State v. Wiley, CX-87-1633
| Citation | 420 N.W.2d 234 |
| Decision Date | 01 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. CX-87-1633,CX-87-1633 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Earthia B. WILEY, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Minnesota |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Guilty plea of defendant who had demonstrated extensive knowledge of his constitutional rights and of criminal procedure was not invalidated by trial court's failure to ask questions set out in Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.01.
2. Post-conviction petitioner did not establish he was incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea, nor that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Thomas L. Johnson, Hennepin Co. Atty., Anne E. Peek, Asst. Co. Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.
C. Paul Jones, State Public Defender, Elizabeth B. Davies, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Considered and decided by RANDALL, P.J., and LANSING and MULALLY, JJ., with oral argument waived.
This is an appeal from a post-conviction order denying appellant Earthia Wiley's claim that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea to attempted third degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.344, subd. 1(c) and Sec. 609.17 (1986). We affirm.
Appellant Earthia Wiley pleaded guilty to attempted third degree criminal sexual conduct on June 16, 1986, after having been charged with first degree criminal sexual conduct for an incident occurring on December 6, 1984. Wiley pleaded guilty following an omnibus hearing, at which his counsel made a motion to suppress statements made to police, a motion to admit evidence of prior sexual conduct of the complainant, and a motion to dismiss for alleged loss or destruction of exculpatory evidence by Wiley's former counsel.
On the record, Wiley's counsel informed the court a plea agreement had been reached, under which Wiley would submit an Alford plea, maintaining his innocence, and the state would amend the charge to attempted third degree criminal sexual conduct. The state and the defense agreed there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea based on the testimony heard at the Rasmussen hearing just concluded. The court stated it would allow an oral amendment to the complaint, to be followed by a written amended complaint, which was filed the following day. The court then recessed for Wiley and counsel to fill out the Rule 15 petition to plead guilty.
Upon return from the recess, Wiley was sworn and examined by his counsel as follows:
The trial court asked Wiley the following question concerning his understanding of the plea:
The court then questioned Wiley concerning his understanding of the possible sentences for each charge.
Wiley's counsel had made a motion for a competency examination under Minn.R.Crim.P. 20.01, based on the opinion of Wiley's personal physician that due to hypertension diabetes mellitus and required medications, Wiley was not competent to participate in trial proceedings. A psychological examination was conducted, to which counsel objected because it did not include an examination of Wiley's physical condition. However, counsel later obtained an order requiring such an examination.
Wiley testified at the post-conviction hearing he had not taken his insulin the day the guilty plea was offered. He also testified he had eaten no food and drunk four double shots of rum over the lunch hour. His counsel did testify he detected the odor of alcohol on Wiley's breath, but did not question his ability to comprehend the proceedings.
Wiley's counsel testified he was prepared to go to trial on June 16, 1986, but had discussed the possibility of a plea twice before with Wiley. He estimated he and Wiley discussed the Rule 15 petition for 20 to 30 minutes. Wiley's counsel testified to a number of meetings and phone calls with Wiley, supporting his conclusion Wiley understood his constitutional rights as well as any client he ever had.
Wiley testified his counsel was not prepared for trial, and that this lack of preparation forced him to consider pleading guilty. He testified counsel did not discuss with him the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and spent only seven or eight minutes on the petition. He testified that although he was intoxicated it "didn't seem to make any difference" because he had so much on his mind.
The post-conviction court, also the presiding judge at the guilty plea hearing, found that Wiley gave no appearance of being intoxicated at the hearing, and that he had "communicated many times with his attorney regarding his case." The court found the waiver of Wiley's constitutional rights to have been knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and that Wiley was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. The court noted in an accompanying memorandum Wiley has "a knowledge of law and procedure extremely unusual in a person not 'learned in the law' by way of formal education."
Wiley had filed a notice to remove the judge from hearing the post-conviction petition, but this notice was denied on the grounds Wiley had earlier removed another judge from the trial proceedings, and had made no showing of actual prejudice.
Did the post-conviction court err in denying the petition?
Wiley contends he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because: 1) he was not adequately informed of his rights so as to make the waiver of those rights knowing and intelligent; 2) he was incompetent at the time of the plea; and 3) he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the time the plea was taken.
Wiley argues the trial court's failure to ask the questions set out in Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.01 makes the record inadequate to show the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) ().
It is generally held the McCarthy decision does not apply to state court criminal proceedings. See Roddy v. Black, 516 F.2d 1380 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 226, 46 L.Ed.2d 147 (1975); Neeley v. Duckworth, 473 F.Supp. 288, 292 (D.Ind.1979) (). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that
there is no constitutional requirement that the trial court employ a particular litany to validate a guilty plea.
Rouse v. Foster, 672 F.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir.1982). The Eighth Circuit also has indicated
that having informed a defendant of his rights at an arraignment hearing does not require the procedure to be repeated at a guilty plea hearing if the record shows the defendant understood the consequences of the plea when entered.
Stacey v. Solem, 801 F.2d 1048, 1050 n. 2 (8th Cir.1986), citing Clark v. Solem, 693 F.2d 59, 60-61 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1090, 103 S.Ct. 1787, 76 L.Ed.2d 355 (1983); see also State v. Doughman, 340 N.W.2d 348 (Minn.Ct.App.1983) ().
Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.01 lists the questions to be asked the defendant concerning his knowledge of his constitutional rights and his waiver of those rights by pleading guilty. Wiley was asked only one question concerning his waiver of constitutional rights, and that question, asked by his counsel, was very general, referring to the petition to plead guilty for the specific rights being waived. However, Wiley's counsel testified he discussed those rights in going through the Rule 15 petition with Wiley. Moreover, Wiley, with five criminal history points, has had extensive exposure to the criminal justice system, a factor which may be considered in determining whether a guilty plea is knowing and intelligent. See State v. Bryant, 378 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1986). His extensive writings to the court and participation in prior court proceedings indicate an even greater knowledge of the system. See State v. Brant, 407 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (). Both the court and Wiley's counsel indicated Wiley was unusually knowledgeable about his constitutional rights within the criminal justice system. We conclude the trial court's failure to follow Rule 15.01 procedures does not invalidate the guilty plea.
This knowledge was not acquired solely while in prison following the plea. Wiley's pre-plea submissions to the court reveal a knowledge of many of the rights subject to Rule 15.01 questioning, including the right to counsel, due process rights to a...
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