State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 01 April 1908
• Citation: 61 S.E. 61,146 N.C. 618
• Parties: STATE v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

61 S.E. 61

146 N.C. 618

STATE v. WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

April 1, 1908

Clark C.J., and Hoke, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Burke County; Peebles, Judge.

Laws 1907, p. 1147, c. 806, prohibiting any person from carrying into B. county, in any one day, more than one-half gallon of spirituous, vinous, or malt liquor, except for delivery to a druggist for medical purposes, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, was unconstitutional, as unduly restricting the right of the citizen to the use of such liquor without any intent to sell same or violate any prohibited act in relation thereto; the carrying into the county of the prohibited quantity having no reasonable substantial relation to the sale of liquors as prohibited by law.

The defendant was called to plead to the following bill of indictment: "The jurors for the state, upon their oaths present: That Jake Williams, late of the county of Burke, on the 10th day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seven, with force and arms, at and in the county aforesaid, did unlawfully and willfully have and bring into said county of Burke, on one certain day, more than one-half gallon, to wit, one gallon of spirituous, vinous and malt liquors, the same not being then and there brought by the said Jake Williams to a druggist for medical purposes nor for delivery at the State Hospital, nor the School for the Deaf, nor Broad Oaks Sanitarium, nor to Grace Hospital, in said county, for medical purposes, against the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state." Defendant moved to quash. Motion allowed. The solicitor for the state appealed.

The Attorney General, for the State.

CONNOR J.

By chapter 24, p. 57, Pub. Laws 1907, the Legislature enacted a statute declaring that it shall be unlawful for any person to "manufacture, sell or otherwise dispose of for gain" spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors in the county of Burke. The act contains the usual exceptions in regard to sales by druggists. It is also provided that neither the manufacture of domestic wines "nor the sale of such wines at the place of manufacture in quantities not less than one gallon" are prohibited. The place of delivery of any liquors brought into the county is declared to be deemed the place of sale. Common carriers are prohibited from bringing liquors into the county, etc. The statute is amended by chapter 806, p. 1147, Laws 1907, by adding at the end of section 1 the following: "It shall be further unlawful for any person, except to a druggist for medical purposes, as aforesaid, to bring into said county of Burke, in any one day, more than one-half gallon of such spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, and every person so offending shall, upon conviction be fined, or imprisoned in the discretion of the court." The motion to quash the bill of indictment involves the proposition that chapter 806 is an unwarranted interference with defendant's property and of his liberty. That it is violative of the Constitution, which declares that "among the inalienable rights of all men are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness," of which they cannot be deprived but "by the law of the land." That the Constitution is "the law of the land," in the sense that no act of either department of the government which violates its provisions or exceeds its powers can be enforced to deprive the citizen of his life, liberty, or property, is a fundamental truth. To deny it is to assert that constitutional government is a failure, and liberty, regulated by law, has no abiding place in our political system. The Constitution is of necessity, as well as the declared will of the people, the supreme law, and in no proper legal sense, can any act of either department of the government which violates its provisions or exceeds the powers delegated be the law. To state the same proposition affirmatively: An act of the Legislature which finds no support in the Constitution or is not an exercise of the power conferred therein imposes no duty, deprives the citizen of no right, and subjects him to no penalty. This is a "first principle," the recognition of which is essential to the preservation of liberty. "If the Constitution prescribed one rule and the law another and a different rule, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the Constitution, and not the law, governs the case before them for judgment." Curtis, J., in Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U. S.) 628, 15 L.Ed. 691. "An unconstitutional law is void and is as no law. An offense created by it is not a crime. A conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment." Bradley, J., in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 376, 25 L.Ed. 717. "The limitations imposed by our constitutional law upon the action of the governments, both state and national, are essential to the preservation of public and private rights, notwithstanding the representative character of our political institutions." Matthews, J., in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 556, 4 S.Ct. 121, 28 L.Ed. 232. "An unconstitutional act is not a law. It binds no one, and protects no one." Field, J., in Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 101, 7 S.Ct. 471, 30 L.Ed. 588. "No court is bound to enforce, nor is any one legally bound to obey, an act of Congress inconsistent with the Constitution. In this country the will of the people, as expressed in the fundamental law, must be the will of the courts and Legislatures." Harlan, J., in Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 297, 17 S.Ct. 335, 41 L.Ed. 715. "Whatever the people, framing their organic act, have declared to be the limits of legislative power, and the modes in which that power shall be exercised, must always be recognized by the "courts, state and national, as obligatory." Brewer, J., in Stearns v. Minn., 179 U.S. 241, 21 S.Ct. 80, 45 L.Ed. 162.

It is the right of the citizen, when called to the bar of the court, to appeal to the Constitution and demand that the court declare whether the statute which he is charged with violating be "the law of the land." To make this right of any value or protection to the citizen it must be the duty of the court to declare its judgment thereon. To deny this is to keep the promise to the ear and break it to the hope-to make of none effect the declaration that "ours is a government of law, and not of men." "It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of a government outside of the supreme law of the land finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violations of the principles of the Constitution." Harlan, J., in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 382, 21 S.Ct. 823, 45 L.Ed. 1088. Judge Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 U. S. 399, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), referring to the omnipotence of the British Parliament and its unrestricted power, from which they had suffered so much, and against which they waged successful war, said: "In order, therefore, to guard against so great an evil it has been the policy of the American states, which have individually framed their state Constitutions since the Revolution, and of the people of the United States, when they framed the federal Constitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative powers and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If any act of Congress or of the Legislature of the state violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void." "It is axiomatic that the judicial department of the government is charged with the solemn duty of enforcing the Constitution, and therefore, in cases properly presented, of determining whether a given manifestation of authority has exceeded the Constitution as against any legislation conflicting therewith has become now an accepted fact in the judicial life of this nation."

The people in the exercise of their political sovereignty established the government, delegated to it certain enumerated powers, assigned to it appropriate functions established departments, and assigned to them appropriate powers and duties, imposed such limitations as experience had taught to be necessary for the preservation of liberty and, to the end that their government should not by construction, implication, or otherwise deprive them of unenumerated, but "inalienable, rights," declared: "This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people and all powers not herein delegated remain with the people." Article 1, § 37. This court in Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787), after most careful consideration, "and with great deliberation and firmness," unanimously declared that no act which the Legislature could pass could, by any means, repeal or alter the Constitution. However much we may desire to sustain the acts of the Legislature as a co-ordinate department of the government, we may not, without being recreant to the duty imposed upon us and the rights of the citizen, refuse to decide firmly and fearlessly the issue which he makes with the government. In the discharge of the duty, and the exercise of the power, to pass upon the validity of the statute, we are admonished by the uniform decisions of the courts that we should "approach the question with great caution, examine it in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation and patient attention can throw any new light upon the subject, and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity of the act are placed, in our judgment, beyond reasonable doubt." Shaw, C.J., in Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 95, 26 Am. Dec. 631; ...