State v. Williams

Decision Date04 August 1949
Docket Number30819.
Citation34 Wn.2d 367,209 P.2d 331
PartiesSTATE v. WILLIAMS.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Wayne LeRoy Williams was convicted of murder in the first degree and of assault in the first degree and he appeals.

Affirmed.

SIMPSON J., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Snohomish County Ralph C. Bell, judge.

Arnold R. Zempel, Everett, James Tynan, Everett, for appellant.

Philip Sheridan, C. P. Brownlee, Harold J. Hall, Everett, for respondent,

BEALS Justice.

The defendant, Wayne LeRoy Williams, was charged, by count I of the information, with the crime of murder in the first degree, and, by count II, with the crime of assault in the first degree. The counts read as follows:

'Count I, He, the said Wayne LeRoy Williams, in the County of Snohomish, State of Washington, on or about the 17th day of June, 1948, with a premeditated design to effect the death of Hallie Lucille Williams, a human being, did wilfully unlawfully and feloniously strike, beat, cut and wound one Hallie Lucille Williams, a human being, with rocks and boulders, with his hands and feet, and did kick and push the said Hallie Lucille Williams in such a manner as to cause the said Hallie Lucille Williams to fall from a cliff, thereby mortally wounding the said Hallie Lucille Williams, from which said mortal wounds the said Hallie Lucille Williams died in said county and state on or about the 17th day of June, 1948.
'Count II, He, the said Wayne LeRoy Williams, in the County of Snohomish, State of Washington, on or about the 17th day of June, 1948, with intent to kill one Bernice Williams, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did make an assault upon the said Bernice Williams with his hands, fists and feet and did strike, beat, cut and wound said Bernice Williams with rocks and boulders and did kick and push the said Bernice Williams in such a manner as to cause the said Bernice Williams to fall from a cliff and in a manner likely to produce the death of the said Bernice Williams, * * *'

The defendant was arraigned June 22, 1948, and, in open court, the information was served upon him by handing him a copy thereof. In response to a question by the court, the defendant stated that he was not represented by counsel and that, because of lack of money, he was unable to retain an attorney. The defendant, having been asked by the court whether he desired that the court appoint counsel, answered in the affirmative, whereupon the court appointed Arnold R. Zempel, Esquire, to represent defendant, and the cause was continued to June 25th following for further proceedings.

On the day last mentioned, the defendant was brought Before the court, his counsel being present, and entered a plea of not guilty to both counts of the information. Defendant's counsel, on behalf of his client, filed a written plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. By this plea, the defendant stated that he 'was insane or mentally irresponsible at the time of the commission of the crimes charged,' and, further, that he had become sane and mentally responsible 'between the time of commission of the said crimes and the time of trial herein.'

August 26th following, the defendant filed an amended plea of not guilty to the two counts charged by the information, also pleading that he was insane or mentally irresponsible at the time of the commission of the crimes charged, and

'(1) That said insanity and mental irresponsibility still exists.

'(2) That the defendant has not become sane or mentally responsible between the commission of said crimes set forth in Counts I and II of said Information and the time of trial.'

In support of his amended plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, defendant's counsel filed his own affidavit, stating that, August 26, 1948, 'a physician, specializing in psychiatry,' had made an examination of the defendant and reported his findings to the affiant, the physician stating his belief that the defendant was, at that date, not sane and not mentally responsible.

The case was called for trial September 20, 1948, both the state and the defendant announcing that they were ready for trial. The case was submitted to the jury September 24th and, the same day, the jury returned its verdict, finding the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree (as charged by count I of the information), and answering the question, 'Shall the defendant suffer the penalty of death,' in the affirmative. The jury also found the defendant guilty of assault in the first degree, as charged by count II of the information.

On the same day, the defendant moved for a new trial, upon the following grounds:

'(1) Misconduct of the jury.

'(2) Newly discovered evidence material for the defendant which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence and produced at the trial.

'(3) Accident and surprise.

'(4) Error of law occurring at the trial and excepted to by the defendant.

'(5) That the verdict is contrary to law and evidence.

'(6) Misconduct of counsel for the Prosecution.'

The defendant also made a motion for arrest of judgment, upon the ground 'That there has been no proof of certain elements of the crime for which the defendant has been tried.' Defendant's counsel requested that a hearing be held to determine the question of defendant's sanity, and that the judgment be suspended pending such hearing.

