State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 24 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2020-0234 |
| Citation | 174 N.H. 635,273 A.3d 394 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Carley WILLIAMS |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
John M. Formella, attorney general (Zachary L. Higham, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Stephanie Hausman, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.
The defendant, Carley Williams, appeals the decision of the Circuit Court (Derby, J.) to impose a portion of her suspended sentence. Following a multi-day, in-person, evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the defendant violated the suspended sentence's condition of good behavior, in part, by committing identity fraud and that the violation warranted imposing "a reasonable portion of the suspended sentence." On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by finding that she committed identity fraud and by holding the subsequent hearing telephonically at which it imposed 70 days (less 10 days of time served) of her 12-month suspended sentence. We affirm.
The following facts either were found by the trial court or relate the content of documents in the record. In 2016, the defendant reported to the police that a customer at work had exposed himself to her. This report was false, and, in 2017, she pleaded guilty to unsworn falsification and making a false report to law enforcement. For these offenses, the defendant received a 12-month correctional sentence, deferred for one year on the condition of good behavior, and then suspended for one year on the same terms. The deferred sentence became a suspended sentence in June 2018, which was set to expire in July 2019.
In April 2019, the defendant was arrested for theft by unauthorized taking. She was later convicted on this charge, and there is no dispute that her conviction violated the terms of her suspended sentence.
In June 2019, the State moved to impose the 12-month suspended sentence. At the November 4, 2019 hearing on the motion, the defendant claimed to be her brother's primary caretaker and argued that imposition of the 12-month suspended sentence would deprive him of necessary care. As a result, the trial court imposed only 10 days of the 12-month sentence. On November 26, 2019, the State moved to reconsider, arguing that the defendant had lied to the court about the extent of her brother's medical problems and her role caring for him.
The defendant subsequently filed a police report claiming that, on November 4, M.P., the daughter of her brother's girlfriend, had stolen from her. On December 11, 2019, the defendant called the Milford Police Department, posing as M.P., and asked whether there was a warrant for M.P.’s arrest. The defendant's call was forwarded to the Milford dispatch office.
The court held a hearing on the State's motion to reconsider on February 3, 2020. At that hearing, a Milford police officer testified that the police had investigated the defendant's claim that M.P. had stolen from her. When the officer was asked whether the police had charged M.P., he responded, He testified that the police had not yet apprehended M.P.
On February 7, 2020, the State filed a second motion to impose, asserting that the defendant committed identity fraud by "posing as another individual in an attempt to obtain confidential information." The court held a hearing on the second motion to impose on March 2, 2020. The State presented the testimony of: (1) the director of the Milford dispatch center; (2) a Milford police officer; and (3) a Milford police detective. The defendant submitted no evidence on her own behalf.
With respect to the confidentiality of pending arrest warrant information, the director of the dispatch center testified that Milford arrest warrants are not available to the general public. He testified that dispatch provides pending arrest warrant information over the telephone only to law enforcement, and not to anyone else. A person seeking such information about themselves must ask for it in person. He further testified that the dispatch center treats all arrest warrant information as confidential, even if a Right-to-Know Law request is made. The director explained that "[b]asically," all criminal record information "comes through the SPOTS terminal." "SPOTS" stands for New Hampshire's State Police Online Telecommunications System. The dispatch center's policy is that "under no circumstances shall any information obtained from SPOTS be given to anyone other than a law enforcement officer properly authorized by his or her department."
The police officer and police detective likewise testified that Milford arrest warrants are not available to the general public and are treated as confidential. They testified that, if a third party were to call the department and ask for information about a warrant for someone else's arrest, the department would not provide that information. The detective further testified that, in response to the defendant's December 11 call, he called M.P. at the number in the department's computer system. He left a message for her and she returned the call, denying that she had called previously to inquire about warrants.
In a March 26, 2020 narrative order, the trial court: (1) granted the State's motion to reconsider and vacated its earlier order imposing only 10 days of the suspended sentence; (2) found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant breached the good behavior condition of her suspended sentence, in part, by committing identity fraud; and (3) concluded that the defendant's breach warranted imposing "a reasonable portion of the suspended sentence," less credit for time served.
As to the confidentiality of pending warrant information, the court found that the "police witnesses credibly testified that the existence of unexecuted arrest warrants is confidential information about the person who is the subject of the arrest warrant." Specifically, the court found that there was "sufficient evidence about the [Milford police department's] regular business practice of obtaining and executing arrest warrants prior to the actual arrest and the filing of charges, that any unexecuted arrest warrant against [M.P.] would not have been revealed to a member of the general public over the phone." The court explained that although "[t]here was no evidence of a specific written statute, regulation or policy, ... issued and unexecuted arrest warrants ... are not available to the general public upon request."
To impose a suspended sentence on the ground that a defendant has violated a condition of good behavior, a trial court must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct. State v. Luikart, 174 N.H. 210, ––––, 261 A.3d 928, (2021) (slip op. at 5). We review a trial court's decision to impose a suspended sentence for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. State v. Gibbs, 157 N.H. 538, 540, 953 A.2d 439 (2008). To prevail on a challenge asserting that the trial court erred in finding a violation of a suspension condition, a defendant must show that the evidence before the trial court on a motion to impose, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, fails to support the trial court's finding. See Luikart, 174 N.H. at ––––, 261 A.3d 928 (slip op. at 3).
Here, the trial court found that, in addition to her conviction for unauthorized taking, which indisputably violated the condition of good behavior, the defendant committed identity fraud. Because the defendant was not convicted of identity fraud, the State had the burden to prove the essential elements of identity fraud by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at ––––, 261 A.3d 928 (slip op. at 5).
The variant of identity fraud at issue is RSA 638:26, I(d), under which a person is guilty of identity fraud if he or she "[p]oses as another person, without the express authorization of such person, with the purpose of obtaining confidential information about such person that is not available to the general public." RSA 638:26, I(d) (2016). For the purposes of this appeal, the defendant does not dispute that she posed as another person without that person's authorization. The only issue in dispute is whether she did so "with the purpose of obtaining confidential information about such person that is not available to the general public." Id.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she committed identity fraud because, she contends, "the existence of a pending arrest warrant [is] not ‘confidential’ within the meaning of the identity fraud statute." The defendant asserts that for information to be "confidential" under RSA 638:26, I(d), it must be "declared so by law." She reasons that because there is "[n]o statute or court rule" that "makes the existence of a pending warrant confidential," information about such warrants is not confidential as a matter of law.
Addressing this argument requires that we engage in statutory interpretation. The interpretation of a statute raises a question of law, which we review de novo. See State v. Pinault, 168 N.H. 28, 31, 120 A.3d 913 (2015). We construe provisions of the Criminal Code according to the fair import of their terms and to promote justice. Id. ; see RSA 625:3 (2016). We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Pinault, 168 N.H. at 31, 120 A.3d 913. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. Only when the statutory language is ambiguous do we look to the legislative history to aid in our interpretation. State v. Eldridge, 173 N.H. 61, 67, 237 A.3d 266 (2020).
Under...
To continue reading
Request your trial