State v. Wilhelm

• Decision Date: 04 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 24897.,24897.
• Citation: 15 P.3d 824,135 Idaho 111
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert Louis WILHELM, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

15 P.3d 824

135 Idaho 111

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert Louis WILHELM, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 24897.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

August 4, 2000.

Rehearing Denied October 2, 2000.

Review Denied December 11, 2000.

Gregory D. Horne, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cude, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Rebekah A. Cude argued.

LANSING, Judge.

Robert Louis Wilhelm brings this appeal from his judgment of conviction, entered upon a guilty plea, for trafficking in marijuana.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On August 29, 1995, Wilhelm was arrested while in possession of seventy-five pounds of marijuana. He was charged with trafficking in marijuana, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(1)(C). At the time of his arrest on the state charge, Wilhelm was on supervised release for a federal criminal offense of possession of cocaine. Because of his Idaho arrest Wilhelm was found to be in violation of his federal supervised release and was ordered to serve a two-year term in federal prison.

During the pendency of the proceedings in the district court, Wilhelm filed a motion to dismiss this case, arguing that this trafficking charge subjected him to double jeopardy. He asserted that he had already served time in federal prison for the same conduct that was the basis of the state charge and that the Idaho State Tax Commission had seized $2,500 from him at the time of his arrest, which effectively served as punishment for the crime. These prior punishments, he argued, precluded further prosecution. The district court denied his motion to dismiss.

The State ultimately added to the charge against Wilhelm one count of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, I.C. § 18-1701, and a persistent violator sentence enhancement under I.C. § 19-2514. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wilhelm unconditionally pleaded guilty to trafficking in marijuana and to being a persistent violator. The State then dismissed the conspiracy charge. The trial court imposed a unified life sentence with a seven and one-half year minimum term and assessed a $50,000 fine.

In this appeal Wilhelm attacks his guilty plea on several bases, contends that the action should be dismissed for violation of his rights against double jeopardy, asserts that the amended indictment was jurisdictionally defective with respect to the persistent violator charge, and asserts that there were errors in sentencing.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Validity of the Guilty Plea

We address first Wilhelm's claims that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Wilhelm argues that he pleaded guilty in reliance upon certain misrepresentations made by the district court and that the district court failed to inquire properly into his mental competence to enter the plea. Wilhelm did not, however, move to set aside his guilty plea or otherwise raise these arguments to the district court.¹

In order to be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Acevedo, 131 Idaho 513, 515, 960 P.2d 196, 198 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Rose, 122 Idaho 555, 558, 835 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Ct.App.1992). However, a challenge to the voluntariness of a plea may not be raised for the first time on appeal unless it presents a question of fundamental error. State v. Harris, 127 Idaho 376, 379, 900 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Ct.App.1995).

A contention that the defendant lacked the mental capacity to enter a guilty plea is an issue that must be raised to the trial court. "[W]here the competency question has not been raised, the trial judge has no duty to independently inquire as to the competency of the defendant." State v. Fuchs, 100 Idaho 341, 346, 597 P.2d 227, 232 (1979). Wilhelm did not seek a judicial determination of his competence before pleading guilty, nor move to withdraw his guilty plea, nor otherwise formally place his mental competence to plead guilty at issue. The Fuchs decision suggests, however, that even without a formal motion from the defendant, the trial court may have an obligation to conduct a hearing on a defendant's competence to plead guilty if "a question of competency lurks in the background." Id. The Fuchs court referred to the holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271 (9th Cir.1977), that to satisfy due process, a hearing on a defendant's competence to plead guilty is necessary "if the trial judge entertains or should have reasonably entertained a good-faith doubt as to the competence of the defendant." Fuchs, 100 Idaho at 346-47, 597 P.2d at 232-233. Wilhelm argues that the district court had reason to doubt his competence because at the plea hearing the court was informed that Wilhelm was under psychiatric care for manic depression and attention deficit disorder.

