State v. William Spradling
| Decision Date | 31 March 1982 |
| Docket Number | 81-07-0059,82-LW-3309 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM SPRADLING Defendant-Appellant. CASE |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Mr John F. Holcomb, Prosecuting Attorney for Butler County Butler County Courthouse, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Mr Fred Miller, Spillane and Miller, 508 Rentschler Building Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for Defendant-Appellant.
This cause came on to be heard upon the appeal, transcript of the docket, journal entries and original papers from the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Ohio, transcript of proceedings, briefs and oral arguments of counsel.
Now therefore, the assignment of error having been fully considered, is passed upon in conformity with App. R. 12(A) as follows:
On January 22, 1981, the home of Kenneth and Patricia Dugas was forcibly entered and certain rooms therein were ransacked. A fingerprint, found on a glass window which had been removed from the rear door, linked the appellant with the entry.
Before trial, the appellant filed a motion in limine requesting that evidence of three burglaries allegedly committed by the appellant in the same neighborhood eight (8) months prior to the burglary in question be excluded from the trial. The trial court overruled the motion, the evidence was admitted and the appellant was convicted of violating R.C. 2911.11(A)(3) (aggravated burglary). This appeal timely follows:
The appellant cites but one assignment of error:
The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant-appellant when it overruled appellant's motion in limine.
The general rule is that evidence which shows or tends to show that the accused has previously committed an offense, wholly independent of the one for which he is on trial, is inadmissible. State v. Burson (1974), 38 Ohio St. 2d 157, 311 N.E.2d 526.
This is to prohibit the introduction of such evidence for the purpose of establishing the propensity of the accused to commit the crime in question. Furthermore, this exclusionary rule works to limit (1), the tendency to convict the accused because he escaped punishment for the other offenses; (2), the possible confusion of issues by admitting evidence of other crimes; and (3), the prejudicial effect of attacking the accused when he is not prepared to demonstrate that the attacking evidence is valid. State v. Curry (1975), 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720, quoting Whitty v. State (1967), 34 Wis. 2d 278, 292, 149 N.E.2d 557.
The appellant argues that this general rule along with R.C. 2945.59 works to exclude the prior burglaries from being introduced into evidence. However, R.C. 2945.59, as a rule of evidence and not of substantive law (Clyne v. State (1931), 123 Ohio St. 234, 174 N.E. 676), has been superseded by Evid. R. 404 (B). See, Ohio Const. Art. IV, ] 5, cl. B; Evid. R. 102. Nevertheless, for all practical purposes, Evid. R. 404(B) merely restates, with some modifications, the Ohio common law as it was previously codified in R.C. 2945.59. Therefore, any case decided under that statute retains some value as a precedent.
However, we note that Evid. R. 404(B) provides several exceptions to the general rule set out above. It reads as follows:
(B) Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (Emphasis added.)
With the foregoing in mind, we now must analyze those issues raised under this assignment of error. In doing so, we rely upon the method of analysis for cases of this nature as set out by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Gardner (1979), 59 Ohio St. 2d 14, 391 N.E.2d 337.
Following this analysis, we must first determine if any of the exceptions set out in Evid. R. 404(B) was material to the issues at trial; and secondly, if one was, whether or not evidence of the prior burglaries was relevant as tending to establish it. State v. Gardner, supra, at 20.
In reviewing the record, we find that the appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge against him. By making this plea all the elements of the offense were then placed in issue. A purpose to commit a theft offense (i.e., intent) is one of the essential elements of the offense of aggravated burglary. Therefore, the element of intent contained in Evid. R. 404(B) was a material fact in issue at trial.
This then raises the question of whether or not the evidence of the prior burglaries was relevant to the issue of intent. In order for the prior burglaries to be relevant, they "must have such a temporal, modal and situational relationship" with the elements of aggravated burglary so that they establish a purposeful action on the part of the appellant in respect to the commission of the burglary at the Dugas' home. Burson, supra, at 159. It is our determination that there is such a relationship.
The evidence establishes that (1) the other burglaries occurred within the same general neighborhood; (2), that in each burglary, entry was gained in a similar fashion (by removal of a glass window at the rear of the homes, all of which fronted a creek); (3), that the appellant's fingerprints were found on sections of glass removed from the other homes as well as at the Dugas' home; and (4), that personal items such as jewelry and television sets were taken from the bedrooms of the other homes while the master bedroom at the Dugas' home was ransacked, although no items were stolen.
Furthermore, we...
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