State v. Harris

• Decision Date: 17 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 21560,21560
• Citation: 900 P.2d 1387,127 Idaho 376
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jeremy Blaine HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1387

900 P.2d 1387

127 Idaho 376

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jeremy Blaine HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21560.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Aug. 17, 1995.

[127 Idaho 378] Kent D. Jensen, Rupert, for appellant.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Charles E. Zalesky, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

LANSING, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed for second degree murder, I.C. §§ 18-4001, -4003(g). Jeremy Blaine Harris was initially charged with murder in the first degree. In return for the prosecutor's agreement to reduce the charge to second degree murder and to recommend to the district court a unified sentence of twenty years with a minimum term of confinement of ten years, Harris pleaded guilty to the reduced charge. The district court imposed a lengthier sentence than that recommended by the State, sentencing Harris to the custody of the Board of Correction for twenty-five years, with a minimum term of incarceration of fifteen years. On appeal, Harris challenges the validity of his guilty plea and the reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The circumstances of the charge against Harris are as follows. On July 31, 1993, Jeremy Harris, who was then sixteen years old and was very intoxicated, entered the home of his friend, thirteen-year-old Brendy Thueson. Finding her asleep, Harris decided to steal alcohol and other belongings of the Thueson family. Harris began to carry away a loaded rifle which he found in a bedroom. While leaving the home, Harris was surprised by Brendy as she came out of her bedroom. Harris immediately turned and fired the rifle, killing Brendy.

Harris was initially charged with first degree murder and pleaded not guilty. He subsequently entered into a written plea agreement by which the prosecutor agreed to reduce the charge to murder in the second degree and to recommend that the court impose a unified sentence of twenty years, with a ten-year minimum term of confinement. At the change of plea hearing, the district court advised Harris of the rights he would be waiving if he pleaded guilty and examined Harris regarding his understanding of the consequences of a guilty plea. The court then explained that it would give weight to the attorneys' sentencing recommendations but would not be obligated to adopt them. The court stated:

Now, I have made it very plain to your attorneys, and I want to make it very plain to you here today, that I will not be bound under Rule 11 of the Idaho Criminal Rules by this plea negotiation. I will make my own decision as to how you should be sentenced. I will give great weight and deference to the recommendations of the attorneys. I do that because they are the ones that for a year have been researching the facts, researching the law, seeing what witnesses would testify and how they would testify. They know their cases a lot better than I do. That's why I give great weight and deference to their recommendations. But I will not be bound by those recommendations.

At the subsequent sentencing hearing, after reviewing a presentence report and listening to testimony of witnesses and argument of counsel, the district court stated that it took "no consideration as concerns the plea negotiation" and imposed a unified twenty-five year sentence with a fifteen-year minimum term, a sentence which was longer than that recommended by the State.

On appeal, Harris first argues that he pleaded guilty in return for the prosecutor's recommendation of a particular sentence and that the district court, in effect, accepted the recommendation and then did not follow it. Harris asserts that the court's failure to give adequate consideration to the plea agreement after having told Harris that it would give

[127 Idaho 379] great deference to the attorneys' recommendations undermined the basis of the agreement and tainted the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Harris also contends that the court's refusal to follow the sentencing recommendations of the prosecutor was a "rejection" of the plea agreement, requiring the court to give Harris an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11(d)(4). Finally, Harris argues that his sentence is excessive and an abuse of the court's discretion.

II. ANALYSIS

A. VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

We consider first Harris's contention that the judge's statement at the plea hearing that he would give weight and deference to the sentencing recommendations of the attorneys, coupled with the court's subsequent rejection of those recommendations, misled Harris and rendered his guilty plea involuntary.

To be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483-84, 861 P.2d 51, 53-54 (1993); State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976); Svenson v. State, 110 Idaho 161, 715 P.2d 374 (Ct.App.1986). A guilty plea entered in reliance upon a false premise may be set aside. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984); Svenson, 110 Idaho at 162, 715 P.2d at 375.

Harris did not challenge the voluntariness of his plea below but, rather, raises this question for the first time on appeal. Issues not presented to the trial court cannot be considered on appeal unless a question of fundamental error is involved. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 824 P.2d 109 (1991); State v. Denny, 122 Idaho 563, 835 P.2d 1374 (Ct.App.1992).

Error is fundamental if it goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or goes to the foundation of the case or takes from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive. State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918, 854 P.2d 259, 261 (1993); State v. Sarabia, 125 Idaho 815, 818, 875 P.2d 227, 230 (1994). Under this definition, we conclude that conduct by a trial court inducing a defendant to plead guilty in reliance upon promises that are later dishonored by the court would be fundamental error. Actions that coerce or falsely induce a defendant to plead guilty go to the foundation of the defendant's rights, and when the misconduct is by the court itself rather than the prosecutor or a third party, it is error of which the trial court necessarily should be aware and which the trial court had the opportunity to prevent or correct. Therefore, although Harris did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea below, we will consider his claim that his plea was induced by a sentencing promise from the court that was later disclaimed.

After a complete review of the record, we conclude that Harris's assertion that the court falsely induced him to plead guilty is without support. First, Harris signed the written plea agreement before the hearing at which the court indicated an intent to give deference to the recommendations of counsel. The agreement stated, "The defendant ... understands that the Court is not bound nor obligated to follow the State's recommendation and that additional conditions or penalties may be imposed." It also correctly specified that the penalty for second degree murder ranges from a minimum of ten years to a maximum of life in prison. See I.C. § 18-4004. Thus, Harris's decision to change his plea to guilty was made before he heard the judge's statement and with disclosure that the court could depart from the sentencing recommendations of the parties. Both the timing and the content of the written agreement counter any implication that Harris's decision to plead guilty was predicated upon the judge's comment at the hearing.

Second, at the plea hearing, the court assiduously explained, and Harris repeatedly acknowledged, that the court was not obligated to adopt the sentence recommended by the prosecutor. Although the court stated that it would "give great weight and deference to the recommendations of the attorneys," the court also engaged in the following colloquy with Harris:

The Court: I can still sentence you to your natural life in the Idaho State Penitentiary if I feel that the facts and circumstances support that decision. Do you understand that?

The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: That in fact I could sentence you, for you to die in the Idaho State Penitentiary, without possibility of parole. Do you understand that?

The Defendant: Yes.

....

The Court: Have you discussed that with your attorney?

The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Specifically, your attorney has come to you and said: "Jeremy, we are going to be asking for these things, but this Judge has a rule and he will sentence you to what he feels is appropriate"?

The Defendant: Yes, sir.

Later, at the same hearing, after Harris was sworn, the court again asked if he understood that the sentencing recommendation made by the State was not binding on the court. Harris indicated that he understood the court was not bound. The court then offered Harris an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, which Harris declined. The fact that Harris understood the court retained authority to impose a greater sentence is also confirmed by Harris's statements at the subsequent sentencing hearing. During his allocution before being sentenced, Harris acknowledged that he might be sentenced to life in prison.

Finally, and most importantly, because this issue was not raised below, there is absolutely no evidence through testimony from Harris or from any other source that the judge's statement of intent to give deference to the attorneys' sentencing recommendations in any way influenced Harris's decision to plead guilty.

Thus, although Harris has alleged fundamental error that rendered his guilty plea involuntary, his claim is belied by the appellate record. Because the record discloses that Harris made his decision to plead guilty before hearing the judge's comment, because he was repeatedly informed that the court could elect a sentence lengthier than that...