State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 31 December 1848
• Citation: 31 N.C. 140,9 Ired. 140
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: THE STATE v. JOHN P. WILLIAMS.

9 Ired. 140

31 N.C. 140

THE STATE

v.JOHN P. WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December Term, 1848.

An indictment will lie under our Statute for feloniously taking and carrying away a runaway slave, “with intent to dispose of him to another,” &c. even though the taker did not know who was the owner of the slave.

The possession of a stolen thing is evidence to some extent, against the possessor, of a taking by him. Ordinarily, it is stronger or weaker, in proportion to the period intervening between the stealing and the finding in possession of the accused; and, after the lapse of a considerable time, before a possession is shewn in the accused, the law does not infer his guilt, but leaves that question to the jury under a consideration of all the circumstances.

Where there were different counts in a bill of indictment, one charging a taking by the prisoner with violence, and another by seduction, and each of them also charging a conveying away, with the intents required by the Statute, the jury are not bound to find in which way the taking was had, but the verdict might be general, though there were other defective counts.

An indictment, in a case under our Statute, for the abduction of negroes, which charges that the defendant “by violence, feloniously took,” is as good as if it had averred that the defendant “feloniously by violence took,” &c.

In an indictment relating to the larceny or abduction of a slave, in describing him as the property of A. B., you may use indifferently the phrases, “then and there being the property or of the proper goods and chattels of A. B.,” &c., or and “the property of A. B.,” after laying the value, &c. of the slave.

In an indictment for stealing, &c. a slave, under our Statute, the words “with an intent to sell and dispose of the said slave” are sufficient.

The cases of Hall, 2 Hay. 105; Davis, 2 Law Rep. 291; Jernigan, N. C. Term Rep. 44; Roper, 3 Dev. 473; Hardin, 2 Dev. & Bat. 402; Sparrow, N. C. Term Rep. 93, and Harvey, 2 Dev. & Bat. 390, cited and approved.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Sampson County, at the Fall Term, 1848, his Honor Judge PEARSON presiding.

The prisoner was indicted in eleven counts. The first charged, that he, “a certain male slave named Jim, of the value of ten dollars, and the property of Wm. D. Cobb, felonionly did steal, take, and carry away, contrary to the form of the statute” &c. Another count charged that he “did by seduction, feloniously take and carry away, a certain male slave named Jim, of the value of ten dollars, and the property of William D. Cobb, with an intention to sell or dispose of said slave Jim to another, contrary to the form,” &c. Another count charged that he “did by violence feloniously take and carry away a certain male slave named Jim, of the value of ten dollars, and the property of William D. Cobb, with an intention to sell or dispose of said slave Jim to another, country,” &c. The other eight counts alleged a taking of the negro by violence, or by seduction, respectively, with an intent to sell, or to appropriate to the prisoner's own use, without charging a conveying away; or alleged a conveying away by violence or by seduction, respectively, with an intent to sell or to appropriate, without charging a taking.

On the trial there was evidence, that on the 3rd day of April, 1848, the slave ran away from the owner, Cobb, who lived in Wayne County, about nine miles from Goldsboro', where the prisoner lived, and there was a depot of the Wilmington rail road: that about ten o'clock on the 23rd of April, (as stated in the exception,) the prisoner took passage to Wilmington and entered one of the cars, and two negro men also entered another car, in which negroes were generally transported, and after going about two miles the prisoner paid his own fare and that of the two negroes to Wilmington, and they proceeded to that place in the train: that about 10 o'clock of the 23rd of April, just after the cars arrived from Goldsboro', the prisoner, who was then unknown to the collector of the Port, took passage on board a steamer, belonging to the line, to Charleston for himself and two negro men, and signed a manifest, describing them, in the name of “John Williamson:” that in due course the steamer would arrive at Charleston in time for a passenger to reach Hamburg on the rail road from Charleston to that place in the night of the 24th of April: and that on the 25th of April, 1848, the prisoner sold the negro Jim and another negro to one Trowbridge in Hamburg, the prisoner then calling himself ““John Smith:” and that in October following, suspecting that the negroes had been improperly carried away, Trowbridge brought them back to Wayne, and Cobb claimed Jim as his and he was identified by others.

The prisoner called several witnesses to establish an alibi, and their evidence was left to the jury on the point.

The counsel on the part of the State contended: that if the jury should believe that the slave was in the possession of the prisoner twenty days after he ranaway, then, in the absence of evidence to rebut it, the law raised a presumption, that the prisoner had stolen him or feloniously taken him by violence or seduction.

The counsel for the prisoner, on the other hand, insisted, that, as the slave had runaway, the owner had lost his possession; and, that, as lost property, he could not be stolen, especially if the prisoner did not know the owner: and there was no evidence that he did know the owner, or even that the negro was a slave.

The prisoner's counsel further insisted, that the prisoner's conveying away the slave from this State and selling him would not authorise his conviction, but that he must also have taken him feloniously; and that there was no evidence from which the jury could infer that the slave was stolen or was taken by violence or seduction by the prisoner from the possession of the owner; and, even admitting a runaway slave to be in the possession of the owner for the purposes of this indictment, yet that, for aught in the evidence, the slave might have been and probably was stolen or taken by some other person and delivered to the prisoner at Goldsboro': and that in such a case the prisoner could not be convicted, because the jury ought not to be allowed to guess how the fact was.

The Court instructed the jury, that to raise a presumption, that the possessor of stolen property had stolen it, the possession must be so recent after the theft, that the possessor could not have well come by it unless he had stolen it himself: and that, when the property was a negro man, who had runaway twenty days before the pessessor was first seen in possession, the time was too long for the Court to lay it down as a rule of law, that the possessor was to be presumed to have been the taker; and in such case it was to be passed on by the jury, as an open question of fact, upon the evidence.

The Court further instructed the jury, that, to justify a conviction of the prisoner, they must find both a taking of the slave by him from the owner and also a conveying away: for the two acts must concur in order to constitute the offence: that in this case the color of the negro raised a presumption to every one that he was a slave; and that stealing, or taking him by violence or seduction and conveying him away, with intent to sell or dispose of him, was a felony within the statute, though the negro was a runaway at the time and the prisoner did not know the owner: And that it was for the jury to determine upon the evidence, whether the prisoner did in fact steal or take the slave by violence or seduction and convey him with the intents charged: And that if the prisoner met with the slave while he was runaway and then took him by violence, or seduced him to go with him with the intent supposed, that would be a taking within the Act: And that, if the prisoner holding himself out as the owner or as the person having the charge of the negro, caused him to get into the cars and paid his fare and thereby enabled him to pass along the rail road, that would be a conveying within the Act, although the prisoner was in one car and the negro in another. And the Court further instructed the jury, in reference to the manner in which the prisoner might have come into possession of the slave, that, if the prisoner had an accomplice, who stole or took the negro and brought him to the prisoner, and the prisoner's part was then to convey him away and sell him, there would not be a stealing by the prisoner, nor a taking within the statute. But that if the prisoner got some agent to carry messages to the slave, as a go between, and in that manner seduced the slave to come to him at Goldsborough, and get into the cars, the agent or go-between not having taken possession or any control over the slave, then that would be a taking by theprisoner: And that it was for the jury to decide from all the evidence, whether the prisoner himself took the slave or seduced him by messages sent by an agent to come to him and then took him, or whether the slave was taken by another person and delivered to the prisoner: and that if they were not satisfied either as to the taking of the slave by the prisoner in the modes mentioned or the conveying away by him, with the intents charged, they ought to find the prisoner not guilty. But if the jury should find such taking and conveying by the prisoner, inasmuch as there were counts in the...