government, he used various motortrucks, including the one which he is accused of operating, without first having obtained a license. These trucks were used by the appellant only in the business of carrying the mail under his contract. They had painted on them the usual insignia of vehicles used for these purposes including the words, 'United States Mail.' The terms of his contract required him to provide vehicles for the carriage of the mail, and to keep them properly equipped and in repair, and he was required also to furnish all necessary oil, gasoline, tires, upkeep, and drivers. The contract further provided that such trucks should be used only in the business of carrying United States mail. At the time of his arrest, the appellant was in the exercise of the duties imposed upon him under his contract.

The 1915 Session Laws (Laws 1915, p. 385), as amended by chapter 46, Session Laws of 1919 (Laws 1919, p 90), provide, among other things, that it shall be unlawful to operate automobiles and motortrucks on the public highways of the state without first having obtained a license therefor. The minimum license fee required of a motortruck is $10 per annum, and the fee increases as the weight and capacity of the truck increase. The 1919 act especially exempts 'all motor vehicles owned by the United States government, and used exclusively in its service.'

Appellant's argument is that the United States government has the constitutional right to carry its mails in any manner it may see fit, and without let or hindrance from any person or state; that in the use of his trucks he was in the performance of a governmental duty; that he was an instrumentality selected by the United States government for the purpose of carrying out and putting into effect its constitutional duty of carrying, delivering, and caring for the mail; that such a tax or license fee could not be lawfully imposed on the government itself, if it had owned the trucks and operated them in the performance of the work which appellant was doing, and that, since he is doing for the government what it might do for itself, to impose a tax on him would be in fact to impose it on the government because any private person carrying the mail must require the government to pay him an additional amount equal to any such taxation as he may be required to pay. The principal cases cited by the appellant in support of his argument are the following: Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L.Ed. 204; McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579; Williams v. City of Talladega, 226 U.S. 404, 33 S.Ct. 116, 57 L.Ed. 275; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460, 26 L. Ed. 1067; and Johnson v. State of Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 41 S.Ct. 16, 65 L.Ed. 126

On the other hand, the respondent contends that the license fee is a tax imposed on the right to operate a motortruck on the public highways of the state, and is not a tax imposed on the right to carry the United States mail; that the state has sole control of its roads and highways, and that the agents of the United States are amenable to the reasonable rules and regulations governing the use of such highways; that the immunity of the federal government from state taxation is not negotiable to the extent that it can transfer that immunity to every person who contracts with it to do any act for the furtherance of governmental business; that the mail contract between an individual and the federal government does not render the former an essential governmental agent, and confer on him freedom from state control. In support of its argument respondent cites and relies upon the following, among other cases: Commonwealth v. Closson, 229 Mass. 329, 118 N.E. 653, L. R. A. 1918C, 939; Ex parte Marshall, 75 Fla. 97, 77 So. 869, L. R. A. 1918C, 944; Searight v. Stokes, 3 How. 151, 11 L.Ed. 537--to which may be added: Dickey v. Maysville, etc., Turnpike Co., 7 Dana (Ky.) 113; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Richmond (C. C.) 178 F. 310; Id., 224 U.S. 160, 32 S.Ct. 449, 56 L.Ed. 710; Fidelity & Dep. Co. v. State of Penn., 240 U.S. 319, 36 S.Ct. 298, 60 L.Ed. 664; Lumberville Delaware Bridge Co. v. Board of Assessors, 55 N. J. Law, 529, 26 A. 711, 25 L. R. A. 134.

The single legal question involved in this case is an interesting one. Although the same question, based upon identical facts, must exist in nearly every state of the union, we have not been cited to a single case which is directly in point, nor has our independent search resulted in finding one.

We are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from must stand. It is doubtless true that the states may not directly tax the property of the federal government, nor the instrumentalities which it uses to discharge any of its constitutional functions, nor may a state, by taxation or otherwise, materially interfere with the due, expeditious, and orderly procedure of that government while in the exercise of its constitutional powers. When it acts within its powers it is supreme, and all the states are subordinate to it. Being supreme, it must maintain its supremacy in order that our form of government shall continue to be stable and lasting. It is on this broad principle, as we understand it, that the federal Supreme Court has always held that a state may not tax the federal government or its instrumentalities, or do ought which would directly interfere with its lawful operations, because, had the various states such powers, they might showly but surely undermine and weaken its foundations, independence, and acknowledged supremacy. It was on these grounds and for these reasons that the United States Supreme Court held, in the epoch-making cases of McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, and Osborn v. U.S. Bank, supra, that a state did not have power to directly tax the right of the United States Bank to do business in such states.

But the law of those cases is not applicable to the facts of this case. In those cases the bank was chartered by the United States, and controlled by congressional acts as to the manner of doing business. It was the direct issue and immediate instrumentality of the government. Its private property within the state might be taxed like any other property, but for the state to require it to pay a tax for the right to do business was equal to requiring the government itself to pay a tax for the privilege of performing, within the borders of the state, functions authorized or imposed on it by the federal Constitution. But the case at bar cannot come within the scope or spirit of those decisions. Here there is no effort to tax the business of carrying the mail. The appellant is not direct instrumentality of the government; he is a personal contractor, doing certain work for the government, at a fixed compensation. In no sense is he the representative or agent of the government nor an integral part of it. As was said by the federal Supreme Court in the case of Fidelity & Dep. Co. v. Commonwealth of Penn., supra (which case we will later notice in more detail):

'But mere contracts between private corporations and the United States do not necessarily render the former essential governmental agencies and confer freedom from state control.'

A person building a state road is nothing but a contractor; he is no part of the state or its agencies, and does not thereby inherit the various immunities of the state. There is nothing in appellant's contract which indicates that the government intended to pass its immunities on to him. Under these circumstances it should be presumed that it was the intention that he should be subject to the general laws of the state.

Nor are those cases out of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning taxation in interstate commerce in point. Such were the cases of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, supra, and Williams v. City of Talladega, supra. The state of Texas passed a law imposing taxes on every chartered telegraph company doing business in the state, and each such company was thereby required to pay a tax of 1 cent for each full-rate message sent and one-half cent for each message the toll for which was less than full rate. The telegraph company was incorporated under the laws of the state of New York. Many years ago the...