State v. Wiley
| Decision Date | 23 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 18944-KA,18944-KA |
| Citation | 513 So.2d 849 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Warner WILEY, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Donnie Ellerman, Dennis Grady Stewart, Winnsboro, for appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, William R. Coenen, Jr., Dist. Atty., Rayville, E. Rudolph McIntyre, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Winnsboro, for appellee.
Before HALL, C.J., and MARVIN and FRED W. JONES, Jr., JJ.
Defendant, Warner Wiley, a man in his early twenties, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. His appeal presents twenty-five assignments of error. Finding no merit to these assignments, we affirm.
In the late evening hours of November 20, 1983, Mrs. Myrla Massey, a woman in her mid to late seventies, was attacked in the bedroom of her home in Winnsboro, Louisiana. She was repeatedly beaten about the head with a long piece of wood or metal such as an angle iron or an ax handle. A similar type of instrument was used to severely lacerate her vagina, tearing the vaginal wall and puncturing the bladder. Sperm was found in Mrs. Massey's vagina and the condition of her rectum indicated that it had been penetrated by a softer object such as a penis.
The state's forensic pathology expert testified that extensive force was used in delivering the blows to Mrs. Massey's head, causing two skull fractures, but that she did not die instantly. He testified that she was alive when her vagina was lacerated with the blunt instrument and when her rectum was penetrated. He stated that there was no way to determine if she was alive when the sperm was deposited in her vagina.
Mrs. Massey's body was found the following morning by her eighty-three year old husband. Her night gown was pushed up around her breasts and blood had issued from her ears, nose, mouth, vagina and rectum.
Mr. Massey was present in a separate bedroom in the home when the attack on his wife occurred. He was unable to hear any disturbance as he is deaf and did not own a hearing aid at the time.
Two identifiable fingerprints were found at the scene and later compared with the defendant's fingerprints. The state's fingerprint comparison expert testified that eight to nine points are required to make a positive identification of a fingerprint. She found eleven positive points on each of the two fingerprints matching the defendant's fingerprints. Head and pubic hair of a black person recovered from the bed sheets and Mrs. Massey's body had characteristics similar to samples taken from the defendant, according to the state's hair comparison expert. Analysis of the seminal fluid found in Mrs. Massey's vagina and on newspaper at the scene revealed that it was type A. The defendant was determined to be a type A secretor. A secretor is a person who secretes his blood group typing into his body fluids. The state's expert in body fluid analysis testified that the seminal fluid found at the scene could have been deposited by the defendant.
By these assignments, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce into evidence various inculpatory statements alleged to have been made by the defendant. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the first three statements and objected to the fourth when it was introduced at trial.
The first statement was made on November 28, 1983. The defendant was being transported from Winnsboro to the West Carroll Parish Sheriff's Office in Oak Grove, Louisiana by State Troopers James C. McKenzie and Stanley Martin. Trooper McKenzie testified that the defendant spontaneously stated that he wanted to jump out of the car and kill himself. The defendant argues that this statement is irrelevant.
Evidence is relevant if it makes any fact indicating guilt or innocence more or less probable. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the trial court's ruling as to the relevancy of evidence should not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Whittaker 463 So.2d 1270 (La.1985); State v. Johnson, 453 So.2d 279 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984).
The trial judge ruled that the statement was admissible. The statement was relevant to the state of mind of the defendant at the time of his arrest, to be accorded such weight and effect on the issue of guilt or innocence as the jury might give it. We find no abuse of discretion.
The defendant made another statement on November 28, 1983, this time to Deputy Harry B. Keffer of the West Carroll Parish Sheriff's Office. Deputy Keffer was in the radio room when he was alerted that defendant had stated that he was going to hang himself in his cell. He went to the defendant's cell and inquired as to what the problem was and the defendant repeated that he wanted to kill himself. Deputy Keffer then inquired why the defendant would want to do a stupid thing like that and the defendant responded "because I killed that woman, they're gonna to pin it on me and I got nothing to lose for it."
Defendant argues that this statement was not admissible for several reasons. He argues that no Miranda warnings were given, that the defendant was in a confused mental state, that no attorney had been appointed, and that the statement was uncorroborated, unrecorded and contradictory.
Spontaneous, voluntary statements of a person in custody, not given as a result of police interrogation or compelling influence, are admissible in evidence without Miranda warnings. State v. Smith, 407 So.2d 652 (La.1981); State v. Johnson, 457 So.2d 732 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984) writ denied 460 So.2d 608 (1984).
Deputy Keffer testified that he knew nothing about the case and was merely seeking to investigate a disturbance in the jail. The conversation between Deputy Keffer and the defendant did not constitute custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda. Furthermore, defendant was given Miranda warnings the morning before this statement was made.
Emotional distress is not grounds for rendering a confession inadmissible unless it is so severe that the party confessing is unable to voluntarily do so. State v. Beck, 445 So.2d 470 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984) writ denied, 446 So.2d 315 (La.1984).
No evidence was presented by the defendant at the hearing on the motion to suppress or at the trial to corroborate his alleged mental confusion. Deputy Keffer testified that defendant was calm, not crying or "hyper", and did not seem to be upset. We find this contention to be without merit.
On November 29, 1983, at the West Carroll Parish Sheriff's office, State Troopers McKenzie and David Rushing conducted a four hour interview of the defendant in an effort to obtain a confession. No confession was forthcoming and the interview was not taped. At trial Trooper McKenzie testified as to the content of notes he took of defendant's responses relating to the case. He testified that the defendant said that if the fingerprints proved he had done it, then he "ought to be punished"; that if he did it, to tell the family he was sorry; and in reference to the murder weapon, that "you can't find it".
The defendant argues that he was entitled to have the entirety of the statement presented to the jury.
The fact that the purported statement of the accused does not consist of a verbatim reiteration of the conversation between them, due to the witness's inability to recall or other valid explanation, does not violate the rights of the accused under Section 450. All that the law requires is that the substance of the confession or statement be given. State v. Marmillion, 339 So.2d 788 (La.1976); State v. Domino, 234 La. 950, 102 So.2d 227 (1958).
Trooper McKenzie testified that pre-confession statements are not tape-recorded due to the cost factor and secretarial limitations. He further testified that much of the conversation occurring during the interview did not relate to the instant offense.
The mere fact that exculpatory statements may "possibly" have been made will not suffice to warrant excluding the evidence of the confession or inculpatory statement in the absence of a showing of prejudice resulting from the officer's inability to recall "everything" that was said. State v. Sepulvado, 342 So.2d 630 (La.1977). We find that these statements were properly admitted.
The fourth statement was made to Winnsboro Police Officer Mitch Reynolds. It occurred in the middle of the night on June 15, 1985 while Reynolds was delivering a prisoner he had arrested to the Franklin Parish Jail. Officer Reynolds testified that the defendant said, "When I get out of here, I'll kill your momma next."
At trial defense counsel objected to the statement as being irrelevant. On appeal defendant only argues that the state did not show that the confession was obtained freely and voluntarily and that no Miranda warnings were given. Defendant argues that allowing this statement into evidence without a foundation was reversible error. The admissibility of a custodial and spontaneous confession has already been discussed. The record reflects that Officer Reynolds did not go to the jail to interrogate the defendant, that he did not provoke the conversation, nor did he promise or threaten the defendant in order to get a statement. The statement made by the defendant was spontaneous, voluntary and was not elicited by police interrogation and is therefore admissible.
These assignments are without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 2, 3, 17 AND 18
By these assignments defendant questions the admission into evidence of various photographic...
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