October 20, 1948, the defendant being present in court in the custody of the sheriff, and represented by his counsel, the court asked the defendant if he had any statement to make Before sentence was pronounced, to which the defendant replied that he was not guilty. Defendant's counsel then spoke on behalf of his client and renewed his motion for the appointment of a sanity commission and suspension of judgment, which motion the court denied, whereupon the defendant was called Before the bar of the court and was, by the court, sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, pursuant to the verdict of the jury upon count I of the information. As to count II of the information, the court ruled that sentence by stayed until a return of the execution of the death warrant be filed. Defendant's counsel then gave oral notice of appeal to this court.

October 22, 1948, a formal written judgment, embodying the sentence orally imposed as aforsaid, was signed by the judge and filed in the office of the clerk of the court.

The following day, defendant filed written notice of appeal to this court from the formal judgment and sentence.

In his brief, appellant makes the following assignments of error:

'(1) In denying the motion of the defense for an election as to which charge in the Information the State would proceed upon.

'(2) By denying the use of the appellant's conversations to show attitude or frame of mind, in urging the defense of insanity.

'(3) In denying the motion for the appointment of a Sanity Commission.

'(4) In putting the appellant on trial, when he was not of sufficient understanding to know the nature of the charge against him.

'(5) In denying the motion for new trial.

'(6) In denying the motion in arrest of judgment.'

Appellant assigns no error upon any instruction of the court, and assignment No. 2 refers only to matters occurring Before the jury during the trial. While evidence was introduced on behalf of appellant, he himself did not take the witness stand. From the evidence introduced, we make the following summary. Apparently, none of the statements made were denied by the appellant or by any witness who testified on his behalf.

Appellant is a native-born citizen of the United States, and, prior to June, 1948, was a resident of the state of Oklahoma. During the year 1941, he married Hallie Lucile Williams, four children having been born of the marriage.

June 12, 1948, appellant, with his family, arrived in the city of Seattle, where they took up quarters with appellant's sister, at 1050 north 36th street.

On the morning of June 17th, appellant, with his wife and four-year-old daughter, Mary Bernice, left the house by automobile, apparently to look for an apartment. After an absence of several hours, appellant returned to his sister's home alone, his clothing being smeared with blood. His sister notified the police, and several officers hurried to her home, where, after adequate investigation, they placed appellant under arrest. Asked where his wife and daughter were, appellant stated that they would not come back, and, when asked what he meant, replied that he had killed them with a rock and thrown them over a cliff.

Taken to a police substation, appellant was searched, his wife's wrist watch and rings being found in his pocket. Appellant then stated, in response to questions by the police officers, that he had killed his wife and daughter, relating events which had occurred since he left his sister's home in the morning. As it appeared possible that Mrs. Williams and her daughter might not be dead, appellant having stated that he had thrown them over a cliff, several police officers and deputy sheriffs, taking appellant with them, started on a search for the scene of the crime. The sheriff of Snohomish county was also represented. The party drove here and there, looking for the place where the offense had been committed, until about 9 o'clock p. m., when the search was abandoned because of darkness.

The following morning, the search was renewed, appellant then directing the officers to the place where he said he had thrown his wife and daughter over a cliff. The sheriff of Snohomish county, from the edge of the bluff, called to see if any one would answer him. Hearing a faint reply, the sheriff climbed down the cliff about sixty or seventy feet to a ledge, where he found the body of Mrs. Williams,...

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6 cases
  • State v. Ray
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • March 21, 1991
    ...State v. Negrin, 37 Wash.App. 516, 525, 681 P.2d 1287, review denied, 102 Wash.2d 1002 (1984). See also State v. Williams, 34 Wash.2d 367, 384, 386-87, 209 P.2d 331 (1949). The offer of proof allows the trial court to properly exercise its discretion when reviewing, "revaluating [sic ]", an......
  • State v. Lawrence
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • February 2, 2012
    ...In long-standing common parlance, this evaluation committee is known as a “sanity commission.” 1 E.g., State v. Williams, 34 Wash.2d 367, 371, 209 P.2d 331 (1949). By statute, the court may direct that the defendant's own “qualified expert or professional person” be allowed to witness the e......
  • State v. Collins
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • August 22, 1957
    ...entitled to submit such evidence as he wanted, provided only that it was relevant and competent to sustain his plea. State v. Williams, 1949, 34 Wash.2d 367, 209 P.2d 331; State v. Flanney, 1911, 61 Wash. 482, 488, 112 P. 630. The question before us, then, is whether by the rulings of the t......
  • State v. Odell
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • February 13, 1951
    ...it also tends to prove another offense.' 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence (11th ed.) 555, § 358. In the recent case of State v. Willims, 34 Wash.2d 367, 209 P.2d 331, 341, the defendant was charged with the crime of murder in the first degree. The defendant pleaded that he was insane or mental......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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