We disagree that the information given to the district court was sufficient to trigger an obligation for the court to order a mental examination of Wilhelm. The district court made a brief inquiry to determine whether Wilhelm's mental health problems or the medication that he was taking impaired his ability to think clearly and to knowingly enter a plea. Nothing which Wilhelm or his counsel said at the hearing gave a reason to believe that Wilhelm was incompetent. Throughout the hearing, Wilhelm answered the court's questions appropriately; and he asked intelligent, pointed questions about his potential sentence, the effect of the persistent violator enhancement, and the prospect of credit for time served. We find nothing in the record that should have caused the trial court to entertain a good faith doubt about Wilhelm's competence to plead guilty. Therefore, we reject Wilhelm's contention that his guilty plea should be set aside on appeal because the trial court did not sua sponte order a hearing to determine Wilhelm's competence.

Wilhelm's next contention, that he was misled into pleading guilty by misrepresentations of the trial court, presents an issue of fundamental error. "[C]onduct by a trial court inducing a defendant to plead guilty in reliance upon promises that are later dishonored by the court would be fundamental error." Harris, 127 Idaho at 379, 900 P.2d at 1390. Therefore, we will examine this claim despite Wilhelm's failure to raise it below.

Wilhelm first asserts that the district court misled him by representing that if he pleaded guilty his determinate sentence would be five years rather than the seven and one-half years actually imposed and that the district court represented that Wilhelm would be given credit for twenty months that he served in a federal prison. We find, however, that the hearing transcripts upon which Wilhelm relies for this claim do not support his position. These transcripts show that at his arraignment, the district court correctly informed Wilhelm that the mandatory minimum sentence, prescribed by statute, for the offense of trafficking in marijuana was five years. Wilhelm was also informed that though the court could not impose a lesser sentence, it had the discretion "to go beyond that to the maximum." This colloquy could not be reasonably interpreted as a promise by the district court that a particular sentence would be imposed upon Wilhelm. Next, the transcript of the hearing in which credit for time served in the federal prison was discussed shows that it was defense counsel, not the court, who speculated that Wilhelm would receive credit on his state sentence for his federal imprisonment. The district court did not adopt this position nor make any promise in that regard. Thus, Wilhelm's assertion that he was induced to plead guilty by misrepresentations of the trial court are without support in the record.

Wilhelm also contends that the district court assured him that no information that he revealed in the course of debriefings with law enforcement personnel would be utilized against him and then broke this promise by considering such information at sentencing. Once again, the record disproves Wilhelm's contention. Wilhelm met with law enforcement officials on two separate occasions. The first meeting took place in 1995, prior to his incarceration in federal prison. Details from this meeting were included in the presentence investigation report (PSI), which the court considered at sentencing. The second meeting occurred in the summer of 1997. According to the record before this Court, Wilhelm met with narcotics officers pursuant to a "free talk" agreement with the prosecutor. Under this agreement, Wilhelm voluntarily met with law enforcement personnel and the State agreed not to use information divulged during the meeting in criminal proceedings against Wilhelm. This 1997 "free talk" debriefing was the subject of the district court's assurances that the information he divulged would not be used against him. The record reflects that the only information about Wilhelm's disclosures to police that was considered by the district court at sentencing derived from the 1995 meeting, not Wilhelm's 1997 meeting with law enforcement. Hence, the court did not violate its assurances to Wilhelm.

B. Double Jeopardy

Wilhelm next contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the marijuana charge on the ground that the prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He argues that he has already been punished for the marijuana offense because the Idaho State Tax Commission seized $2,500 from him pursuant to the Idaho Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, I.C. § 63-4208. This seizure, according to Wilhelm, constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes, and therefore he cannot be punished again for the same offense.²

We will not address the merits of this issue because it was waived by Wilhelm's guilty plea. The entry of a valid, unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects. State v. Kelchner, 130 Idaho 37, 39, 936 P.2d...