State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 27 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1 CA-CR 21-0592 |
| Parties | STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. TIFFANY SOLANO WILLIAMS, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Not for Publication – Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR 2020-114989-001 The Honorable Dewain D. Fox, Judge
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson By Karen Moody Counsel for Appellee.
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Damon A. Rossi Counsel for Appellant.
Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Paul J McMurdie joined.
¶1 Tiffany Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, both class 3 dangerous felonies and domestic violence offenses. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, -1204, -704. The jury also found four aggravating circumstances applied for sentencing enhancement purposes. See A.R.S. § 13-701. Williams was sentenced to a presumptive term of 7.5 years for both counts, to run concurrently. Williams appeals the superior court's sentencing order, and for the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND[1]
¶2 In the spring of 2020, Williams, her three daughters, and her boyfriend were visiting her half-sister (female victim) and half-brother (male victim), who also occasionally stayed in the female victim's apartment. The family stayed with female victim for about a week before they moved to a hotel. One of Williams' daughters stayed with the female victim rather than move to the hotel with her mother.
¶3 When Williams returned to pick up her daughter, she began to argue with the female victim, who asked Williams to leave. Williams refused, and ultimately both victims pushed Williams out of the apartment. A physical altercation ensued, and Williams' boyfriend joined in the fray, attacking the male victim while Williams began wrestling on the ground with the female victim. A neighbor overheard the fight, came outside, and separated the women.
¶4 As the men continued fighting, Williams approached the two with a knife, stabbing the male victim in his abdomen. He fell to the ground, at which time Williams turned her attention back to the female victim, swinging and waving the knife in her face. At some point, Williams changed course, returning to the prone male victim and stabbed him three more times. Williams fled to her car, parked in the apartment complex's parking lot.
¶5 When officers arrived, they found Williams inside her car in the parking lot. In a subsequent search of Williams' vehicle, officers found a pair of scissors and a sheath containing two knives. The items were tested for biological matter, but they did not contain any of the male victim's blood or DNA. Officers also searched the area in and around the apartment but recovered no other weapons. The weapon used to stab the victim was never found.
¶6 The State charged Williams with two counts of aggravated assault, both class 3 dangerous felonies and domestic violence offenses. A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, -1204, -704. For count 1, the State alleged that Williams used a knife, deadly weapon, or dangerous instrument and caused physical injury to the male victim. For count 2, the State alleged that Williams used a knife, deadly weapon, or dangerous instrument and placed the female victim in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury. The State also filed an allegation of aggravating circumstances, alleging the following:
¶7 After a seven-day trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The jury also found four aggravating circumstances were established for count 1: (1) the offense involved infliction or threat of serious physical injury, (2) the offense involved a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, (3) the offense caused physical, emotional, or financial harm to the male victim, and (4) the offense was committed in the presence of a child, and the victim is related to the defendant by blood. As to count 2, the jury found the first 3 circumstances proven but found that 4 was not proven.
¶8 At the sentencing hearing, the superior court weighed the four aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors that Williams suffered a traumatic childhood and experienced mental-health issues. In doing, so the court explained that it "will give significant weight to the offense causing physical[,] financial[,] or emotional harm to the victim[s], and that the offense[s] involved the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury." The court also explained that it would not "give much weight at all to the offense involved in the use, threatened use or possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument during the commission of the crime, because this is already designated as a dangerous offense [and] the sentencing range already takes that into account." The court found that the mitigating factors did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances and sentenced Williams to a presumptive term of 7.5 years on both counts to run concurrently. Williams timely appealed.
¶9 Williams argues that the superior court erred by considering the offenses involved the use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon. The superior court may consider whether the "[u]se, threatened use or possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument during the commission of the crime" and impose an aggravated sentence accordingly. A.R.S. § 13-701(C), (D)(2). But the court may not consider the (D)(2) aggravating circumstance if the use, threatened use, or possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument "is an essential element of the offense of conviction or has been utilized to enhance the range of punishment under § 13-704." A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(2). Section 13-704(A) provides an enhanced sentencing range for a felony conviction "that is a dangerous offense." A dangerous offense is "an offense involving the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury on another person." A.R.S. § 13-105(13).
¶10 Williams argues that the superior court's error in considering the (D)(2) aggravating circumstance was fundamental because the court used an impermissible factor in sentencing. Williams asserts that the proper standard of review is harmless error. But, Williams did not object to the State's allegation of aggravating circumstances under A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(2) at any point before or during the trial. Thus, we review for fundamental error. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 (2005). The defendant has the burden to show that fundamental error exists and that the error was prejudicial. Id. at ¶ 20. "A defendant establishes fundamental error by showing that (1) the error went to the foundation of the case, (2) the error took from the defendant a right essential to his defense, or (3) the error was so egregious that [s]he could not possibly have received a fair trial." State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018). Whether an error is prejudicial is fact specific and dependent on "the nature of the error." Id. at 144, ¶ 29. We agree that the court's failure to dismiss the (D)(2) aggravating circumstance constitutes fundamental error. See A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(2).
¶11 The State argues that even if the court impermissibly considered the (D)(2) aggravating circumstance, Williams cannot show resulting prejudice. The State cites State v. Munninger for the proposition that speculation about a lower sentence is not enough to show prejudice. 213 Ariz. 393, 397, ¶ 14 (App. 2006). In Munninger, the court considered a prohibited aggravating circumstance and sentenced the defendant to an aggravated and enhanced sentence. Id. at 395, ¶ 1. The defendant speculated that his sentence may have been different had the court not considered the prohibited circumstance. Id. at 397, ¶ 14. The court rejected this argument, finding that the defendant did not meet his burden to show prejudice because no evidence supported the proposition that the sentence may have been lighter. Id. The State contends the court did not consider the (D)(2) circumstance during sentencing because the court gave the circumstance "little weight" given that A.R.S. § 13-704 accounted for the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.
¶12 Williams argues that she suffered prejudice because the record shows that the superior court could have imposed a lesser sentence, absent consideration of the aggravating circumstance. Indeed, a case must be remanded "[w]hen it is unclear whether the judge would have imposed the same sentences absent the inappropriate factor." State v Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 509, ¶ 24 (App. 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted). But here, the jury found four aggravating factors applied to count 1 and three aggravating factors applied to count 2. The record shows that the court relied heavily on aggravating circumstances other than the (D)(2) circumstance, especially given the (D)(2) aggravating circumstance was already addressed under the sentencing enhancement. More importantly, the court sentenced Williams to a...
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